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ABSTRACT 
The transformation of local government in South Africa has established a 
complex model of multiple principals exercising municipal budget oversight on 
municipal managers.  However, earlier research has not sufficiently focused on 
the phenomenon of the multiplicity of principals and its wider institutional 
architecture, relationship dynamics and effects in order to understand the 
institutional constellations of oversight principals, their behaviour and their 
interactions on the municipal budget process.   Particularly, an empirical 
exploration focusing on understanding the experiences and perceptions of 
municipal managers and oversight principals on oversight through the multiple 
principal model remains elusive.  
 
The aim of this study was to explore and describe the experiences and 
perceptions of municipal managers, municipal councillors and the Provincial 
Treasury on the multiple oversight principals’ model, its manifestations, dynamics 
and effects on municipal budget oversight. The study utilised principal-agent 
theory to develop a conceptual and theoretical framework, and utilised the 
interpretive qualitative case study of the Western Cape to guide the research 
process.  A sample of respondents consisting five (5) municipal managers, one 
(1) Provincial Treasury representative and ten (10) municipal councillors from 
municipalities in the Western Cape were interviewed for the study. The 
transcribed data from the 16 interviews were analysed, using a qualitative 
analysis method.  
    
The study findings reaffirmed the existence of multiple principals bequeathed 
with authority to exercise of municipal budget oversight in the Western Cape 
Province.  Strong evidence emerged that application of the multiple principal 
model manifests independent, conflicting and fragmented budget oversight 
relationships and behaviour between the Provincial Treasury and municipal 
councillors during different stages of the municipal budget process.  While the 
study acknowledges that the model and its application generates both positive 
and negative effects resulting in too complex, onerous and conflict-prone 
oversight relationships, it also highlighted  these effects as necessary intrinsic 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
xv 
 
attributes that do not necessarily have to manifest adverse consequences on the 
municipal budget oversight. 
  
These findings contradict the common-sense advocates for a collective model 
that emphasises coordination to improve cohesiveness among oversight 
principals, especially between the Provincial Treasury and the municipal 
councillors.  The findings confirm that the Municipal Finance Management Act 
has consciously established a responsive system that distributes oversight 
among autonomous political structures in order to comprehensively eclipse the 
discretion of the municipal manager with varied and complementary oversight 
expertise, energy and diversity.   
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter outlines the background against which the study is undertaken, as 
well as the context for the research problem.  It also describes the research aim, 
questions and objectives emanating from the shortcomings of the current 
research and literature.  In addition, this chapter presents the significance of the 
study and its intended contribution within the articulated scope and limitations. A 
brief overview of the research methodology utilised by the study is explained.  
This chapter concludes with an overview of the structure of the thesis.   
 
1.2 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE STUDY  
Accountability for municipal finances is widely regarded as a critical requirement 
for the consolidation of municipalities into democratic developmental, viable and 
sustainable government structures. Thus, the new system of municipal 
governance establishes processes and mechanisms geared towards 
accountable management of municipal finances (Ababio, 2007; Munzhedzi, 
2016).  These processes and mechanisms are institutionalised through various 
laws, policies and regulations to promote accountability, fiscal discipline and 
effective stewardship in the management of municipal finances.   
 
Undoubtedly, municipal financial accountability constitutes one of the central 
concerns of the post-1994 order for South Africa’s 257 municipalities.  Several 
scholars have alluded to municipal financial accountability as fundamental to the 
existence and effective functioning of municipalities.  Dalton-Brits and Van 
Niekerk (2016: 118) highlight municipal financial accountability as an essential 
requirement for promoting “effective service delivery”.  Khalo (2013) suggests 
that municipal financial accountability improves performance, safeguards against 
unethical practices and mismanagement of resources and abuse of power, as 
well as improves integrity and trust in local government. Similarly, Laubscher 
(2012: 63) suggests that “municipal financial accountability and control are of 
utmost importance when it comes to determining the success or failure of local 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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government in South Africa”. Therefore, the need to ensure that the municipal 
administration accounts for the use of municipal finance is considered essential 
for the system of democratic municipal governance.  
 
However, and despite the widely-articulated benefits for municipal financial 
accountability, it is documented extensively that many of South Africa’s 
municipalities fail to effectively manage and account for their finances.  Govender 
and Reddy (2012) articulate this failure, stating that “there is ample evidence 
showing deleterious collection of failures that are attributed to among other 
things, poor financial management and accountability”.  This failure is also 
captured in municipal audit reports dating as far back as 2000 which have 
consistently shown the lack of effective municipal financial accountability in the 
majority of municipalities in South Africa.  
 
The lack of effective municipal financial accountability in South Africa is regarded 
as one of the root causes of municipalities’ inability to fulfill their constitutional 
mandate.  The Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) 
Ministry (COGTA 2014: 6) found that due to persistent failure to ensure effective 
financial accountability “of all South African municipalities only 7% of 
municipalities were fully functional, 30% were doing reasonably well, 32% were 
almost dysfunctional and 31% were totally dysfunctional”.  Concurring, the 
Auditor-General (2017) maintains that the prevalence of lack of effective financial 
accountability is one of the root causes of the disastrous state of most of South 
Africa's municipalities.  In the same way, Govender and Reddy (2012); Mantzaris 
and Pillay (2014); Van der Waldt (2015); Pillay (2016); and Sidanda (2017) 
highlight the lack of effective municipal financial accountability as contributing 
towards municipalities slipping into distress, with many of them becoming 
dysfunctional and technically bankrupt.   
 
Astonishingly, this gloomy state of municipal financial accountability has 
persisted despite the existence of a comprehensive municipal budget oversight 
architecture (Khalo, 2013; Mantzaris, 2014).  This architecture, which is a 
creation of the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (hereafter referred 
to as the MFMA), establishes a model that involves multiple structures for 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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exercising municipal budget oversight. Ababio (2007); Steytler and De Visser 
(2009); KhaIo (2013); Ajam and Fourie (2014); Mathenjwa (2014a); Ncube and 
Tullock (2017) and Hanabe, Taylor and Mclean (2017) list municipal councils, 
provincial public accounts committees, oversight committees and the Auditor-
General, Provincial and National Treasury departments, National and Provincial 
Local Government departments, as structures empowered by the MFMA to 
exercise oversight on the municipal budget.  
 
Notably, the MFMA creates a model of municipal budget oversight that involves 
multiple structures, which consist of the political structures from the municipal, 
provincial and national governments.  Fundamentally, the model of municipal 
budget oversight by multiple structures institutionalises a quantitative stacking of 
political structures to exercise individual budget oversight on the municipal 
manager.  Thus, a multiplicity of structures has become the defining feature of 
the model and practice of municipal budget oversight in South Africa (Ababio, 
2007; Mathenjwa, 2014a; Ncube and Tullock, 2017). Equally intrinsic in the 
model is that these multiple principals are endowed with concurrent legislative 
authority to oversee the behaviour of municipal managers during drafting, 
approval, implementation, and auditing of the municipal budget (National 
Treasury, 2011; Van der Waldt, 2015).  
 
The concurrency of the oversight authority has resulted in multiple structures 
individually institutionalising different budget oversight measures, which they 
variously deploy and enforce on the municipal manager during the budget 
process.  According to Ababio (2007: 5), the institutionalisation of the budget 
oversight authority has resulted in different oversight structures utilising different 
“legislative instruments, such as hearings through the institutions of provincial 
and municipal public accounts committees, audit and oversight committee, the 
municipal council and of course, whistle-blowers and the public”.      
 
Though the model of municipal budget by multiple oversight structures has 
gained significant traction and widespread veneration as an innovation for 
promoting municipal fiscal accountability, it has also become the focus of a 
persistent debate regarding its appropriateness, practicality and effectiveness.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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This raging debate is polarised between the proponents and critics of the 
municipal budget oversight by multiply structures.  The debate has become 
progressively sharper given the persistent incidents of high financial 
accountability failures of many municipalities.   
 
Those not averse to the model of municipal budget oversight by multiple 
structures, generally highlight its ability to harness the intergovernmental 
capacity in order to address municipal financial accountability challenges.    
Authors such as Ababio (2007) and Van der Waldt (2015) describe the 
proliferation of budget oversight structures as one of the fundamental aspects of 
the transformation of municipal finance as well as appropriate to responding to 
the complexities of the system of municipal fiscal governance in South Africa.  
Similarly, Makhado, Masehela, Mamogale and Motimele (2012) state that this 
model represents a significant milestone in the modernisation of municipal 
financial management and accountability. 
  
The National Treasury (2011), as the custodian of public finances in the country, 
highlights the multiplicity of budget oversight structures as a significant novelty 
for promoting appropriate municipal financial accountability.  In addition to 
addressing the deficiencies of internal control systems of municipalities that tend 
to be grossly flawed, the spreading of oversight roles and responsibilities across 
the multiple structures is often deemed necessary to ensure 360-degree vision 
buttressed by the vigilance and expertise of more than a single political oversight 
structure (Ababio, 2007; National Treasury, 2011).  Therefore, those in support 
of municipal budget oversight by multiple principal model perceive it as a 
necessary complement for the intergovernmental issues and dynamics shaping 
the municipal budget. 
      
On the contrary, those critical to the multiple oversight structure perceive it as 
inherently too complex, fragmenting, duplicating, and overlapping the oversight 
efforts.  Cameron (2014: 84) argues that though the MFMA and its regulations 
regarding oversight are “well-intended, the implications of a design that involves 
intergovernmental structures have proved to be problematic in practice”.  
Likewise, Mathenjwa (2014a) finds that the model that consists of many players 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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with conflated and conflicting responsibilities tend to be complex and destructive 
due to potential overlaps and competing oversight measures and approaches.    
The multiplicity of oversight structures has implications to the municipal 
managers.   Ababio (2007: 3) refers to the multiple structures and their numerous 
oversight measures as “bloodhounds that smell and bite harder”, while 
paralysing municipal officials.  Equally, Fourie, Opperman and Scott (2007) 
regard the model of municipal budget oversight by multiple structures as 
subjecting municipal managers to excessive and burdensome oversight 
environment.  Likewise, Steytler (2008: 5) describes this type of oversight 
arrangements that produces a plethora of legal structures and measures, 
resulting in a compliance environment that induce “over-regulation that leads to 
greater lawlessness rather than securing the desired accountability outcomes”.   
Therefore, Steytler (2008) argues that such arrangements are costly and 
inevitably result in the strangulation of the municipal administration.   
 
The above views are consistent with the findings of an assessment on the State 
of Local Government in South Africa which found that the multiplicity of oversight 
structures has led to “functional overreach and complexity that has forced many 
municipalities into distress mode” (COGTA, 2009: 3).  Similarly, a review 
conducted by the Department of Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation, found that 
the challenges facing local government include “complex reporting demands that 
have weakened the institutional ability of many municipalities” (2014: 10).   
 
At the heart of the criticism for the multiplicity of oversight structures is the 
intergovernmental nature of the model.  This is because the intergovernmental 
relationship between the national, provincial and local government in South 
Africa has remained is still developing, not hermetically sealed – and thus, 
fraught with challenges.  Evidence suggests that intergovernmental relations and 
political climate has proved to be potentially combustive and conflict-prone 
(Cameron, 2010). Fuo (2017: 327) states that the intergovernmental supervision 
relationship between municipalities and other spheres of government is “often 
misconceived, doubted and contested”.  Therefore, the municipal budget 
oversight model that effectuated through multijurisdictional supervision 
relationship is likely to encounter problems (Mathenjwa, 2014a).   
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 1.3 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM  
While the formal existence and legitimacy of the municipal budget oversight 
model is not in contention, there is, however, a problem of inadequate knowledge 
of the nature, issues, dynamics, and complexities related to the interrelationships 
among the multiple principals involved.  This lack of knowledge of municipal 
budget oversight by multiple principals can in the main be attributed to earlier 
research that did not sufficiently focus on the phenomenon of the multiplicity of 
principals. Evidently, topics such as mechanisms for municipal budget oversight, 
the role of public accounts committees in municipal finance and budget oversight 
have received some attention in research and literature (Botes, 2011) Khalo, 
2013; Dalton-Brits and Van Niekerk, 2016).  However, few scholars have written 
about the involvement of multiple jurisdictions in municipal budget oversight 
(Ababio, 2007; Mathenjwa, 2014).  Consequently, the phenomenon of municipal 
budget oversight by multiple principals, its wider institutional architecture, 
relationships, dynamics and effects have largely remained unexplored, 
empirically speaking.  
   
Notably, the polarised debates and contestation on the multiplicity of municipal 
budget oversight principals is mainly based on common-sense views.   In this 
regard, the support or criticism of the multiple-principal model for municipal 
budget oversight is informed mainly by self-evident truth and assumptions that 
are not based on solid empirical and theoretical foundations.  Consequently, 
there is a tendency in the literature to overgeneralise across all provinces and to 
neglect provincial variations and politically mediated processes in how municipal 
budget oversight occurs.  Accordingly, this often leads to an assumption that 
despite being variously located in different spheres of government, there is a 
mutually constitutive behaviour and approach among the municipal budget 
oversight principals. 
 
Therefore, there is a general lack of understanding of the issues, dynamics, and 
complexities existing among the budget oversight actors.  In addition, there is a 
lack of understanding the impact of simultaneous and parallel relationships and 
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interactivity emanating among the oversight principals.  As I will show later in a 
more extensive literature review, there is a clear research gap and a deficit of 
literature on the perspectives of municipal managers and the oversight principals 
on the multiple-principal model and the practice of municipal budget oversight.  
    
Glaringly, the available literature does not adequately illuminate and describe the 
critical peculiarities and complexities of the multiple-principal model phenomenon 
as it relates to municipal managers, Provincial Treasury and municipal 
councillors when exercising budget oversight on the municipal budget process. 
Evidently, the institutional constellation of municipal budget oversight principals 
and their interactions in a specific province requires empirical investigation.  
Thus, an exploratory study investigating the meaning, interplay, tensions and 
effects emanating from the multiplicity of municipal budget oversight principals is 
justified.     In particular, there is a glaring need to focus an empirical investigation 
on how municipal managers and political principals as key municipal budget 
oversight actors experience and perceive the multiple-principal model, its 
manifestations, dynamics and effects of municipal budget oversight by multiple 
principals.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The central aim of the study is to understand the experiences and perceptions of 
key budget actors of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.   This 
central aim is guided by the following research questions: 
1. How do municipal managers in the Western Cape Province 
understand and perceive the multiple-principal model, its 
application and effects on the municipal budget process?  
2. What do municipal councillors and Provincial Treasury in the 
Western Cape experience and perceive as manifestations and 
dynamics of oversight by multiple principals during the municipal 
budget process?   
3. What do Provincial Treasury and municipal councillors’ identify as 
the positive and negative effects of municipal budget oversight by 
multiple principals in the Western Cape?    
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The three research questions above were structured to guide and focus the 
process of developing an in-depth and critical understanding of the nature, 
practice, and effects of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  
Likewise, the research questions were used to unearth what the municipal 
budget oversight themselves perceive as the manifestations and dynamics of the 
model of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  
    
Finally, exploring the experiences and perceptions of municipal managers, 
Provincial Treasury and municipal councillors on the effects of multiple principals 
on municipal budget oversight provides clarity on their possible impact on the 
multiple-principal model and the principals’ constitutive behaviour on the 
municipal budget oversight.  Together, these three aspects may provide a 
comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the phenomenon being studied.  
The exploration and description of the effects was thought to be relevant to 
enable the surfacing of descriptions that support and or oppose the model and 
practice of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.   
 
1.5 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this study is to contribute towards developing a deeper understanding 
of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  The following objectives will 
guide the study:    
 To review the literature on the concept of oversight by multiple principals 
and to develop a rigorous conceptual and theoretical framework for 
understanding issues around budget oversight.   
 To conduct an analytical legislative review with the aim of exploring the 
assumptions behind the relevant legislative provisions that establish and 
facilitate the multiple principals for municipal budget oversight in South 
Africa.  
 To describe the governance context and peculiarities that influence 
municipal budget oversight in the Western Cape Province.     
 Conduct interviews to shed light on how municipal managers and 
oversight principals in selected municipalities in the Western Cape 
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experience and perceive the multiple-principal model, its manifestations, 
dynamics and effects when exercising municipal budget oversight on the 
municipal budget process.  
 To identify areas of further research on municipal budget oversight by 
multiple principals.  
   
The experiences and perceptions of the municipal managers, Provincial 
Treasury, and municipal councillors do not occur in a political vacuum – hence 
the study will explore the peculiarities of the Western Cape.  This means that 
particular views of what the Provincial Treasury, individual municipal managers, 
and municipal councillors know and think have to be considered since this will 
illuminate salient aspects that could contribute toward a better understanding of 
the municipal budget oversight by multiple principals. 
 
It is, however, worth noting that the experiences and perceptions of the municipal 
managers and oversight principals may not necessarily be truthful and not reflect 
objective reality.  This is because the subjectivity can take on an objective reality 
of its own.  The social constructionist theory has long held that reality is not simply 
external (Berger and Luckmann, 1991).  As Black and Street (2014) infer, the 
exploration of perceptions in a research project assists in developing insights into 
a complex phenomenon.  In this regard, these perceptions serve as a starting 
point to understand better the subjective opinions, beliefs, and attitudes of the 
municipal managers and principals involved regarding the municipal budget 
oversight by multiple principals.   
 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY   
The institutional integrity of municipalities in South Africa has attracted sustained 
negative focus 1995. In particular, the failure to ensure effective budget oversight 
has received sustained media and academic attention.  Reports of high 
prevalence of corruption, financial maladministration incidents and widespread 
regulatory compliance failures, have become a common feature in newspapers 
as well as academic reports (Laubscher, 2012; Oberholzer, 2012).   
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In terms of the above, there are clear reasons for South Africa to be concerned 
about the state of municipal financial management and accountability.  However, 
future attempts to initiate new ways of exercising municipal budget oversight 
must be based on the understanding of the current theories and experiences.  
Any investigation of the current model and its manifestations on the municipal 
budget oversight has the potential to be highly significant. It is, therefore, within 
this context of a lack of effective municipal budget oversight that this study 
investigates the nature, dynamics and effect of the multiple principals on the 
municipal budget oversight.   
 
This study contributes to the understanding of municipal budget oversight by 
multiple principals in the following ways.  Firstly, this study provides a conceptual 
and theoretical description of the municipal budget oversight processes by 
multiple principals.   Secondly, the study makes an empirical contribution by 
establishing greater understanding and advanced knowledge on the 
phenomenon of multiple-principal model.  The National Treasury (2011: 19) 
underscores the need for such an understanding as a  
“…necessary prerequisite in clarify the roles and responsibilities of 
national and provincial departments and of other stakeholders in 
order to strengthen systems to monitor local government 
compliance, finances and performance”.  
  
Thirdly, given that oversight structures are constantly reforming and 
strengthening the municipal budget oversight and accountability framework, this 
study is timely and relevant.  Fourthly, the findings of the study will contribute 
towards understanding how the Western Cape Province and municipalities are 
handling the complex relationships and interactions between the stakeholders 
involved in municipal budget oversight.  Quite fundamentally, the study will 
highlight how the stakeholders in the Western Cape experience, deal with the 
conflation of municipal autonomy and provincial supervision in the exercise of 
municipal budget oversight.  
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Fifthly, the study will contribute towards answering questions such as the one 
asked by the Western Cape Minster of Finance, Dr Ivan Meyer, during the 
welcoming address of the Conference on the “Development of the National Anti-
Corruption Strategy” on 26 April 2018, where he inquired:    
“Why is it that, despite a Constitution with a comprehensive 
fundamental framework for creating good governance and promoting 
ethics and integrity in the public service, and despite many laws that 
regulate public financial management and procurement, that 
criminalises corruption and that establishes multiple institutions to 
fight corruption, it however still thrives?” 
 
 
1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
The study focused on the Western Cape Province, and is confined to the 
municipal managers, Provincial Treasury and municipal councillors as key 
structures involved in the municipal budget oversight in the Western Cape.  The 
study did not include the Western Cape provincial department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs due to the focus of the study being on the 
budget.   
     
The legislative framework for municipal budget oversight was used to anchor the 
study.  This is because the system of municipal budget oversight is stringently 
prescribed by various legislation.  Thus, any investigation that ignores the 
legislative and policy instruments governing the municipal budget oversight is 
likely to be significantly defective.  However, this study does not attempt to 
provide an extensive legal analysis of the municipal budget oversight by multiple 
principals.  Equally, the study does not focus directly on the political issues and 
activities that could be relevant to municipal budget oversight.  I am mindful of 
the fact that the political dynamics are important and have an impact on the 
relationship between the municipal manager and the budget oversight principals, 
however, it is not the focus of this study.  
 
It was also not the focus of this study to do a comparison of different models of 
oversight (single oversight principal or the collective oversight principals).  
Similarly, the study does not attempt to evaluate the quality and the effectiveness 
of the model and its oversight mechanisms.  While the study intends to highlight 
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the positive and negative effects of municipal budget oversight by multiple 
principals, it is not the focus of study to recommend a detailed plan for the 
possible mitigation of the negative effects.  Therefore, it is not the objective of 
this study to offer any recommendation on how to improve the municipal budget 
oversight.   
   
1.8 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The study utilised an interpretive and a qualitative design to explore and describe 
the experiences and perceptions of municipal managers and oversight principals 
on the multiple-principal model, the principals’ constitutive behaviour and effects 
on the municipal budget process.  In addition, the study employed an exploratory 
qualitative case study in order to assist in exploring a contemporary 
phenomenon, which is inseparable from the context in which it exists (Yin, 2003).  
Furthermore, the ability of an exploratory qualitative research approach to 
engender deep insight of municipal budget oversight actors made it suitable for 
this study.   
 
Thus, the utilisation of exploratory and interpretative qualitative approach along 
with triangulation of evidence enabled me to investigate the participants' 
understanding of the world and their lived experiences.  It allowed participants to 
reflect and express their beliefs, opinions, and attitudes regarding the multiple-
principal model, the principals’ constitutive behaviour and effects.  Significantly, 
the qualitative research paradigm, strategy, and approach facilitate the elevation 
of the complexity of multiple-principal model, the principals’ constitutive 
behaviour and effects on the oversight of the municipal budget process.  
  
This exploratory qualitative case study draws mainly from semi-structured 
interviews with municipal managers and oversight principals from municipalities 
in the Western Cape.  The participants were not identified on the statistical and 
representative basis, but primarily due to their experience and knowledge on the 
topic of the study.  Accordingly, I considered both the municipal managers, 
municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury unit responsible for municipal 
budgets as having specialised and valuable information on the phenomenon 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
13 
 
being investigated.  As Luborsky and Rubinstein (1995) cautioned, if the research 
is not conducting a comparative study, it is often unjustifiable to include 
participants who do not have experience of the phenomenon being investigated. 
In this regard, a purposive sampling of participants was used to enable an 
appropriate selection participants that ensure the quality of the research process.    
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS   
The thesis has nine chapters.    
Chapter One of this thesis provides the background for the study.  It introduces 
the context and rationale for exploring the perceptions of municipal managers on 
municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  In addition, the chapter 
presents the research problem, research questions and the significance of the 
study.  The scope of the study is also explained.  
  
Chapter Two presents the conceptual and theoretical framework for the study.  
This chapter uses a theoretical framework as a normative anchor, which will be 
used to explore and explain the relationship between the multiplicity of the 
principal and single agent in government.  
 
This is followed by Chapter Three, which provides a review of the literature on 
municipal budget oversight by multiple principals in South Africa.  The chapter 
will highlight the legislative framework and assumptions governing the model of 
principals exercising municipal budget oversight in South Africa.   
 
Chapter Four discusses the research paradigm, design, and methodology used 
in conducting data collection.  This chapter also presents the processes followed 
to conduct data analysis, and outlines the process undertaken to ensure and 
comply with the ethical consideration.   
 
Chapter Five provides an overview of the Western Cape Province.  The 
governance context and peculiarities of the Western Cape are discussed with the 
aim of highlighting the provincial structures and processes shaping the municipal 
budget oversight in the Western Cape.   
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Chapter Six presents the results of interviews conducted with municipal 
managers.  The main themes emerging from data analysis are reported.  The 
experiences and perceptions of the municipal manager on the multiple-principal 
model, the principals’ behaviour and effects on municipal budget process are 
presented.   
 
Chapter Seven focuses on the results of interviews conducted with the Provincial 
Treasury and the municipal councillors.  This chapter presents the experiences 
and perceptions of municipal budget oversight principals on the multiple-principal 
model, its manifestations, dynamics and effects during the municipal budget 
process.   
 
Chapter Eight presents an integrated discussion on the experiences and 
perceptions of the municipal managers and oversight principals.  The thesis 
concludes with Chapter Nine which provides a summary and discussion of the 
research findings; and concludes by exploring study limitations as well as 
possible areas for future research.    
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CHAPTER 2:  REVIEW OF CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK OF OVERSIGHT 
 
2.1   INTRODUCTION  
The aim of this chapter is to critically review the literature on oversight in order to 
identify an appropriate conceptual and theoretical framework for the study.  This 
chapter consists of five sections. The first section reviews the literature on the 
concept of oversight and distinguishes it from that of accountability.  This section 
also provides insight into the concept of oversight in contemporary governance.  
While the debates around the definition of oversight are important, it is not the 
objective of this study to veer into an extensive explanation for the diverse 
conceptual and theoretical complexities of the meaning of oversight.  Rather, this 
section focuses on developing an appropriate conceptual framework of oversight 
for use in this thesis.   
  
The second section identifies the theoretical frameworks for understanding 
oversight.  The third section describes the key features of the theory and how 
oversight relationships manifest. The fourth section provides an understanding 
of how a multiple-principal model is constructed, as well as its advantages and 
disadvantages.  And the fifth and final section outlines the limits of the principal-
agent theory.   
 
 2.2 CONCEPT OF OVERSIGHT  
A logical starting point for an exploration of the concept of oversight is to establish 
how it is embedded in different theories of governance, and to distinguish it from 
a related term, accountability.  This is necessary because the terms are 
commonly confused or erroneously used interchangeably (Newell and Bellour, 
2002:2).  Thus, failure to distinguish between oversight and accountability has 
the potential to affect the reliability and analytical cogency of a study under 
review.  
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The commonly-accepted concept and the meaning of accountability underscore 
the obligation of someone to explain him/herself to somebody or some structure.  
This meaning of accountability is evident in Bovens’ (2007) definition, which 
refers to accountability as an institutionalised relationship for account-giving. This 
definition highlights an obligation to account, to answer and justify conduct 
(Bovens, 2007).  Thus, a key distinguishing feature of accountability is that 
information flows from the account-giver to its respective authority. 
 
Oversight, on the other hand, is a concept that focuses on the behaviour of the 
overseer in its quest to watch over the overseen (Lane, 2007).  It explains what 
overseers do in order to secure the responsiveness of the account-giver 
(Gailmard, 2010).  Therefore, oversight is primarily about demanding and 
enforcing account-giving.  Pelizzo, Kinyondo, Umar (2015: 5) articulate the 
difference between accountability and oversight as follows: 
“While the process through which the overseer oversees the 
overseen is called oversight, the converse process through which the 
overseen body accounts for its choices, actions, and decisions 
generates what is defined as accountability.”   
 
 
Notwithstanding the conceptual differences between oversight and 
accountability, there is considerable complementarity between them.  Arguably, 
oversight is an essential requirement to ensure the efficacy of accountability.  
Thus, Prado and Carson (2014) suggest that effective accountability is largely 
dependent on effective oversight. If oversight is flawed or weak, then 
accountability will be significantly deficient (Santiso, 2015).  This means that 
efforts to achieve accountability must also harness and enhance oversight. 
   
2.2.1 DEFINITION OF OVERSIGHT 
Different authors variously define oversight.  Authors such as Rockman (1984); 
Larsen (1997); and Oleszek (2010) have observed that oversight has diverse 
meanings and interpretations. The diversity of the definitions of oversight is 
usually ascribed to it being variously appropriated by many authors from diverse 
disciplines adopting theoretical approaches. In addition, definitions spanning 
different fields such as politics, public administration, finance, management, and 
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law (Larsen, 1997) have subjected oversight to multiple usages (Rockman, 
1984).   
 
A survey of definitions of oversight in the context of governance, both public and 
private, reveals references to oversight as supervision; monitoring; watchfulness; 
and surveillance (Oleszek 2010; Pelizzo, et al, 2015).  Other definitions portray 
oversight as limiting and constraining discretion and ensuring compliance with 
rules (Steenhuisen, 2009; Lemos, 2010). For example, political scientists 
commonly prefix oversight with either legislative or parliamentary oversight, 
thereby emphasising oversight as a purview of elected public representatives 
(Schick, 2002; Bala and Deering, 2013).  
  
In the South African context, there is an inclination to define oversight as 
legislative oversight.  Senay and Besdziek (1999: 3) define oversight within the 
South Africa context as “the proactive interactions initiated by a legislature to 
enforce compliance with the constitutional mandates and legal obligations”.  
Likewise, Van der Waldt’s (2015) definition of oversight emphasises the watchful 
and structured scrutiny exercised by elected public representatives in monitoring 
the implementation of policy, utilisation of resources, and the general compliance 
with regulations.  
 
2.2.2 OVERSIGHT IN CONTEMPORARY GOVERNANCE  
A literature survey shows that an inquiry on the topic on oversight of the 
bureaucracy has been an enduring historical concern of public administration.  
Particularly, oversight of the bureaucracy has for a long time remained a subject 
of academic inquiry and public commentary.  Public policy literature is replete 
with chronicles of politics-administrative dichotomy.  Brennan (2015: 16) states 
that the conflictual relationship between “political authority and administrative 
professional discretion has been the centrepiece of public administration”.  
  
This is evident in “Governing in the Absence of Angels”, an article in which 
Johnson (2003: 1) quotes James Madison (Federalist Paper, 1787, No. 51) 
stating that:   
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“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels 
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary. In framing a government, which is 
to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
you must first enable the government to control the governed, and in 
the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people 
is, no doubt, the primary control of government; but experience has 
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” 
 
 
The above statement indicates that the need to oversee government, and in 
particular, it’s appointed officials, has always been a concern of public 
administration.  It shows that the necessity for “rituals of verification” of the 
actions of the bureaucracy has always been a “syndrome of a distrusting society” 
(Power, 1997: 29).  Similarly, Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981) describe 
the inevitable tension between the elected politicians and the appointed 
government officials as having been a constant theme of public administration 
studies and a subject of considerable debate throughout history.   
 
Progressively, the notion of oversight has developed into a distinct and widely-
recognised governance and management concept.  Furthermore, oversight has 
attained global prominence as part of the efforts to make governments and their 
bureaucracies accountable.    Thus, oversight has gradually come to be regarded 
as having equal status as planning, monitoring, and evaluation (Grigorescu, 
2010).  As a system that ensures political oversight of the bureaucracy, oversight 
has particularly become a concept that is intrinsic to a system of good 
governance and is widely heralded as a way of addressing the ever-present veil 
of suspicion of government officials (Steenhuisen, 2009).  According to 
Grigorescu (2010), the proliferation of processes such as audits, protection of 
whistleblowers and financial reporting, attests to the increasing significance and 
relevance of oversight in contemporary governance.   
  
Most fundamentally, oversight has also received constitutional recognition in 
some countries, which could be interpreted as an explicit acknowledgement of 
the value of oversight.  In the context of South Africa, oversight is a constitutional 
imperative.  Van der Waldt (2015) states that oversight is one of the essential 
elements of South Africa’s constitutional democracy, which enables the 
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systematic monitoring of the executive and appointed government officials.  As 
Fessha (2008) indicates, legislatures in South Africa are vested with explicit 
constitutional authority to oversee the administration in order to detect arbitrary 
behaviour or unconstitutional conduct. 
 
2.3 OVERSIGHT APPROACHES AND MECHANISMS  
Oversight is pursued to influence the behaviour of the appointed government 
officials.   It provides politicians with the authority and opportunity to exercise 
“preventive and corrective review measures” on the specific policy or programme 
of government (Larsen, 1997: 4).  In this regard, oversight ensures that the 
politicians, individually or collectively, control the behaviour of officials in the 
performance of specific policy objectives.  Police-patrol and fire-alarm are 
approaches used by political structures to exercise oversight over the 
bureaucracy.      
 
2.3.2 POLICE PATROL OVERSIGHT APPROACH   
The police patrol oversight approach describes the behaviour and activities that 
entail active monitoring of the behaviour of officials (Bala and Deering; 2013) 
Shelton, 2013).  Nolan (2010: 22) states that the police patrol oversight approach 
“resembles policemen on the beat patrolling in a systematic, proactive, regular 
way”.  Therefore, the police-patrol oversight approach is often used in situations 
where there is a trust deficit between the legislature and appointed government 
officials.   According to Bala and Deering (2013), the legislature uses the police 
patrol method to exercise direct surveillance to detect, remedy and discourage 
violations by officials. 
 
2.3.2 FIRE-ALARM OVERSIGHT APPROACH   
Fire-alarm oversight approach, on the other hand, is described as remote 
observation from the legislature Bala and Deering (2013).  Fire-alarm oversight 
approaches are utilised in an instance where the legislature relies on more 
indirect measures of oversight, rather than on visible and direct measures. Fire-
alarm oversight approaches can be understood as being exercised through 
arms-length rules and procedures.  They are also regarded as episodic, problem-
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focused, less intrusive but more reactive, often responding or triggered by 
something or somebody.  This is only evident when the legislature reacts (Bala 
and Deering (2013). These approaches require related oversight mechanisms to 
induce a compliant behaviour from the officials.  James and Alley (2002) identify 
ex-ante oversight, concurrent (or on-going) oversight and ex-post oversight as 
mechanisms used by legislatures to exercise oversight on the officials.   
 
Ex-ante oversight mechanisms are defined as beforehand, forward-looking or 
prior scrutiny mechanisms, which include laws, policies, regulations, resolutions 
and contract as some of the ex-ante mechanisms used to set out the ex-ante 
parameters for officials (Hill and Jones, 1992).  These mechanisms enable 
political structures to influence the policy processes before granting 
authorisation. Specifically, ex-ante oversight mechanisms ensure the approval of 
proposals by political structures to constrain the behaviour of officials during the 
implementation (Busuioc, 2007).  It prescribes and orders the future behaviour 
of the executive and government administration. Therefore, ex-ante oversight 
mechanisms can simply be regarded as a systematic way of defining the scope 
determined before- hand within which an official can operate and make 
decisions. 
 
Political structures utilise the ex-ante scrutiny to insert measures in policy and 
programme proposals from the executive and administrative structures.  Busuioc 
(2007: 11) states that ex-ante oversight mechanisms create a “zone of discretion 
for the official”.  As a result, these measures are useful for predetermining the 
future behaviour of the officials. Behn (2001: 7) underscores this assertion by 
stating:  
“If you want to exercise oversight, you have to be able to specify what 
you expect officials to do and not do and how to do what is required. 
Failure to specify the terms of the bargain with some clarity at the 
beginning almost inevitably leads to trouble.”  
 
 
In this regard, through ex-ante approval, political structures are able to prescribe 
binding procedural rules of the bureaucracy to  assist in defining the object of 
policy and setting requirements for administrative behaviour.  Accordingly, the 
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legislature utilises the ex-ante mechanisms to manipulate and construct a narrow 
path to which the officials must adhere.  Therefore, ex-ante oversight 
mechanisms provide an effective way of minimising utility loss, as well as 
providing some kind of a warranty that specifies the future behaviour of the 
officials (Hill and Jones, 1992).   
     
Concurrent or on-going oversight mechanisms are referred to as those 
conducted after the approval to ensure that the officials adhere to its directives 
during implementation (Santiso, 2005).  Political structures utilise on-going 
monitoring for continuous observation, investigation, analyses of reports with a 
view to immediately control the behaviour and performance of the officials 
(Santiso, 2005).  Therefore, these mechanisms enable political structures to 
have relevant information on the execution of the approved decisions.    In this 
regard, concurrent oversight allows the political structures to limit information 
asymmetry and to track the implementation activities in order to activate 
timeously corrective measures when there are deviations   
 
Ex-post oversight mechanisms are mainly reviews conducted after the fact or at 
the end of the programme implementation.  The most common forms of ex-post 
oversight include reviews and financial audits reports, conducted in order to 
ascertain the outcome of a process or product to determine its success or failure.  
According to Johnston (2009) ex-post oversight enables retrospective 
interrogation of how policies and programmes have been implemented as well 
as the direct outcomes and impact.  Therefore, ex-post measures provide the 
political structures with relevant information to enable them to assess how and 
to what extent the official adhered to its legislative directives.   
  
2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Having outlined the conceptual definitions, approaches and mechanisms of 
oversight in the above sections, this section presents the theoretical framework 
for the study.  According to Nilsen (2015: 1), a theoretical framework is critical in 
enabling the researcher to interact with the phenomenon, and aids the process 
of analysis and discussion of the findings of the study.  Scholars in political 
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science and public administration regularly confront the challenge of identifying 
an appropriate theory to explain the political-bureaucratic oversight and 
accountability relationship.  A theoretical framework is required to guide the 
analysis of the relationship between the municipal budget oversight actors and 
highlight the factors that are likely to support or act as impediments in the 
municipal budget oversight environment. Authors such as Van Slyke (2006) and 
Schillemans (2013) have identified stewardship and principal-agent theories to 
understand oversight.  
 
2.4.1 STEWARDSHIP THEORY  
Stewardship theory describes a relationship between the management and 
leadership in an organisation.  Donaldson and Davis (1991) present stewardship 
as a relationship between the principal and the manager.  Within this relationship, 
the principal, as the ultimate authority, delegates tasks and responsibilities to the 
manager as the steward (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  Fundamentally, the 
stewardship theory presents the manager’s behaviour as aligned to its leadership 
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997).  Therefore, stewardship theory 
explains a relationship between a principal and the manager that is based on a 
contract characterised by moral commitment, mutual benefit and common goal 
(Caldwell, Bischoff, & Karri, 2002).   
 
Stewardship theory outlines a contractual relationship in which the manager 
aligns its behaviour in congruence with the principals and the ideals of the 
organisation (Davis et al, 1997).   In particular, stewardship theory describes a 
manager’s behaviour as promoting common good and “pro-organisational and 
collectivistic and has higher utility than individualistic self-serving behaviour” 
(Davis et al., 1997, 24).  Most importantly, in a stewardship theory, a manager 
and its leaders share a common agenda therefore, the principal trust the steward 
and is willing take risks on how he/she manages the resources of the 
organisation.   
 
However, there is doubt regarding the appropriateness of the use of stewardship 
theory in describing the oversight relationship involving municipal managers and 
political structures in the municipal budget process in South Africa.   As indicated 
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in Chapter One of this study, there is a perennial problem of lack of municipal 
financial accountability in municipalities.  Regular reports indicate high levels of 
irregular, wasteful and unauthorised spending in municipalities, thus, indicating 
that municipal managers have different objectives to those their principals.  In 
this regard, there is heightened lack of trust and, accordingly, political structures 
deploy a considerable amount of time and resources to conduct surveillance and 
sanctioning municipal managers for deviation and other non-compliant 
behaviour.  Thus, stewardship theory does not appropriately explain the 
oversight and accountability relationship between municipal managers and the 
political principals.  
 
2.4.2 PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
The principal-agent theory (PAT) is widely regarded as the foremost theoretical 
framework for explaining the regulatory, political and bureaucratic relationships 
between the official and the elected political principals (Gailmard, 2010).  Several 
authors recognise and attest to the applicability and usefulness of the principal-
agent theory in studying political oversight (Moe, 1984; Lane, 2007; Yuen, 2013).  
In addition, many authors argue that the principal-agent theory has become the 
leading theoretical and analytical device in accountability and oversight studies, 
particularly in public administration (Schillemans and Busuioc, 2014).   
 
In its simplest or basic conception, the principal-agent theory (also known as 
agency theory) is defined as “the relationship between two or more parties, in 
which one party, designated as the principal, engages another party, the agent, 
to perform some task on behalf of the principal” (Moe, 1984: 757).  The principal-
agent theory derives from the rational choice theory, which assumes that actors 
always behave in a manner that elevates their self-interests (Andersson, 2016).  
In this regard, rational choice theory portrays agents as “rationally choosing 
alternatives that satisfy their own desires and beliefs better than any other 
alternatives presented” (Andersson, 2016: 15).   
 
 
An agency relationship presupposes some form of a relationship between the 
consenting principal and its agent in order for the agent to perform certain 
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functions and duties for which the agent is incentivised by the principal 
(Eisenhardt, 1998).  A political-bureaucratic relationship is often embodied in a 
contract, mandate or some form of legal directives.  Sobol (2015) identifies the 
contract as a prerequisite to the institutional design of the principal-agent 
relationship between the political authority and the bureaucracy.  Thus, the 
contract has emerged in the literature as one of the fundamental aspects of the 
principal-agent theory.  In fact, the significance of the contract in the agency 
relationship resulted in it being referred to as a “contractual relationship” (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976: 306).  
   
A contract facilitates an official and binding delegation between the principal and 
the agent.  Shelton (2013) defines delegation as an expression of the functional 
arrangement between a principal and the agent.  Therefore, delegation is a 
fundamental feature inherent in the principal-agent relationship (Hawkins, Lake, 
Nielson and Tierney, 2006).  The emphasis on the binding nature of delegation 
is intended to distinguish it from a mere hortatory arrangement or informal 
relationship.  
  
Authors such as McCubbins (2000); and Huber and Shipan (2011) describe 
delegation in government as necessary and express doubt that modern 
government structures can function effectively without delegation.  In fact, 
McCubbins (2000: 304) unequivocally state that, “no modern democratic 
government depends exclusively on elected public representatives”.  This means 
that delegation from the political authority to the appointed officials is an essential 
process for the functioning of government.  This is because, delegation in an 
agency relationship grants and empowers the agent with the necessary 
discretion to act independently without undue interference from the intrusive 
principal (Stanbury, 2003).  
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2.4.3 THE STRUCTURING OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP 
In most governance contexts, the delegation between the principal and the agent 
is structured to respond to organisational objectives, dynamics and challenges. 
Waterman and Meier (1998) identify three ways in which delegation and its 
resultant models are structured: single-principal and single-agent model; 
collective principals and single-agent model; and multiple principals and single-
agent model (Waterman and Meier, 1998). These models of delegation are 
discussed below.   
  
2.4.3.1 SINGLE-PRINCIPAL AND SINGLE-AGENT MODEL  
The most basic and simplest model of delegation takes place between the single 
principal and the single agent (Shelton, 2013).  Ong (2006) describes this model 
as when the legislature delegates to the single agent.  In government, this model 
establishes and confines the agency relationship between the legislature and a 
single specific agent.  As a result, the agent receives instructions from a single 
principal.    
 
2.4.3.2 COLLECTIVE-PRINCIPALS AND SINGLE-AGENT MODEL 
While the basic delegation relationship involves one principal with a single agent, 
there are organisational designs whereby the agent receives delegations from 
more than one principals acting as a collective.  Nielson and Tierney (2003); and 
Ong (2006) describe this model of delegation as the collective principals. In a 
collective-principals model, the agent receives delegations from a group of 
principals that work collectively in concert and in a coordinated manner with the 
single agent (Moe, 1984).   
 
2.4.3.3 MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS AND SINGLE-AGENT MODEL 
In terms of the above, the collective-principals model involves more than one 
principal.  Similarly, the multiple principal model consists of more than one 
principal, but according to Nielson and Tierney (2003) these two models must 
not be confused as they have an important difference.  Unlike the collective-
principals model, which entails a cooperative relationship among principals, the 
multiple-principal model, on the other hand, consists of principals that are 
independent of one another, each having a discrete and separate relationship 
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with the same agent (Nielson and Tierney, 2003).  Ong (2006: 186) describes 
multiple principals as follows:      
“Firstly, given that each principal has his/her own distinct goals and 
preferences, the nature of the delegation relationship with the agent 
is different from that with another principal.  Secondly, each principal 
can negotiate a different delegation arrangement with the agent 
independently and without consultation with the other principals.”    
 
 
Importantly, the multiple-principal model is certainly not an anomaly.  According 
to Shapiro (2005: 278), it is “only rarely that the agent has the luxury of aligning 
its interests with a single principal”.  Commonly, the multiple-principal model of 
delegation is a prevalent institutional architecture of many governments 
(Dehousse, 2008).  In this regard, the multiple-principal model of delegation has 
become a critical form of political delegation that is fundamental to effective 
governance.     
 
2.4.4 DELEGATION AS CATALYST FOR OVERSIGHT  
Delegation to the agent establishes an oversight relationship that allows the 
principal to conscript the behaviour of the agent.  Busuioc (2007: 12) refers to 
delegation as “a zone of discretion conceptualised as the sum of delegated 
powers granted by the principal to the agent, minus the sum of oversight 
instruments, available for use by the principals”. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the duty to exercise oversight is a structural corollary of a delegation of 
discretionary powers, which bequeaths the principal with the authority and the 
obligation to ensure that the agent adheres to the terms of the delegation.   
  
Fundamentally, the principals’ obligation and responsibility to constrain the 
behaviour of the agent is essentially about addressing the agency problem.  
Armour, Hansmann, and Kraakman (2009) define the agency problem as: 
“[A]n incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to 
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise 
confuse.  It is self-interest seeking with guile, which includes but is 
scarcely limited to more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing, and 
cheating.”  
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Such information asymmetry requires the principal to exercise oversight (Lane, 
2000). In fact, much of the literature explains the principal-agent (PA) relationship 
as essentially, about how the principal minimises the agency problem emanating 
from information asymmetry and goal conflict (Moe 1984; Waterman and Meier, 
1998; Lane, 2007). Gailmard (2010) defines information asymmetry as a 
situation where the agent has more information than the principal does.   
Understandably, information is critical in oversight and without its availability, it 
is doubtful whether the political principal will be able to exercise meaningful 
control over and influence on the agent.  According to Morgan (1997), the 
principals rely on the relevant, reliable and accurate information to exercise 
meaningful oversight on the agent.  Thus, the principal needs information from 
the agent in order to ensure that the perennial problem of information asymmetry 
between the principal and the agent is minimised.  
 
In addition, the agent’s self-interested, utility maximising and opportunistic 
behaviour requires the principal to guard its delegation by being vigilant.   
(Stiglitz, 2004).  Thus, oversight serves as a way of reigning in the discretionary 
power of the agent. Kim (2011) also finds that oversight addresses the perennial 
issue of a deviant agent by imposing and reinforcing a duty of loyalty from a 
straying agent.  This was long realised by Weber as cited by Huber and Shipan 
(2002): 
“[T]he power position of the government administration is always 
over-towering.  The political master finds himself in the position of a 
dilettante who stands opposite the expert, facing the trained official 
who stands within the management of administration.” 
 
A thorough examination of the above quote shows that delegation is a significant 
feature of the oversight relationship.  Both the agent and the principal need power 
to function effectively.  It is for this reason that power is often referred to as a 
conundrum because as the agent needs the power to execute the principal’s 
mandate, so does that principal need to ensure that the agent exercises that 
power responsibly (Stanbury, 2003).  
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2.4.5 DIFFERENT OVERSIGHT MODELS  
It is clear that the institutional design of delegation requires a corresponding 
institutional architecture to underpin oversight.  Hill and Jones (1992) describe 
the institutional architecture as consisting of oversight models that include a 
single principal model, collective-principals model and multiple-principal model. 
These models for oversight are discussed below.  
       
2.4.4.1 SINGLE PRINCIPAL MODEL 
Oversight in a single principal model describes the agency relationship that 
involves one principal and an agent (Biber, 2009).  Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 
(2004) describe a single political principal structure as that which usually involves 
the legislature as the only principal exercising oversight.  In this model, the 
delegation and oversight is straightforward, in the sense that the agent is directed 
and accounts to a single principal.  
However, such a simple principal-agent dyadic relationship has become 
significantly limited.  According to Biber (2009), such a simple principal-agent 
relationship is rarely reflective of reality in even the simplest sector or 
organisation.  Moe (1987) also add that the though one principal and one agent 
relationship is simple and convenient, it is grossly unrealistic considering the 
complexity of the government.  
 
2.4.4.2 COLLECTIVE-PRINCIPALS MODEL 
As indicated earlier, the collective-principals model has more than one 
cooperating principal.  Freeman and Rossi (2012) perceive the collective 
principals as consisting of principals with concurrent assignments.  According to 
Freeman and Rossi (2012), the fundamental feature of the collective-principals 
model is consensus among principals.  Thus, the principals agree on the 
objectives, methods and other measures through which to exercise oversight on 
the agent.  It can therefore, be argued that complementarity, collaboration and 
synergy of oversight objectives and strategies are high in the collective-principals 
model. 
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2.4.4.3 MULTIPLE-PRINCIPAL MODEL (MPM) 
MPM like collective principals involves a number of oversight principals.  The 
difference is that MPM involves institutional layering of principals without 
eliminating existing ones (Prado, et al 2015).   Hooghe and Marks (2003: 10) 
describe the MPM as “multi- or poly-centred, something akin to a marble cake” 
in which the activities and decisions of a single entity are structured in such a 
way that each has its own independent life and existence.  In terms of this 
illustration, the MPM formalises the sovereignty of decision-making among the 
principals.  Therefore, oversight by MPM entails independent and non-
cooperating principals which “compete with each other by designing independent 
oversight mechanisms” which they individually employ against the agent 
(Yamashita, 2010: 79).   
 
While the notion of a multiplicity of principals highlights the element of 
concurrency as a key characteristic of how oversight principals perform 
oversight, it also represents a reconfiguration of the basic PAT to MPM. Gailmard 
(2010) asserts that the PAT is capable of the necessary flexibility to 
accommodate variations in institutional arrangements. Likewise, Lane (2007: 
621) asserts that the PAT “is flexible and adaptable to studying the arrays of 
political relationships. This reconfiguration becomes necessary to accommodate 
the obtaining institutional reality and enables proper analyses of the complex 
institutional dynamics inherent in multilevel or multijurisdictional engagements 
(Benz, 20007).  
    
In particular, the emerging system of multi-level or polycentric governance 
system has elevated the MPM (Dehousse, 2008).   In this regard, the practice of 
oversight by multiple principals is no longer an anomaly but an institutional reality 
of the architecture of modern governance.  Notably, most studies now recognise 
that bureaucratic actions are influenced by multiple institutions that often 
compete with one another for the role of principal.  However, the utilisation of the 
MPM must be carefully considered in order to avoid the “risk of stretching the 
PAT further and reaching a point where the core of the principal-agent framework 
becomes indistinct and elusive, with the consequence of the analytical leverage 
being lost” (Maggetti and Papadopoulos, 2016: 7).   
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2.5 KEY FEATURES OF OVERSIGHT BY MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS  
The key features of oversight by multiple principals include independence, 
heterogeneity, competition, complexity and redundancy (Martimort, 1999; 
Linstead and Thanem, 2007; Raynard, 2016).  These features are discussed 
below.    
 
2.5.1 INDEPENDENT PRINCIPALS 
The co-existence of independent principals defines the institutional interactions 
of principals within the MPM.  Martimort (1999) refers to oversight by multiple 
principals as involving multiple principals utilising independent measures and 
processes to monitor the behaviour of the common agent.  Consequently, 
independence in terms of oversight action and behaviour is the cornerstone of 
the MPM.   
 
2.5.2 HETEROGENEITY 
Heterogeneity of oversight means different and alternative ways of exercising 
oversight are used.  It promotes and elevates conscious divergence and contrast 
between and among the oversight principals.  Linstead and Thanem (2007) 
suggest that heterogeneity disrupts the relative stability and unicity model of 
oversight.  Accordingly, “heterogeneity of actions” are critical in how the 
principals behave towards their common agent (Prado, Carson and Correa, 
2015: 128).   
 
2.5.3 COMPETING OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS 
In a more complex environment involving multiple principals, the exercise of 
oversight is non-cooperative and competitive.  According to Martimort (1999), 
political oversight model involving multiple principals promotes competition 
among them.  Political scientists such as Moe (1994); and Martimort (1996) 
support the independence of oversight as a way of promoting competition among 
them.  This can be considered to promote commitment and the ability to address 
oversight deficit among the oversight principals. The coexistence of fragmented 
and overlapping oversight authority between the principals is in itself a 
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competition-inducing space. But even so, it does not mean that competition in 
oversight is bad. 
 
2.5.4 COMPLEXITY 
Institutional arrangements consisting of heterogeneous and competitive 
oversight principals are likely to be complex.  Raynard (2016) defines complexity 
as an organisational arrangement in which the same function is undertaken by 
non-hierarchical, non-cooperating multiple structures with divergent and 
overlapping values and objective.  Therefore, complexity is inevitable in an 
arrangement that structures different oversight principals with divergent oversight 
goals and processes.   
  
According to Raynard (2016), jurisdictional overlap occurs when the prescriptive 
decisions target the same jurisdictional space and behaviour.  Consequently, 
overlaps produce and possibly create competition among the oversight 
principals.  It is important to note that the resultant overlaps and possible 
competition should not necessarily be construed as negative outcomes.         
 
2.5.5 REDUNDANCY 
In the context of oversight, particularly oversight by multiple principals, the term 
redundancy means having several oversight principals that “work simultaneously 
but are capable of carrying the load by themselves if required” (Downer, 2009: 
4).  This means that the MPM can facilitate a multiplicity of different oversight 
approaches and measures in order to respond to the behavioural mutation of the 
agent.  
 
It is conceivable that single or collective oversight principals can experience 
failure.  However, multiple principals fragment oversight between independent 
oversight principals, in order to prevent total oversight system failure.  Thus, 
redundancy serves as a feature, which facilitates the reliability within the complex 
system of the MPM.   Beck (1992) refers to redundancy as a foundation stone at 
the heart of the permutations to respond effectively to complex oversight.  
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2. 6 ADVANTAGES OF THE MPM 
Oversight by multiple principals holds great advantages and has comparatively 
more benefits than a single principal (McGovern, 2009).  The sheer number of 
the oversight principals will undoubtedly have a positive effect on the behaviour 
of the administrative agent.  As Ehrhardt (2009: 631) remarks, “in much the same 
way as the grain of sands irritates an oyster into producing a pearl, multiple 
principals create an irritation that stimulates a response from the agent”.  
Therefore, the multiplicity of oversight principals has the potential to produce 
what Ivanova and Roy (2007: 1) refer to as “productive overlaps”.  The productive 
overlaps as occasioned by the diversity and plurality of oversight principals and 
their respective measures galvanise and harness the relative expertise and 
commitments of the principals. These insights crucially inform this PhD. 
    
The multiplicity of oversight principals can also create alternative oversight 
opportunities.  Prado et al (2015: 129) shows that these alternatives oversight 
measures have the potential to contribute towards the change in the behaviour 
of some principals.  The effectiveness of one or some principals can infect or 
expose the other principal.   Similarly, principals can learn and copy the 
behaviour and attitude of those principals that are effective in their oversight roles 
and responsibilities.  
        
Oversight by multiple principals is generally regarded as an effective way of 
preventing possible capture of one or some principals by the administrative agent 
(Romzek and Ingraham, 2000).  This is because the multiplicity of oversight 
principals model does not require the consent of the collective to engage 
individually with the agent.  Furthermore, individual principals are not 
encumbered by the prevailing institutional environment binding the single or the 
collective.    
  
Widmalm (2016: 127) states that “in reality, there are some places where 
corruption is so widespread that it may be hard to find a single principled 
principal, and then the MPM is more useful”.  This argument is consistent with 
Kooiman’s (1993) observation that in public administration, no single principal 
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has all the requisite capacity to solve the complex, dynamic and diversified 
oversight problems of contemporary governance.  Similarly, Mulgan (2003: 189) 
argues that the proliferation of oversight principals has become indispensable 
due to the emerging complex “multifaceted, pluralist” multi-level system of 
governance.  
 
Equally important is the view that the exercise of oversight by multiple principals 
has the potential to offer the required 360-degree surveillance on the 
administrative agent. Lane (2007: 627) clearly articulates this view as follows:   
“[A] web that comprises dozens of individual strands, each 
representing a component of the oversight system.  A single strand 
by itself is able to capture very few attempts at potential violations of 
legislative goals but intertwined with all of the other oversight 
mechanisms, the stands create a system of allowing few institutional 
activities to go unnoticed.” 
     
Therefore, oversight by multiple principals contains quantitative oversight 
instruments that promote what (Amodu, 2008) refers to as the compliance 
continuum which establishes a multiplicity of oversight measures that have the 
potential to contribute toward influencing the compliance behaviour of the 
administrative agent.  Equally, a multiplicity of oversight principals is said to serve 
as fire-alarm that triggers the attention of other principals to the problem.  In this 
regard, the signal from one principal compels other principals to act.  This is 
because it becomes difficult for other principals to ignore the signal once one 
principal has highlighted it. 
 
2.7 THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF OVERSIGHT BY MULTIPLE 
PRINCIPALS  
Primarily, oversight by multiple principals creates a problem of “multiple 
accountability disorder” (Schillemans and Busuioc, 2014: 2).  This is considered 
a pathology that creates confusion and negatively affects both the principals and 
the agent.  In addition, oversight by multiple principals results in the collective 
action problem.  The collective action problem is defined as an occurrence 
whereby individuals in the group pursue their own interests which result in the 
failure of a group (Ostrom, 2010; Prado, 2016). The notion of a collective action 
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problem is reflected in an everyday saying: “Too much of a good thing is bad.”  
This also holds true for too much oversight resulting from the multiplicity of 
principals with multiple oversight measures.  Logically, challenges are inevitable 
among multiple principals that are competing and have overlapping and 
concurrent authority over the same agent.   
 
2.7.1 EXCESSIVE OVERSIGHT   
Excessive oversight is a manifestation of overlapping, parallel and uncoordinated 
oversight measures from the multiple principals.  Equally, excessive oversight 
results from competing political principals with sharply conflicting preferences 
(Whitford, 2005).  This ostensibly results from many conflicting eyes from multiple 
principals on a common oversight conflicting overlooking the agent.  Bovens 
(2005) refers to this scenario as too much oversight that is likely to turn the agent 
into a bureaucrat that is rule-obsessed, proceduralist and risk-averse.   
 
Notably, excessive oversight resulting from the multiplicity of principals can 
contribute towards oversight fatigue.  This will result in the agent’s selective 
response to various oversight demands.  Dehousse (2008: 795) found that a 
situation where “there are several principals, each with their own preferences 
and each anxious to exert some degree of oversight over the agent” is likely to 
result in an atypical and problematic interaction.  Lyne, Nielson and Tierney 
(2003: 13) describe this problem as follows:   
“If some principal X offer the agent more benefits that principal Y, 
then the agent will tend to produce results that are proportionately 
more consistent with the preferences of X.  Principals with more 
power and resources have a greater impact on the agent behaviour.”          
 
2.7.2 COMPLIANCE OVERLOAD 
MPM of oversight subjects the agent to multiple demands for answers, 
explanations and justifications.  The multiple efforts of the principals result in 
layers of compliance requirements.  Evidently, these multiple efforts of oversight 
create compliance overload for the administrative agent.  Compliance overload 
refers to the excessive obligations and requirements to respond to oversight 
demands (Haywood and Green, 2008).  This compliance overload results from 
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the obligation to simultaneously satisfy a multiplicity of compliance oversight 
demands.   
  
The effort expended to produce multiple compliance reports for different 
oversight principals is often onerous.  To respond fully to these demands, a 
bureaucrat is required to deploy extensive human resources, finances and time 
in order to comply.  Inevitably, the unmitigated avalanche of oversight demands 
on the administrative agent is likely to overload.   This arduous oversight involving 
multiple principals is undoubtedly confusing and burdensome to the 
administrative agent and has the potential to significantly paralyse small entities, 
units or departments (Koppell, 2005; Olson, 2013).  
  
In other words, too much oversight is likely to cause more problems than good.  
Given that the principals have different preferences, expectations and demands 
for the same administrative agency, the performance of oversight becomes 
significantly complex and onerous.  According to Silverberg (2006: 25), the 
multiplicity of oversight “is like a magnifying glass: hold it one way and you can 
examine an object closely; hold it another way and you can burn that object to a 
crisp”.  Therefore, oversight by multiple principals creates a situation where the 
principals direct the agent in different directions and ultimately defocus the agent.   
 
2.7.3 ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN 
The above discussion indicates that administrative agents spend a considerable 
amount of time and effort complying.  These efforts expended on compliance are 
referred to as an administrative burden.  Administrative burden is defined as an 
individual’s experience of policy implementation as onerous (Burden, Canon, 
Meyer and Moynihan, 2012).  Administrative burden implies excessive overlap 
and duplication, resulting in the multiplicity of oversight demands (Burden, et al, 
2012).  Likewise, OECD (2014) refers to administrative burden as the cost of 
complying with information obligations stemming from oversight.  
  
Similar to compliance overload, the administrative burden is exaggerated by the 
multiple principals arrangement.  Thus, while the multiplicity of oversight 
principals and approaches are regarded as best behaviour, it, unfortunately, 
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requires the administrative agent to respond with what is regarded as “high level 
of resources” (Burden et al, 2012: 742).  Equally, the literature indicates that 
oversight by multiple principals leads to an undesirable effect on the 
administrative agent, especially those within small entities with limited capacity 
(Haywood and Greene, 2008).  
  
In this regard, administrative burden does not only impact on the effectiveness 
of administrations to perform general functions related to policy implementation, 
but it also significantly impedes the administrative agent to comply with 
compliance demands themselves.  According to Kilhof (2014), the concern is that 
the efforts of the administrative agent to respond to the oversight demands far 
outweigh the benefit of oversight.  In this regard, oversight by multiple principals 
can cause unintended effects.  
 
2.7.4 COMPLIANCE COSTS 
Compliance overload and administrative burden are closely associated with an 
increase in monitoring.  Thus, even if is compliance is desirable, it comes at a 
huge cost for government officials.  A substantial amount of compliance costs 
arises out of the multiple efforts to exercise oversight on the administrative agent.  
Compliance costs are also the cost of control or regulatory costs which are 
commonly attributable to the adoption and implementation of requirements 
whether direct or indirect in nature and whether borne by the principals and 
administrative agents (OECD, 2014).  
 
Therefore, compliance costs are essentially costs of enforcement incurred by 
both the principals and the administrative agent.  According to the OECD (2014), 
compliance costs result from numerous and complex reporting requirements.  
The time, labour and equipment spend on responding to compliance demands 
from oversight principals are progressively substantial.  In this regard, the 
process of responding to numerous oversight obligations is a financial cost for 
both the administrative agent and the principals.  More significant compliance 
costs are experienced when sanctions are imposed on the administrative agent, 
as these could result in budget resources being suspended or employees being 
dismissed. 
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The above indicates that the MPM can reduce the administrative agent’s ability 
to be responsive, compliant and ultimately accountable.  Equally, indications are 
that there some unintended consequences that are likely to specifically effect on 
the administrative agent negatively.  In particular, the overlapping and multiplicity 
of oversight demands are generating a set of factors that produce unintended 
consequences and well perverse and undesirable behaviours (Behn, 2001).   
 
2.7.5 FRAGMENTATION OF OVERSIGHT 
Fragmentation in the context of oversight is present in a situation where the 
oversight authority is distributed to multiple principals.  According to Olson (2013: 
7), fragmentation is defined as the “complex layers and combinations of 
coexisting institutions” exercising independent oversight.  Similarly, Mayer (2016) 
suggests that fragmentation is when the “actions of one principal are likely to 
interact with those of another principal”.   Therefore, fragmentation occurs due to 
the independence and non-cooperative interaction between the principals.  
  
 
Arguably, fragmentation results in silos and competitive relationships between 
the principals.  The “siloisation” of oversight is widely considered as resulting 
from a situation where each principal becomes narrowly confined to its oversight 
boundaries and activities and inadvertently, either duplicate, contradicts or 
compete with other oversight principals (Rommel and Verhoest, 2009).  It also 
possible that, even if one principal is effectively exercising oversight on the agent, 
other principals will be dissatisfied with the performance of the principal and/or 
the agent.   
 
Fragmentation and overlapping responsibilities between the different principals 
have the potential to create a destructive bickering and the blame game between 
multiple principals.  This makes oversight complex and challenging.  Inevitably, 
an oversight environment that involves different sets of rules, often contradictory, 
coexisting in the same territory, creates tension among the oversight principals 
(Di John, 2008).  Similarly, it creates the possibility of disagreements, goal 
conflict and divergence among the multiple principals themselves (Waterman, 
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1998).   Shelton (2013) also states that in an environment characterised by 
multiple principals, each principal pursues an independent agenda and has 
different expectations, preference and mandates for the same agent.  Inevitably, 
divergent interests between the principals create possibilities for the 
administrative agent to deviate from the principal's preferences and goal-conflict 
to occur.   Consequently, these principals are likely to engage in a destructive 
conflict among themselves.  
  
In addition, multiple principals are likely to require different information and may 
have different expectations from the agent.  Worsham (2003: 2) describes this 
tension between the principals as “resulting in mixed and often contradicting 
expectations on the bureaucratic agent”.  Quite often, the dominant principal is 
likely to impose its own norms and preferences, and therefore, create conflict 
among the oversight principals. 
   
Furthermore, fragmentation of oversight measures enables bureaucratic drift.   
Political drift, on the other hand, occurs when the principal is either captured by 
the agent or fails to perform its oversight functions.  Understandably, the 
dispersion of oversight authority among multiple principals creates a situation 
where one principal is likely to rely passively on other principals to exercise 
oversight on the agent.  (Hill and Jones, 1992).  Accordingly, the multiplicity of 
principals can result in a principal – or some principals – abdicating their 
oversight obligations to other principals.  
  
2.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE PAT 
While it is clear from the above that the PAT has acquired currency as the 
framework to study oversight, Schillemans and Busuioc (2014) caution against 
the uncritical and indiscriminate use of the principal-agent theory to analyse.     
According to Schillemans and Busuioc (2014), the PAT has inherent limitations 
due it not accurately taking into account some complexities and dynamics of the 
inter-institutional relationships.  According to Schillemans and Busuioc (2014), 
the principal-agent theory is more suitable in an institutional design where there 
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are direct hierarchical lines of command between the different actors in the policy 
process.   
 
The other critical limitation of the PAT is the assumption that the agent is 
inherently disloyal, opportunistic and driven by self-interest. Persson, Rothstein, 
and Teorell (2013) state that lack of effective oversight over public finance is a 
collective action problem rather than just one of opportunistic agents as 
espoused by PAT.  This means that there are situations where the principals 
themselves lack the will and often are complicit in the lack of accountability of the 
agent.  Brinkerhoff (2000: 240) states that in some instances, the principal and 
not the agent, “passively maintains the corrupt system”.  
 
Similarly, Persson et al (2013) highlighted that “since the supposed principled 
principal(s) are also corrupt and not acting in the interest of the society but 
instead pursuing their own narrow self-interests”, the analysis of the oversight 
relationships based on the principal–agent framework will invariably be 
problematic. Therefore, the inability of PAT to acknowledge that the principals 
are equally capable of drifting – and sometimes complicit in the divergent 
behaviour of the agent – imposes a limitation on a strict utilisation of this theory.   
 
2.9 CONCLUSION   
This chapter developed a conceptual framework of oversight.  A literature review 
was conducted to indicate how oversight is conceptually adjacent to 
accountability.  The heart of the difference between accountability and oversight 
was highlighted: accountability focuses on the behaviour of the agent, while 
oversight is about the behaviour of the principal.       
 
It was also highlighted that the concept of oversight has gained significant 
traction in modern democracies.  Its relevance and application in contemporary 
governance were explained as the reason why countries such as South Africa 
have included oversight in their constitutions. Furthermore, the chapter described 
oversight approaches and measures used to exercise oversight.   
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This chapter utilised the PAT to describe the oversight relationship between the 
elected political structures and the appointed officials.  Delegation and 
contracting inherent in the principal-agent relationship were identified as 
instigating the oversight obligation between the principal and the agent.    Most 
importantly, this chapter outlined how the principal-agent framework could be 
reconfigured to MPM.   
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CHAPTER 3:  ARCHITECTURE OF THE MULTIPLE-PRINCIPAL 
MODEL FOR MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter described the nature of oversight relationships between the 
principal and the agent.  This chapter describes the legislative architecture 
establishing the principal-agent relationship in the municipal budget oversight in 
South Africa.  
  
This chapter consists of three main sections.  The first section identifies the 
legislative provisions that create an environment within which the oversight and 
accountability relationships are established.  The second section describes 
applicable legislative instruments that institutionalise the multiplicity of oversight 
structures, relationships and processes in the municipal budget process.  The 
third section discusses the implications of the municipal budget oversight by 
multiple principals.   
  
3.2 THE LEGISLATIVE ARCHITECTURE FOR MUNICIPAL BUDGET 
OVERSIGHT  
Generally, municipal oversight, including municipal budget oversight, is 
entrenched in South Africa’s constitutional dispensation and its emerging 
systems of governance.  The South Africa Constitution Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter 
referred to as the Constitution) is replete with provisions that promote oversight.  
In addition, there are various other legislative provisions that implicitly create or 
facilitate oversight in municipalities. While these provisions are not specific to 
municipal budget oversight, they do promote an environment and mechanisms 
which facilitate municipal budget oversight.  These legislative provisions are 
identified below.  
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3.2.1 CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES  
The South African Constitution enshrines accountability as one of its founding 
values (Section 1 of the Constitution).  This constitutional value obliges all organs 
of state, including both the public representatives and administrators in all 
spheres of government, to be accountable, open and responsive (Section 1(d) of 
the Constitution).  This constitutional value creates a culture of justification in 
which the organs of state have an enduring duty and obligation to provide 
answers, explanation, and justification for decisions. Arguably, this culture of 
justification facilitates and promotes oversight in all spheres of government, 
including local government.  
 
3.2.2 SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The separation of powers doctrine is synonymous with the principle of checks 
and balances.  It is frequently invoked to justify the assignment of power to 
independent institutions. Mojapelo (2013) describes separation of powers as the 
faciliating the division of roles, obligations to distinct but related institutions with 
a defined competence and authority.  Separation of powers is considered to 
facilitate the ability to curtail excessive concentration of state power in one branch 
of government, either the legislature, executive, and judiciary, is widely 
acknowledged as promoting accountability   
 
While separation of powers is not explicitly enshrined in the South African 
Constitution, it is a core element in the structure of the state.  Several provisions 
of the Constitution expressly imply checks and balances between the different 
branches and institutions of government.  This view is consistent with O’Regan’s 
(2005) argument that under constitutional democracy all power of the state is 
constrained, in order to limit the potentially corrupting effect of unconstrained 
power.  
  
3.2.3 BASIC VALUES AND PRINCIPLES GOVERNING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
Section 195 of the Constitution constitutionalises public administration.  This can 
be considered as a decisive way of formalising the concomitant delegation and 
administrative discretion.  As indicated in Chapter Two, the appointment of the 
administrative agent presupposes the intention to cede some authority and allow 
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it to exercise discretion.  However, Section 195 (1) (a) to (i) of the Constitution 
expects those in the public administration to behave in a manner that ensures:         
 “A high standard of professional ethics; 
 Efficient, economic and effective use of resources; 
 Service must provide impartially, fairly, equitably without bias; 
 The public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making; 
 Public administration must be accountable; and 
 Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with 
timely, accessible and accurate information.” 
 
3.2.4 INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE   
South Africa’s constitutional framework has contrived a multifarious collaborative 
and cooperative system of governance with a national government, nine 
provinces, and 257 municipalities.   The cooperative and collaborative system of 
governance is a direct result of the conflation of both decentralisation and 
cooperative intergovernmental relations as contemplated by constitutional 
principles of distinctive, interdependent and interrelated spheres of government 
(Steytler and De Visser, 2009).  The constitutionally envisaged system of 
cooperative government has structures and mechanisms to facilitate, 
coordination, support, cooperation and resolve intergovernmental disputes 
(Section 3 of the Municipal System Act; the Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act 13 of 2005).   
 
Therefore, this system of governance reflects the hallmarks of a design 
embedded within a system that facilitates  non-hierarchical collaborative multi-
sphere relations with both autonomy and supervision of municipalities.  With this 
system, national and provincial governments have the responsibility to ensure 
that municipalities are supported to fulfill their constitutional mandate. This 
constitutional obligation is actualised through the principles of subsidiarity and 
supervision of municipalities.  These are discussed below.       
 
3.2.4.1 Principle of Institutional Subsidiarity 
A municipality derives its powers and functions directly from the Constitution 
(Section 151 of the Constitution).  Specifically, the Constitution allocates original 
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functions and powers directly to the municipalities in terms of section 156 of the 
Constitution and are considered as the fundamental source of power for local 
government (De Visser, 2006).  The original powers are listed in Section 156 (1) 
and (2) functional areas in Schedule 4B and 5B. 
 
In addition to original powers, the Constitution envisages that national and 
provincial government may assign or transfer powers and functions to local 
government (Section 44(a) (ii) and 104 (i) (c) of the Constitution).  De Visser 
(2006) indicates that the decision to assign powers and functions to local 
government is not arbitrary; hence, it is made compulsory by the Constitution 
(Section 156 (4) of the Constitution).   The assignment of powers, authority and 
duties to municipalities is commonly referred to the principle of subsidiarity.  The 
principle of subsidiarity refers to the transfer or delegation of powers, authorities, 
and duties to as the “smallest or closest jurisdiction that can effectively perform 
them” (Black, 2010: 533).  It is regarded as way of harnessing and enhancing 
physical proximity or local distinctiveness to facilitate effective service delivery.  
  
The concept of subsidiarity is relatively new in South Africa legal and political 
vocabulary.  De Visser (2010) claims that those advocating for federalism 
propagated the concept of institutional subsidiarity during the constitutional 
negotiations. (Du Plessis, 2006).   In addition, it is important to note that just like 
its related concepts such as decentralisation, federalism, and autonomy, 
subsidiarity is not explicitly stated in the South African Constitution.  Whilst it was 
included as part of the constitutional principles (XX1) of the 1993 Constitution, it 
is, however, not explicitly mentioned in the 1996 Constitution.  
        
The most fundamental aspect of the principle of institutional subsidiarity is that 
appropriate finances must be transferred to enable the municipality to implement 
the assigned functions or duties (Barber, 2005).  The inability to transfer 
appropriate finances will result in a phenomenon commonly referred to as an 
unfunded mandate. The National Treasury (2011) provides that when national 
and provincial government transfer or assign a function to a municipality through 
agency agreement, the function must be exercised under the authority of the 
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transferring authority.  Therefore, the accounting officer of the municipalities has 
an obligation to comply with the conditions of the transfer.   
 
The accounting officer of the municipality is also required to report to the 
transferring principal, the Provincial and National Treasury as part of section 71 
and 72 of the MFMA (Section 11(b) of the Division of Revenue Act 2016).   In 
particular, section 71 (5) of the MFMA instructs the accounting office of the 
municipality to, by no later than ten working days after the end of the month, 
submit a statement reflecting the particular for the transferred finances to the 
transferring organ of state.  In addition, Section 123 of the MFMA instructs the 
annual financial statements of the municipalities to disclose information on the 
allocations received and how the allocation was spent.  The municipal manager 
is further required to indicate whether the municipality has complied with the 
conditions of the allocation (Section 123 (1) (d) of the MFMA). Likewise, the 
municipal manager is required to provide information on explaining the reasons 
for non-compliance.  
  
Arguably, the transfer of finances to the municipality creates an oversight 
relationship between a national government department and a municipality, in 
particular, the accounting officer of the municipality.  In this regard, the municipal 
manager is required to account for the financial transferred made to the 
municipality.  Thus, institutional subsidiarity imposes accountability requirements 
on the municipal manager, whilst obligating the transferring political authority to 
exercise oversight on the municipal manager.   
 
3.2.4.2 SUPERVISION OF MUNICIPALITIES  
It has been established that South Africa constitutional architecture has 
configured a system in which municipal autonomy is supervised by national and 
provincial spheres of government.  Within this scheme, the autonomy of 
municipalities is not unqualified or exercised in an unencumbered manner but is 
supervised by other spheres of government (Steytler and De Visser, 2009).   
Likewise, Van Wyk (2013: 306) argues that “municipalities cannot operate 
entirely independently and their powers are curtailed by the constitutional 
provisions”.  According to Mathenjwa (2014b) the supervision of municipalities is 
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a constitutional imperative that facilitates oversight of municipalities by national 
and provincial spheres of government. 
   
This notion of municipal supervision by national and provincial spheres of 
government is constitutionally designed to be exercised at arms-length from the 
municipality.   In other words, it is designed and exercised in a manner that 
recognises and respects the autonomy of the municipalities as contemplated in 
section 151 of the Constitution.  For this purpose, municipal supervision must be 
characterised by a high degree of respect for the constitutional constraints that 
protect municipalities against unjustified annexation by other spheres of 
government (Steytler and De Visser, 2009.  As result, the national and provincial 
government are prevented from using their municipal supervision powers to 
justify unwarranted intervention in municipalities’ affairs.  
     
An important aspect of the authority of national and provincial government to 
supervise municipalities is that it constitutionalises oversight by external 
principals.  Constitutionalised municipal supervision by external oversight 
principals’ underscores the legal authority of national and provincial exercise 
oversight on municipalities.   It signifies the formal and binding nature of rules, 
mechanisms and processes adopted by both the national and provincial 
government in overseeing the behaviour of the municipality. Most significantly, 
the constitutionalisation of municipal supervision protects the municipality by 
ensuring that oversight measures and processes by national and provincial 
spheres of government are consistent with the Constitution (Steytler and De 
Visser, 2009).  
 
The national and provincial supervision of municipalities is exercised by a 
number of principals which include the Minister and Member of the Executive 
Council (MEC) of Local Government (now referred to as Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs) (Steytler and De Visser, 2009: 15-11).   
However, both the Minister and MEC for Local Government are required to adopt 
appropriate measures to monitor local government as outlined in Section 105 of 
the Municipal System Act 32 of 2000.   While both the national Ministers and 
provincial MECs constitute the oversight principals, the provincial MECs are 
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“duty-bound” in terms of the Constitution to exercise monitoring on municipalities 
(Steytler and De Visser, 2009: 15: 9).   
 
Thus, the role of the provincial MECs in supporting and exercising supervision 
over municipalities is legal requirement rather than the political one.  Specifically, 
the   nature of supervision by national and provincial governments is highly 
regulated by the law to ensure that they are consistent with the values and 
principals of the Constitution.  In this regard, oversight mechanisms by national 
and provincial spheres of government are only exercised through regulations, 
monitoring and intervention (Mathenjwa, 2014b).   
 
3.2.4.2.1 REGULATION 
The concept of regulation is defined as a uniform set of binding legal rules to 
regulate or provide guidelines.  In the context of supervision, regulations 
generally refer to a legal process intended to achieve compliance. Mathenjwa 
(2014b) describes regulations as legal instruments established mainly by the 
executive for implementing legislation. According to Steytler and De Visser, 
2009) regulations provide for a binding framework within which municipal 
autonomy can be responsibly exercised within a system of cooperative 
governance, in order to ensure that different spheres of government harmonise 
their efforts towards national goals.  
 
Municipal regulations originate from various local government laws such as the 
Municipal Finance Management Act and Municipal System Act.  The Financial 
and Fiscal Commission (2014: 9) lists the following municipal regulations: 
 Municipal Regulations on a Standard Chart of Accounts (SCOA); 
 Municipal Budget and Reporting Regulations; 
 Municipal Finance Misconduct Regulations; 
 Municipal Investment and Municipal Public-Private Partnership 
regulations; 
 Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations; 
 Municipal Regulations on Debt Disclosure; 
 Municipal Regulations and Guidelines on Minimum Competency 
Levels; 
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 Municipal Asset Transfer Regulations 
 
3.2.4.2.2 MONITORING  
Monitoring in the context of municipal supervision by the national and provincial 
government is described as the periodic checking of an activity with the purpose 
of determining to what extent the objectives are achieved (Malan, 2005).   
Likewise, Mathenjwa (2014b) defines monitoring as the act of observing or 
keeping something under review.   In the context of supervision of local 
government, monitoring is a process of periodically ascertaining local 
government’s compliance with the Constitution (Mathenjwa, 2014b).   Steytler 
and De Visser (2009) state that monitoring is necessary as part of the signal 
management process designed to activate early and adequate responses.   
 
The monitoring role of the provincial MECs is strengthened by provisions of the 
Municipal Systems Act which establish mechanisms, processes and procedures 
to monitor municipalities’ ability to perform their powers and functions (Section 
105 of the Municipal System Act).  Steytler and De Visser (2009: 15:10) add that 
these processes, mechanisms, and procedure must enable the MEC to exercise 
monitoring as well as intervene when a municipality does not fulfill its statutory 
obligation. 
 
3.2.4.2.3 INTERVENTION  
Intervention in a municipality is prescribed by section 139 of the Constitution.   
Steytler and De Visser (2009) state that intervention comprises the most powerful 
and intrusive form of supervision of local government.  The main aim of 
intervention in local government is essentially about exercising corrective 
measures.  Therefore, intervention is a constitutionally prescribed process of 
interfering with an entrenched behaviour by imposing a paternalistic relationship 
between local and other spheres of government.  
 
In terms of the MFMA, intervention in municipalities is not an arbitrary act to be 
used by other spheres of government – it can only be exercised within the 
framework of the spirit of the principles of cooperative government. This is to 
ensure that the institutional integrity of the municipality is neither impaired nor 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
49 
 
compromised by other spheres of government. Accordingly, intervention in the 
municipality is conditional and permissible if various support measures have 
failed to yield positive results (Steytler and De Visser, 2009). 
    
As indicated, intervention in the municipality becomes necessary when there is 
an absolute need for a more drastic process of correcting an untenable situation 
in a municipality.  Section 139 of the Constitution provides the need to intervene 
become necessary when there are serious financial problems in the municipality.  
The thrust of section 139 of the Constitution is to enable a provincial government 
to intervene and utilise whatever steps are necessary to get the municipality on 
its feet and fulfilling its obligations.   
 
3.2.5 CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Another constitutional provision that establishes an oversight and accountability 
environment is the object of local government as outlined in section 152 of the 
Constitution.  Section 152 (1) (a) to (e) of the Constitution provides that local 
government is obligated to:  
 “Provide a democratic and accountable government to local 
communities.   
 Ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable 
manner.   
 Promote social and economic development; promote a safe and a 
healthy environment;  
 Ensure the involvement of communities and community organisation in 
matters of local government”.     
 
A careful reading of the above objects of local government shows that the 
municipality has an obligation to promote accountability.  These objects of local 
government obligate the municipality to establish appropriate mechanisms and 
processes in order to promote accountability.  Similarly, the constitutional 
requirement for democratic and participatory democracy can be regarded as 
creating an oversight environment.   Such democracy is necessarily agnostic and 
based on pluralism (Mouffe, 2000).           
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3.3 INSTITUTIONALISATION OF MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT  
A municipal budget is at the heart of municipal governance and related service 
delivery.   The municipal budget serves as an instrument through which the 
finances of the municipality are collected, spent and accounted for.  It serves as 
a key instrument of policy, planning, and performance management for the 
municipality as well as fundamental process of fiscal discipline, viability, and 
sustainability (National Treasury, 2011).  Although seemingly technical, a 
municipal budget reflects the dominant political ideology and social priorities 
pursued by the leading political party in the municipality (Steytler and De Visser, 
2009).  Equally, it serves as a legal and policy instrument, and upon adoption by 
the municipal council, a municipal budget has a binding effect.  Thus, the legality 
of the municipal budget imposes legal obligations severally on all actors as well 
as manifests formal oversight relationships between the administrative agent and 
the political structures.   
 
The legal obligations and relationships in the municipal budget oversight process 
are highly institutionalised. The process of institutionalisation of municipal 
oversight has formalised processes, mechanisms, and structures as well as 
obligations for the political principals to shape the behaviour of the municipal 
administrators.  In other words, the institutionalisation has been realised through 
“regulative and normative pillars embedded in rules, structures, behaviour and 
norms” to influence the behaviour of municipal administrators (Scott, 1995: 35).  
This view is consistent with Van Niekerk and Dalton-Brits (2016: 118) assertion 
that “the statutory and regulatory framework has established the legal basis for 
accountability and oversight in the three spheres of government”. 
 
Fundamentally, the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (MSA) and the Municipal 
Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA) are considered as key statutory 
instruments that facilitate the institutionalisation of municipal budget oversight.  
For example, section 6 (1) of the MSA instructs the administration of the 
municipality to facilitate a culture of public service and accountability among staff.  
The MFMA, on the other hand, provides for the establishment of norms and 
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standards for ensuring transparency, accountability and appropriate lines of 
responsibility in the fiscal and financial affairs of the municipality. 
   
These statutory instruments impose obligations and a formal duty to the 
municipality to institutionalise oversight as a fundamental objective of municipal 
governance.  However, the MFMA is acknowledged as being the most 
authoritative legislative instrument facilitating municipal budget oversight 
(Steytler and De Visser, 2009).    The MFMA is particularly is widely credited for 
establishing the rules, roles and responsibilities of different structures involved in 
the municipal budget oversight process.  These structures are identified and 
discussed below.  
  
3.4.1 MUNICIPAL MANAGER (MM) 
The municipal administration is an invaluable organ of municipal governance.  It 
is a strategic structure appointed to enable the municipal council and its 
structures to perform their constitutional authority, duties and functions.  
Municipal administration provides the most effective way of implementing 
municipal council resolutions.  The MM is the administrative agent and not a 
political structure of the municipality.  Accordingly, the centrality of the position of 
a MM is very important to the governance of the municipality.  Hence, municipal 
managers are regarded as the key structure as opposed to mere personnel of a 
municipality (Steytler and De Visser, 2009).  The significance of this position is 
evidenced by the manner in which it is regulated by various legislative 
instruments.  
  
All municipalities are obliged to appoint the municipal manager as the head of 
the administration of the municipality (Section 83 of the Municipal Structures Act).  
The MM, also referred to as the accounting officer, is appointed in terms of 
section 56 of the Municipal System Act, 32 of 2000.  Upon appointment, the MM 
becomes the agent of the municipal council.  Consequently, an agency 
relationship is established between the between the municipal council and the 
MM.  The agency relationship between the municipal council and the MM is 
established through an appointment contract.  Section 57 (1) (a) of the Municipal 
System Act makes a written contract and a performance agreement legal 
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requirements for the appointment of the MM.  In other words, the municipal 
council utilises the contract and the performance agreement to specify its 
preferences to the MM.  
  
Section 59 of the Municipal System Act and Section 79 of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act delegate statutory functions to the MM (National Treasury, 
2013: 62).  Likewise, section 60 to 66 of the Municipal Systems Act delegates 
financial roles and responsibilities to the municipal manager. In addition to the 
general financial roles and responsibilities delegated to the municipal manager, 
section 68 and 69 of the MFMA prescribes the activities of the MM manager on 
the municipal budget processes.  Furthermore, section 60 of the MFMA provides 
that the municipal manager is required to “provide guidance and advice on 
compliance with the political structures, political office bearers, and officials of 
the municipality”. 
 
The MM is personally responsible for the management financial affairs of the 
municipality (Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review, 2011).  The 
Auditor-General (2015: 23) indicates that in the 2014-2015 financial year, the 
municipal managers were responsible for the municipal budget totalling “R347 
billion, of which R281 billion was for operating expenditure and R66 billion was 
for capital expenditure”.   
        
The delegation of financial responsibilities to the MM is accorded protection by 
the law. Section 119 of the Municipal Systems Act reads:  
“A councillor who attempts to influence the municipal manager not to 
enforce an obligation in terms of this act‚ any other applicable 
legislation or any by-law or decision of the municipality‚ is guilty of an 
offence and on conviction liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding two years.”   
 
However, the MM does not have the right to not account when called upon to do 
so.  Similarly, the MM is instructed by the MFMA “to act with fidelity, honesty and 
in the best interest of the municipality in managing its financial affairs” (Section 
61 of the MFMA).  The MM is required to manage the financial administration of 
the municipality in a manner that ensures that the resources of the municipality 
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are used effectively, efficiently and economically” (Section 62 of the MFMA).  
Lastly, the MM is required to ensure that “unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure and other losses are prevented” (Section 62 of the MFMA).  
Therefore, the MM is the primary administrative agent and the accounting officer 
is integral to all the activities of the various stages of the budget process.  As 
indicated, the MM’s role in the budget process is both legislated by the MFMA 
and delegated by the municipal council.  The MMs’ roles and responsibilities in 
the various stages of the budget process are discussed below.   
 
3.4.1.1 BUDGET PREPARATION          
The MM plays a key technical role of assisting the mayor to prepare the annual 
budget of the municipality.  In terms of Section 68 of the MFMA, the mayor must 
be provided with the necessary administrative support, resources and 
information when discharging the responsibility of coordinating the municipal 
budget preparation.  Section 7 of the Municipal Budget and Reporting 
Regulations (MBRR) provides that the MM must: 
“…prepare, or take all reasonable steps to ensure the preparation of 
budget-related policies of the municipality in accordance with the 
legislation applicable to those policies for tabling in the municipal 
council and by the applicable deadline specified by the mayor in 
terms of section 21 (1) (b) of the Act.  In addition, section 7 (1) (m) of 
the MBRR specifies that the tabling must include policy related to 
budget implementation and monitoring specifically dealing with 
management and oversight”.    
 
3.4.1.2 BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION  
The implementation of the approved municipal budget signals the beginning of 
the financial year, which is prescribed by the MFMA, as 1 July of the year.  The 
MM has the obligation to ensure that the municipal budget is implemented 
coherently and consistently as approved by the municipal council (Steytler and 
De Visser, 2009: 8-22). As Section 69 of the MFMA stipulates, the MM is legally 
responsible for the implementation of the approved budget.   The MFMA states 
that the MM must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the spending of funds 
is in accordance with the budget and is reduced as necessary when revenue is 
anticipated to be less than projected.   
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The MM is also responsible for complying with the annual Division of the 
Revenue Act.  The MFMA (MFMA Circular No 67: 16) states that the municipal 
manager, as the receiving officer is responsible for tabling monthly reports.  
When tabling these reports, the MM is required to inform the municipal council 
on the progress and problems experienced in complying with the annual Division 
of the Revenue Act.  The MFMA (MFMA Circular No 67: 16) instructs the MM to 
provide a comprehensive report to the National Treasury indicating the 
explanation and motivations for non-compliance.  
      
Lastly, the MM is also instructed to ensure that the general revenue and 
expenditure activities of the municipality are properly monitored and when 
necessary, prepare for adjustments.  Also as part of ensuring that the approved 
municipal budget is implemented properly, the MM is required to provide regular 
reports and relevant information that will help stakeholders analyse performance, 
address shortcomings, and improve internal and external control (National 
Treasury, 2004: 49).  These reports are an integral part of in-year monitoring.    
 
3.4.1.3 BUDGET AUDIT 
The MM is required to assist the Auditor-General in conducting an audit of the 
finances of the municipality by preparing the annual financial statements of the 
municipality and, within two months after the end of the financial year to which 
those statements relate, submitting the statements to the Auditor-General for 
auditing (Section 126 of the MFMA).  In addition, the MM must prepare a 
consolidated annual financial statement and submit the statements to the 
Auditor-General for auditing (Section 126 of the MFMA). Section 127 (5) of the 
MFMA instructs the MM to, immediately after the annual report is tabled in the 
MM, submit the annual report to the Auditor-General, Provincial Treasury and 
other provincial departments responsible for local government.   In addition, 
section 219 of the MFMA instructs the MM to attend council and council 
committee meetings where the annual report is discussed, for the purpose of 
responding to questions concerning the report.  
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The MM is also required to submit copies of the minutes of those meetings to the 
Auditor-General, the relevant Provincial Treasury and the provincial department 
responsible for local government in the province.  Lastly, the MM has an 
obligation to make public an oversight report referred to in subsection (1) within 
seven days of its adoption. Online publication of this report is compulsory. 
 
TABLE 1: Duties and Function of the Municipal Manager  
Duties and Functions Key Dates 
Submit the annual performance report to the Auditor-
General 
31 August 
Submit the annual report including the annual 
financial statements to the Auditor-General 
30 
September 
Submission of annual report to the Municipal Public 
Accounts Committee for oversight  
31 January  
Publication of final annual report  31 March  
Source: National Treasury:  MFMA Circular No. 58 
 
3.4.2 THE MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS  
The MM has multiple budget oversight principals.  Many of these principals are 
located internally in the municipality, whilst others are outside the municipality.  
The section below identifies internal and external political principals exercising 
oversight on the municipal budget.     
 
3.4.2.1 INTERNAL OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS 
Internal oversight principals are those located within the municipality.  The 
internal political principals are identified in Section 2 of the Municipal System Act 
as political structures and the community of the municipality. The community and 
political parties are essentially the main principals who delegate power to the 
municipal council.  However, both the community and the political parties are 
represented by their representatives in the municipal council.  The budget 
oversight role of the municipal council is discussed below.   
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Figure 1: Internal Municipal Budget Oversight 
 Source:  Adapted from Fourie, Opperman, and Scott (2007).   
 
3.4.2.1.1 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL   
The municipal council is the primary political authority of the municipality (Section 
151 (2) of the Constitution).  Its political authority derives from being the direct 
outcome of the democratic local electoral process.  As the legitimate 
representative of local citizens, it serves as the voice of the citizens. Equally, the 
municipal council is the legal authority of the municipality.   Section 151 of the 
Constitution vests both the legislative and executive authority of the municipality 
in the municipal council.  This provision reinforces the legal and political status 
of the municipal council.  Most significantly, the Constitution elevates the 
municipal council as the decisive deliberative legislative body of the municipality.  
Likewise, this constitutional provision identifies the municipal council as the 
primary seat of authority in the municipality and within its domain.  
  
The municipal council has exclusive power to appoint and contract the municipal 
manager.  In line with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the 
Constitution, legislatures such as the municipal council are also vested with the 
budget authority.  As the budget authority of the municipality, the municipal 
council is empowered to approve the annual budget through a formal meeting 
called in terms of the rules and regulations for quorum, and voting procedures.  
The process can be delayed through a number of ways.   
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Furthermore, as the budget authority, the municipal council is obliged to  oversee 
the municipal manager.  The MFMA Circular No 32 of 2006 provides clues about 
the process confirming that the municipal council is “vested with the responsibility 
to oversee the performance of their municipal manager”.  The municipal council 
in the first instance utilises non-executive councillors and its various committees 
to exercise budget oversight.   These committees are widely regarded as the 
pillars of the work of a municipal council.   De Visser, Steytler and May (2009:11) 
state that “the functionality of the internal governance arrangements is to a large 
extent dependent on the functioning of the committee system”.  Thus, the council 
delegates the oversight functions to the committees.  These committees, as a 
rule, include the Municipal Public Accounts Committee (MPAC), Oversight 
Committee, and the Audit Committees. MPACs are relative new and were 
introduced by Treasury to improve oversight. 
 
3.4.2.1.2 THE EXECUTIVE MAYOR  
The municipal council in terms of the section 54 of the Municipal Structures Act 
elects the executive mayor.  The executive mayor is elected to serve as the 
executive head of the municipality (Steytler and De Visser, 2009: 3-39).  Steytler 
and De Visser (2009) state that while the executive mayor has functions that are 
prescribed by legislation, most of its functions those delegated by the municipal 
council.   
            
Consequently, the executive mayor has very important functions in the 
governance of the municipality.  Core to these functions is acting as the political 
leader of the budget and integrated development plans of the municipality 
(Steytler and De Visser, 2009: 3-39).  Thus, the executive mayor has the 
authority to provide guidance over the fiscal and financial affairs of the 
municipality.  The executive mayor is also required to take all reasonable steps 
to ensure that the municipality performs its constitutional and statutory functions 
within the limits of the municipality’s approved budget (Section 52 of the MFMA).  
However, the executive mayor may not interfere in the administration of the 
finances of the municipality, such as the procurement process (Section 52 of the 
MFMA).   
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With regard to the municipal budget oversight, the executive mayor’s roles and 
responsibilities are clearly spelled out in section 52 to 54 of the MFMA.  
Specifically, section 52 of the MFMA instructs the executive mayor to oversee 
the preparation of the annual budget.  The executive mayor is also mandated to 
monitor and oversee the municipal manager in the exercise of his/her financial 
responsibilities (Section 52 of the MFMA).  Section 54 of the MFMA obligates the 
executive mayor to: 
a) receive monthly budget reports submitted by the municipal 
manager in order a. consider them;  
b) check whether the budget is implemented in accordance with the 
budget and service delivery agreements; 
c) give instructions to the municipal manager to ensure that the 
budget is implemented in term terms of the budget 
implementation and service delivery plan and that spending of 
funds and revenue collection proceed in accordance with the 
budget.   
     
3.4.2.2 EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT 
External oversight refers to the relationship between a municipality and other 
oversight located in provincial and national spheres of government.  Oversight of 
the municipality by other external government jurisdictions is mainly conceived 
and exercised through the system of cooperative government.  The system of 
cooperative government facilitates the constitutional supervision and monitoring 
of municipalities by national and provincial spheres of government (Mathenjwa 
(2014b).  
 
It has already been established that national and provincial spheres of 
governments have the constitutional authority to supervise municipalities.  
Mathenjwa (2014b) refers to this constitutional design as having established an 
intrusive constitutional authority for other spheres of governments to oversee on 
municipalities.  Consequently, external oversight principals emerge from the 
multiplicity of nexuses that municipalities have with national and provincial 
government departments.  Particularly – and more fundamentally – these 
relationships create a fiscal and budgetary oversight arrangement between the 
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municipality and national government departments.  These external budget 
oversight principals are discussed below. 
 
Figure 2: External Municipal Budget Oversight 
Source: Own table.   
 
3.4.2.2.1 NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL TREASURY DEPARTMENTS 
The supervision roles of the national and provincial government departments 
create multiple oversight obligations on municipalities.  In particular, it obligates 
municipal managers to comply with a multiplicity of oversight requirements.  For 
instance, the municipal manager is obligated to submit monthly, quarterly and 
annual deadline reports to a multiply of principals (Section 132 of the MFMA). In 
this regard, the provincial and national departments have a constitutional duty to 
provide supervision and exercise general budget oversight on municipalities.  
  
The authority of the National Treasury to “enforce compliance” and “to stop 
transfers of funds to an organ of state if that organ of state commits a serious or 
persistent material breach of compliance measures” (Section 216 of the 
Constitution).  In addition, the MFMA also elevates the National Treasury by 
enjoining it to supervise municipal finance and budgets. Steytler and De Visser 
(2009: 15-6) claim that in addition to the constitutional provision, the MFMA also 
buttress the supervisory authority and function of the National Treasury.  In this 
respect, section 2 of the MFMA instructs the National Treasury to monitor the 
budget of municipalities in order to ensure that they are consistent with national 
government’s fiscal and macro-economic policy.   
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Therefore, the National Treasury is also empowered to promote good budget and 
fiscal management by municipalities, and for this purpose monitor the 
implementation of municipal budgets, including their expenditure, revenue 
collection and borrowing (Section 2 (b) of the MFMA). In addition, section 5 of 
the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 prescribes for the provincial 
treasuries to monitor compliance and the preparation of municipal budgets, their 
monthly outcomes of those budgets, receive reports from municipalities and also 
take appropriate steps if a municipality fails to adhere or comply with the relevant 
provisions of the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003.   
 
Accordingly, both the National Treasury and Provincial Treasury are duly 
authorised to investigate any system of financial management and internal 
control in any municipality and in necessary take any other appropriate steps 
required to perform their financial and budgetary control authority and functions 
(Section 2 (d) and (e) of the MFMA.  Given the authority and centrality of National 
Treasury on fiscal and budgetary matters of municipalities, it is important to note 
that the Provincial Treasury is equally very active in exercising municipal budget 
oversight. Due to this role, the Provincial Treasury is added to the long list of the 
multiplicity of oversight principals exercising municipal budget oversight.  In 
addition, the Provincial Treasury is equally mandated by the section 56 of the 
MFMA, to  
“…monitor the budget of municipalities in order to establish whether 
they promote good budget and fiscal management.   For this 
purpose, the Provincial Treasury exercises oversight on the 
development and monitors and for this purpose monitor the 
implementation of municipal budgets, including their expenditure, 
revenue collection and borrowing.”  
  
3.4.2.3 INDEPENDENT STRUCTURES SUPPORTING POLITICAL OVERSIGHT 
PRINCIPALS  
While it is expected that both internal and external political principals must 
exercise oversight on the municipal budget process, it is also acknowledged and 
accepted that these principals might not have the necessary capacity or political 
objectivity to ensure that the municipal manager is compliant.  For this purpose, 
the institutional design of oversight makes provisions for independent structures 
to assist political oversight principals. A key independent institution involved in 
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providing objective information regarding the financial and budget activities of 
municipalities is the Auditor-General.   
 
Therefore, the Auditor-General is external and independent of the municipality.  
It is considered to provide the most objective, legitimate and authoritative ex-post 
oversight on the municipal budget.  Accordingly, the Auditor-General serves as 
the key mechanism of ex-post oversight of the budget.  The review and audit 
conducted by the Auditor-General is also considered to constitute the most 
reliable, independent and external review and evaluation of the municipality’s 
finances and financial system (Steytler and De Visser, 2009: 11-44).   
  
The audit is conducted after the end of the financial year.  It is a key aspect of 
the ex-post oversight.  It is undertaken to assess the compliance of the budget 
with the approved budget and evaluate whether the budget objectives were 
achieved.  Thus, section 122 of the MFMA provides that:  
“Every municipality must for each financial year prepare annual 
financial statements which fairly presents the state of affairs of the 
municipality its performance against its budget, its management of 
revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities, its business activities, its 
financial results, and its financial position as at the end of the financial 
year.”  
 
3.5 THE NATURE OF MULTIPLE MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT 
PROCESSES   
The above section identified who is exercising budget oversight on the municipal 
manager.  This section draws on the literature to highlight how municipal budget 
oversight is exercised by internal and external oversight principals.  This section 
explores ex-ante, on-going and ex-post budget oversight.  
      
3.5.1 EX-ANTE BUDGET OVERSIGHT  
Ex-ante oversight was defined in Chapter Two of this thesis as a form of 
preliminary scrutiny or control mechanism to limit the boundaries within which an 
agent can exercise its discretion.  It was highlighted that ex-ante oversight is a 
prescription that is made by the principal beforehand.  Ex-ante oversight is 
embodied in the approval before in order to minimising and or prevent 
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bureaucratic drift.  On the municipal budget oversight, ex-ante measures are 
applied by the principals during the drafting or preparatory stage of the municipal 
budget process.  These measures are aimed at inducing compliance of the 
municipal manager during the budget drafting stage of the municipal budget 
process.   As indicated earlier in this chapter, the measures used by principals 
are mostly prescribed by legislation in order to prevent possible encroachment 
and the necessary discretion of the municipal manager. 
       
The municipal council exercises ex-ante oversight through the adoption of the 
IDP and the approval of the annual budget (Section 160 of the Constitution).  The 
municipal IDP “forms the policy framework and general basis on which the 
budget is be based” (Steytler and De Visser (2009: 7-4).  Once approved by the 
municipal council, both the IDP and the annual budget imposes strict compliance 
obligations and requirements for the municipal manager.  Consequently, the 
municipal manager is expected to adhere to the preferences of the principals as 
reflected in the approved IDP and the annual budget.   
 
Similarly, the executive mayor has own ex-ante budget oversight measures.  The 
executive mayor also utilises the IDP to exercise ex-ante oversight on the budget.  
As the key political executive structure of the municipality, the executive mayor 
provides general political guidance over the budget process and the priorities 
that must guide the preparation of a budget (Section 53 of the MFMA).  Section 
53 of the MFMA further instructs the executive mayor to “take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that the municipality approves its annual budget before the start 
of the budget year”.   
 
With regard to the Provincial Treasury, various legislative provisions enjoin the 
Provincial Treasury to exercise ex-ante measures on the municipal budget.  
Section 26(1) of the MFMA places a responsibility on the Provincial Treasury to 
ensure that the municipal council approves the annual before the start of the 
budget year.  Similarly, the Section 139 of the Constitution empowers the 
provincial executive to “intervene by taking any appropriate step to ensure that 
the budget or those revenue-raising measures are approved”.  This section 
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provides that the provincial government can dissolve the municipal council 
should it fail to approve the annual budget.  
  
Lastly, the National Treasury has its own ex-ante budget oversight measures.  
The National Treasury utilises the national budget and the national fiscal and 
macroeconomic policy as part of its ex-ante measures on the municipal budget 
(National Treasury, 2004: 45).  These legal instruments and policies serve to 
effectively constrain the scope and the content of the municipal manager during 
the preparation of the budget.  In particular, section 20 (1) (b) (1) of the MFMA 
states that the Minister of Finance with concurrence with the Minister responsible 
for Local Government may prescribe for the regulations, and other supporting 
documents relating to the annual budget.  Also, the MFMA Circular No 58 (2011: 
14) states that regulations are compulsory and that all municipalities “must 
prepare the budget in accordance with the regulations”.  The prescriptions can 
also include the uniform norms and standards concerning the budget of the 
municipality (Section 20 (1) (b) (v) of the MFMA).   
   
Notably, the National Treasury’s ex-ante measures impose rigid and stringent 
prescriptions regarding the format of the annual budget.  It in terms of the 
Municipal Budget and Reporting Regulations, the “annual budget and supporting 
documentation of a municipality must be in the format specified by the national 
treasury and must include tables, charts, and explanatory information, taking into 
account any guidelines issues by the Minister of Finance”.  To this effect, the 
national treasury (MFMA Circular No 67 of 2013: 20) stresses that “for all 
practical purposes, a municipal budget that is not tabled and adopted by 
municipal council in any other format than the prescriptions of the Municipal 
Budget and Reporting Regulations does not legally constitute a municipal 
budget”.  In addition, this circular states that deviation from national treasury 
format constitutes “gross financial negligence on the part of the municipal 
manager” (MFMA Circular No 67: 20).    
  
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
64 
 
3.5.2 ON-GOING BUDGET OVERSIGHT 
The municipal council exercises on-going oversight mainly through the Service 
Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) developed and adopted in 
terms of section 69 of the MFMA. The SDBIP is a monitoring instrument that 
contains detailed monthly projections of revenue and expenditure and 
performance indicators for each quarter.  The SDBIP obligates the MM to submit 
to the mayor no later than 14 days after the approval of an annual budget a draft 
service delivery and budget implementation plan for the budget year; and the 
drafts of the annual performance agreements as required in terms of section 
57(1)(b) of the Municipal Systems Act for the MM and all senior managers. 
 
Just like the municipal council, both the National and Provincial treasuries 
exercise on-going or in-year oversight on the municipal budget execution through 
various reports.  These reports are monthly, quarterly and mid-year (Section 71 
and 72 of the MFMA. The municipal manager of the municipality is required to 
submit financial performance reports to the National Treasury.  The first report 
must be submitted within 45 days after the end of each quarter while the other 
report is due four months after the end of the financial year of the municipality 
(Section 9 (e) of the Division of Revenue Act of 2016). 
 
The National Treasury (2016) states that in-year reporting is a highly strategic 
budget oversight tool that serves as a valuable management tool for early 
warning mechanisms to assist municipal councils to improve their budget 
oversight.   Hence, the National Treasury publicises the municipalities’ in-year 
financial performance information in order to “enable better in-year management 
of and oversight of the municipal budgets” (2016: 24). Evidently, the concurrent 
oversight imposes stringent compliance demands on the municipal manager.  
This seriousness of the compliance demands is reflected in section 74 of the 
MFMA which states that the MM has an obligation to submit reports to the 
executive mayor, national and Provincial Treasury and failure comply with the 
compliance demands, he/she must “promptly report the inability and provide 
reasons to the Provincial Treasury (Section 74 of the MFMA). 
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3.5.3 EX-POST OVERSIGHT  
Ex-post oversight has been described in Chapter Two of this thesis as the review 
or evaluation of how the approved budget has been implemented.  Ex-post 
oversight is exercised to determine whether the implementation of the budget 
was consistent with the approved budget.  The key activities for exercising ex-
post oversight are auditing and annual report.  The council of a municipality must 
consider the annual report of the municipality and of any municipal entity under 
the municipality's sole or shared control, and by no later than two months from 
the date on which the annual report was tabled in the council in terms of section 
127 of the MFMA.  Additionally, the municipal council is required to adopt an 
oversight report containing the council's comments on the annual report.  
  
The Executive Mayor has the legislated responsibility to ensure that the MM 
complies with the auditing process of the municipality.  In this regard, the political 
leadership role of the executive extends to ensuring that the municipal manager 
prepares and submit the required financial statements to the Auditor-General 
(Steytler and De Visser, 2009: 11-48).  Section 133 of the MFMA instructs the 
Executive Mayor to promptly report to the municipal council the failure of the 
municipal manager to submit financial statement to Auditor-General, the National 
Treasury and the provincial departments of treasury and local government.  
Section 127 (5) of the MFMA instructs the MM to, immediately after the annual 
report is tabled in the municipal council, submit the annual report to the Auditor-
General, Provincial Treasury and other provincial departments responsible for 
local government. 
   
3.6 THE IMPLICATION OF MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT   
It is clear from the above that municipal budget oversight involves multiple 
principals.  Equally apparent is that more or less the same budget oversight 
authority is dispersed to different oversight principals.  Furthermore, these 
principals employ oversight measures that reflect considerable areas of overlap 
and duplications among oversight principals.  Consequently, these overlaps and 
duplications have inevitable implications for the municipal manager.  These 
implications are discussed below.   
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
66 
 
    
The multiplicity of oversight principals with multiple and diverse oversight 
mandates have the possibility of overregulation.  Steytler (2008) identifies 
overregulation as an implication of the multiplicity of municipal budget oversight 
principals.  According to Steytler (2008), overregulation has made municipal 
budget oversight excessive with debilitating strangulation on municipal 
managers.  Furthermore, Steytler (2008) indicates that the overregulation of 
budget oversight unnecessarily exaggerates compliance.   
 
Various authors and institutions highlight the excessiveness of compliance 
requirements for the municipal manager as a manifestation of the multiplicity of 
municipal budget oversight principals. According to the FFC (2014), these 
multiple municipal budget oversight principals require the municipal manager to 
produce a plethora of financial and non-financial reports.  These onerous 
reporting requirements have a cumulative impact on the financial burden and 
human resources capacity of the municipality (FFC, 2014).   In particular, FFC 
(2014) states that some municipalities incur an expenditure of up to a total of 
about R6.8 million to comply with the compliance demands resulting from 
reporting to the multiplicity of oversight principals.   
 
The FFC, (2014: 4) quantifies the compliance obligations of municipal managers 
as follows: 
 Approximately over 75 legislative reporting requirements with 
monthly, quarterly, mid-year and annual deadlines; 
 MFMA reporting requirements - approximately over 40 reporting 
requirements; 
 DORA reporting requirement - reporting on transfers. 
 
Furthermore, the FFC (2014: 7) describes the compliance requirements as 
“authoritative, complex, intrusive, and inflexible”.  Likewise, Business Media Live 
(2009: 3) states that the municipal oversight regime imposes a compliance 
burden on the municipal administration.  In addition, Business Media Live 
indicates that “duplication and different monitoring levels take up valuable time 
that could have been used for service delivery”.  Similarly, the FFC (2014) 
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cautions that municipal budget oversight compliance regime is not only 
burdensome but can also “contribute towards moral hazard, and be difficult to 
implement and enforce”.  
  
Furthermore, the FFC (2014) highlights that the compliance burden has resulted 
in a vicious cycle, resulting in more non-compliance and poor service delivery.  
Arguably, these onerous compliance demands are likely to produce negative 
consequences.  As indicated in Chapter Two, this compliance atmosphere can 
lead to perverse and undesirable behaviour on the part of the municipal manager. 
Failure to comply with these compliance requirements invokes legally prescribed 
sanctions for the individual municipal manager, which can include criminal and 
administrations procedures against the municipal manager (FFC, 2013). 
   
Some of the above implications could be explained as stemming from defective 
intergovernmental relations.  According to Edwards (2008), there is generally a 
lack of co-operative governance across all three spheres of government.  
Similarly, Du Plessis (2008) asserts that the intergovernmental relations are 
characterised by tension and conflicts among the national, provincial and local 
government spheres of government.  Consequently, there is ineffective 
communication and a lack of coordination between the three spheres of 
government.   
 
In relation to the challenges of intergovernmental relations, the SALGA (2011: 9) 
states that municipalities are frustrated because of “monopolistic tendencies of 
the other spheres of government”.   SALGA (2011: 9) also claims that the “failures 
of national and provincial policies and processes undermine the ability, credibility 
and effectiveness of municipalities”. In addition, SALGA (2011: 9) indicates that 
the “system of intergovernmental relations is not effective in strengthening 
accountability towards achieving critical and targeted development outcomes”.  
Some of the frustrations experienced by SALGA (2011: 9) include:   
 “The lack of clarity of the roles of different spheres of government 
across various sectors; 
 The conflict and competition over powers and functions between 
provinces and local government. 
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 A perception of exclusion from planning and budgeting; 
 The hegemony of party structures within the provincial 
government.”   
 
The above list indicates and attests to the absence of an environment required 
to facilitate the multiplicity of oversight principals.  It can be deduced from the 
above-listed frustrations that the prevailing tensions and conflict are likely to 
impact on the relationship between the municipality and the other spheres of 
government.  As a result, municipalities, and particularly the municipal 
councillors, likely feel marginalised and undermined to a point where they can 
become disgruntled and disengaged.   
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This section described the municipal budget oversight relationships in South 
Africa.  The chapter utilised legislative provisions to explore and described the 
oversight relationship between the municipal manager and the political principals 
on during the municipal budget process.  Most importantly, this chapter 
highlighted the nature of delegation between the municipal manager and the 
political principals.    
  
Importantly, it was established that the municipal manager is the key 
administrative agent in the municipality appointed by the municipal council.  In 
this regard, the municipal manager is not a political actor budget an 
administrative agent delegated with administrative roles and responsibilities.  
Most significantly, the role of the municipal manager was in the municipal budget 
was explained.   It was further established that the various legal provisions create 
multiple principals that exercise oversight on the municipal budget.  Particularly, 
the chapter discussed the legal provisions that prescribe for national and 
provincial supervision, assignment and transfer of powers to municipalities and 
explicit budget oversight powers of national and Provincial Treasury. It was 
clarified that these legal provisions have created multiple principals.  In particular, 
this detailed how these various principals exercise ex-ante, concurrent and ex-
post oversight on the municipal budget.   In addition, it was established that these 
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municipalities of principals hold implication for both the municipal manager and 
the other oversight principals. 
 
It also becomes evident that the institutionalisation of the multiplicity of oversight 
principals is significantly challenged by the nature of the intergovernmental 
relations.  It was revealed that the required cooperative governance is defective.  
Similarly, it was highlighted that the interaction between the municipalities and 
other spheres of government does not facilitate a desirable environment for the 
multiplicity of political oversight principals to ensure effective municipal budget 
oversight.        
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CHAPTER 4:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter explains the design and methodology used to collect data and 
conduct analysis for the study.  This chapter has five key sections.  The first 
section restates the purpose of the study.  The second section presents the 
research design and approach, discussing the qualitative design, interpretive 
paradigm, exploratory and descriptive approaches. The third section explains the 
data collection method employed for the study.  The fourth outlines the data 
analysis processes.  And the final section of the study will explain the ethical 
considerations applied in the study.   
 
4.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study was to gain understanding of municipal budget 
oversight by multiple principals.  In endeavouring to achieve this purpose, the 
study explored the following research questions:   
1. How do municipal managers in the Western Cape Province understand 
and perceive the multiple-principal model, its application and effects on 
the municipal budget process?  
2. What do municipal councillors and Provincial Treasury officials in the 
Western Cape experience and perceive as manifestations and dynamics 
of oversight by multiple principals during the municipal budget process?   
3. What do the Western Cape Provincial Treasury officials and municipal 
councillors identify as the positive and negative effects of municipal 
budget oversight by multiple principals?     
 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH 
Burns (2000) cautions that the process of conducting research must be pursued 
and guided through a systematic research design.  According to Burns (2000), a 
research design is a systematic plan, structure and strategy of inquiry in order to 
obtain answers to the research questions and problems. For this study, a 
qualitative design was used to explore the experiences of the participants, and 
to navigate data collection, analysis, and interpretation.   
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4.3.1 QUALITATIVE DESIGN 
A qualitative research method was employed for this study to enable the process 
of gathering in-depth primary data that is rich in meaning (Babbie, 2007: 24).  The 
qualitative research methodology for this study was suitable and relevant 
because of its inherent ability to produce a holistic understanding of the rich, 
contextual and generally unstructured, non-numeric data held by municipal 
managers, Provincial Treasury and municipal councillors.  In addition, a 
qualitative methodology was preferred due to its competency for facilitating 
meaningful and constructive conversations, as well as capturing the meaning 
that Provincial Treasury, municipal managers and the municipal councillors 
assign to their experience and perceptions.  
   
Furthermore, the qualitative research method was used due to its potential to 
allow in-depth explore of little-known and poorly-understood issues or 
phenomena on which no studies have been conducted before (Lincoln and Guba, 
1999: 141). As indicated in Chapter One of this study, very little is known about 
the experiences and perceptions of municipal managers, Provincial Treasury and 
municipal councillors regarding the nature, meanings, issues and dynamics of 
municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.      
 
4.3.2 INTERPRETIVE PARADIGM 
This study utilised the interpretive paradigm due to its focus on understanding 
the views and meaning from the perspective of municipal managers, Provincial 
Treasury and municipal councillors and their municipal budget oversight 
environments (Neuman, 2000).  According to Neuman (2000) an interpretive 
paradigm is concerned with understanding the lived experiences of people 
through interpreting, creating, give meaning, defining and justifying, in order to 
make sense of their worlds.  Fundamentally, interpretive paradigm guided the 
process of drawing the participants’ subjective experiences and perceptions 
through listening to narration.  
 
Understanding the complexity of municipal budget oversight by multiple 
principals requires an interpretive investigation in order to respond to the context 
and obtaining dynamics.  Similarly, an interpretive approach was considered 
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relevant and suitable to enable the elevation of detail and unique information 
possessed by the participants.  This approach was considered useful to allow for 
a constructive engagement with structures of consciousness as lived and 
experienced by the participants in the Western Cape Province.   
 
4.3.3 EXPLORATORY AND DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH  
As already indicated, the study sought to inquire about a phenomenon that is 
little understood and is characterised by little knowledge or information regarding 
its effects (Creswell, 2009).  Consequently, there was a need to explore the 
phenomenon in order to understand it better.  An exploratory approach is often 
undertaken when studying a phenomenon in order to gain understanding about 
its nature and problems (Babbie, 2007).  Equally, an exploratory approach is 
commonly suitable for conducting preliminary investigation of a process, event 
or phenomenon (Babbie, 2007).   According to Babbie (2007), an exploratory 
approach is used in situation where the research problem has not been clearly 
defined.  
  
Similarly, a descriptive approach was used to enable participants to reflect on 
their understanding of the topic.  In particular, a descriptive approach was used 
to enable the participants to describe the phenomenon of municipal budget 
oversight by multiple principals, its issues, dynamics and complexities. The 
research questions for this study also required that a documentation and 
description of the phenomenon in a manner that take its natural context into 
consideration (Burns and Grove, 2005).   
 
4.3.5 CASE STUDY  
This study adopted a case study design for its ability to gain in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon. A case study is used to investigate a 
bounded system or a specific person or group of people (Merriam, 2002).  
According to Yin (2003) a case study can be employed as an empirical inquiry 
for investigating a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context in order 
to interrogate what, how, and why questions and where an investigator has little 
control over the events. 
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The exploratory and descriptive approach was combined with a case study 
strategy.  Yin (2003) states that case study refers to a comprehensive research 
strategy with an all-encompassing method, which includes the logic of design, 
data collection techniques, and specific approach to data analysis.  As a 
comprehensive research method commonly used to explore a phenomenon.  
According to Thomas (2011) a case study is one of several ways of doing 
research aimed at understanding human beings in a social context by interpreting 
their actions as a single group or community or a single event. Thomas (2011: 
513) states:  
“Case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, 
projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied 
holistically by one or more methods. The case that is the subject of 
the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides 
an analytical frame—an object—within which the study is conducted 
and which the case illuminates and explicates”.  
 
Despite the potential strengths of the case study design to contribute to the aim 
of this study, I also took into account its possible limitations.  In particular, as the 
researcher, I was acutely aware of the inability case study to enable a 
generalisable conclusion due to its intrinsic small set of data.  Consequently, it 
will be methodologically inappropriate to conclude that the findings from the 
Western Cape municipalities would be the same as in other provinces with 
different social and political context.      
  
4.4 DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
As indicated above, an empirical investigation was pursued through qualitative 
data collection methods.  This was to ensure that data collection was conducted 
in a manner that will reinforce the validity and trustworthiness of the study.  
Primary data was collected from participants in the study through in-depth 
interviews.     
 
4.4.1   INTERVIEWS  
In this study, in-depth interviews with participants were considered appropriate 
given the qualitative and exploratory nature of the study.  This inference is 
consistent with Fontana and Frey (1994: 361) assertion that “interviewing is one 
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of the most common and most powerful techniques researchers use to try and 
understand fellow human beings”. Given that, the phenomenon of municipal 
budget oversight by multiple principals is a complex and not easy to observe, it 
was deemed appropriate to utilise interviews to collect primary data.   
 
As interaction with participants occurred at different intervals and through 
different methods, and degree of focus of the study was historical (Yin, 2003), it 
was not possible to conduct a direct observation of the practice of municipal 
budget oversight by multiple principals.  Thus, I relied on qualitative interviewing 
in order to draw the perspectives of the participants being interviewed.  In 
addition, interviews made the data generation “meaningful, and explicit” (Patton, 
2002: 341).  In Patton’s (2002: 342) view, qualitative interview technique seeks 
to “know what is on and in the mind of interviewees and to gather their stories”.  
Therefore, the qualitative interview techniques were very useful in unearthing 
views, experiences and perceptions of the participants.  In addition, interviews 
helped to obtain targeted and insightful information on the model, manifestations 
and effects of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals (Yin 2003).  
 
In this regard, qualitative interviews were the most appropriate means of 
collecting data for this study.  In fact, the ability to draw comprehensive and useful 
experience and perception of municipal managers and oversight principals on 
municipal budget oversight can be attributed to qualitative interviewing (Holstein 
and Gubrium, 1995: 78).  These interviews established a structured process to 
understand the municipal budget oversight through the eyes of the municipal 
managers and political oversight principals as the actors centrally involved the 
municipal budget oversight relationship. 
   
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews were used as the primary method to 
gather data. Semi-structured qualitative interviews are preferred when the 
researcher intends to seek more than yes or no answers.  According to Scapens 
(2004: 267), semi-structured interviews provide the necessary flexibility to 
“explore the issues in depth, and to follow up the responses that are given by the 
interviewee”.  Thus, meaningful face-to face semi-structured interviews were the 
most suitable method to investigate how municipal managers and oversight 
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principal experience and perceive the municipal budget oversight and its 
associated architecture and complexity.   Interview questions were structured as 
open-ended to allow for further probing of answers and issues raised.  Open-
ended data gathering or interviewing allows social phenomena to be explored in 
considerable depth (Hartley, 1999:  211).  This is possible as open-ended 
questions, that have not encouraged “predetermined” responses from 
interviewees, allow researchers to explore, “probe”, capture and understand “the 
world as seen by respondents” (Patton, 2002: 21). 
 
To ensure that semi-structured interviews were effective, I used an interview 
guide.  Walter (2013: 238) describes the interview guide as a “just a short list of 
the main topics or themes you want to address during the interview”.  An 
interview guide is an instrument used to structure the interview questions and 
engagement.  Similarly, it is used to help the researcher be meticulous and 
coherent, and to ensure that key areas of the study are adequately covered.  I 
was also fully aware that it is sometimes difficult to discern the truthfulness of 
what transpires in the interview.  However, since the focus of this study was on 
the understanding and perceptions of the participants rather than the truth, this 
issue was not an impediment.  In this regard, I was more interested in what the 
participants perceived, believed and thought about the design, behaviour and 
effects of multiple principals on municipal budget oversight.  
 
All interviews were conducted in English.  The interview questions were designed 
to be open-ended rather than closed, making sure that the interviewees were not 
restricted to certain questions and answers.  Thus, the three research questions 
of this study were used to guide the interviews.  This approach was considered 
appropriate to provide participants with the ability to reflect on their views, beliefs 
and opinions.  As Aberbach and Rockman (2002: 674) have advised, face-to face 
open-ended interviews allow for participants to “articulate their views, explaining 
why they think what they think”.  
 
These interviews were structured and handled in a manner that allows for a 
conversation and controlled the dialogue with municipal managers and political 
oversight principals as participants for the study. Likewise, the interview process 
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and questions were handled in a manner that that could best enable responses 
and a follow up.  Exploratory key qualitative questions were framed as follows: 
“What is your view?”; “What is your impression?”; “From your perspective?”; How 
would you describe?”; “What is your view and attitude?” Naturally, follow-up 
questions explored in detail responses from the participants.  
 
As indicated, the above interview approach and questioning facilitated a 
conversation between me and the participants.  Particularly, it allowed the 
interview process to focus on the participant’s experience and perceptions 
expressed in their own words (Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell, and Alexander, 
1990).  As a result, the interviews not only provided a space to explore and 
describe the experience and perceptions of participants on the phenomenon but 
also allowed for further interrogation of the descriptions provided by the 
participants.   
 
While the interview questions were planned beforehand, it became necessary for 
me to make changes. The need to make changes to the initial or planned 
changes is supported by Creswell (2007: 107) who notes that “qualitative 
questions are evolving and that the first iterations of questions are tentative and 
exploratory but give researchers a tool for articulating the primary focus of the 
study”.   In this regard, when I realised that an interview question was too narrow 
to prompt or generate more data from the participants, additional or new interview 
questions were introduced.   
   
All sixteen interviews were conducted with both municipal managers and the 
oversight principals during the months of October 2016 and September 2017.  
The interviews with oversight principals were intermittently held from December 
2016 to September 2017.  All the interviews were held at the participants’ 
workplaces, and were recorded on a digital recording device.  More importantly, 
the interviews were interactive and conversational. 
   
Interviews with municipal managers were less complex because they had a 
general understanding of the questions and concepts. I therefore had to provide 
minimal explanations of issues.  However, interviews with principals (councillors 
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and WC treasury) often required me to explain the some terminology and issues.  
While the constant explanations took more time, it also enabled participants to 
develop an understanding and participate meaningfully.   
 
After the fifth interview with the municipal managers and 11th interview with the 
oversight principals, I felt that adequate data had been collected to answer the 
research questions.  My observation was that the participants were frequently 
repeating the same issues, describing issues and sharing similar experiences 
and perceptions in a similar way.  This was despite my effort in asking and 
probing questions differently.  At this point, I felt that the interviews have reached 
a saturation point.  The saturation point is when no new insights or new 
descriptive code, categories or themes are emerging from the interviews 
(Charmaz, 2006).  Charmaz (2006) defines saturation in the context of a study 
sample as indicating that adequate data has been received and that useful 
questions have been exhausted.  Likewise, Strauss and Corbin (1998: 42) 
describe “saturation as a matter of degree, when pursuing additional data 
becomes counterproductive and new discoveries do not add value to the ongoing 
research project”.   
  
I then discussed the issue of saturation with my supervisor, who advised that the 
qualitative nature of study and the problem is not concerned with quantity, but 
that there is adequate data to answer the questions about the study.  Accordingly, 
it was decided that the amount of data generated from the five municipal 
managers and ten principals was adequate for the purposes of the responding 
the questions of the study.     
     
It was therefore my considered view that these participants contributed in 
exploring and describing the phenomenon of municipal budget oversight by 
multiple principals.  For this purpose, I ensured that the majority of participants 
were those who have been in the municipality for at for more than a year.  It must 
be noted that that the interviews took place a few months after the municipal 
elections.     
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4.4.2 SAMPLING 
Participants for the study were selected in a purposive manner.   Black (2010) 
defines purposive sampling as a technique in which the “researcher relies on his 
or her own judgment when choosing members of the population to participate in 
the study”. Similarly, Berger and Luckmann (1966) describe purposive sampling 
as a method, which the researcher deliberately chooses who to include as 
participants in the study based on their ability to provide necessary and relevant 
data.   
 
Purposeful sampling is common in qualitative research and seeks cases rich in 
information.  There are various benefits of purposive sampling.  Firstly, it 
facilitates access to participants who can provide relevant details about issues of 
central importance to the purpose of the research.  Purposive sampling is also 
often used when only limited numbers of people can serve as primary data 
sources due to the nature of research structure and aims and objectives 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2012).   
 
Municipal managers, councillors and Provincial Treasury officials in the Western 
Cape Province were ideal participants for this study due to their deep knowledge 
of the municipal budget oversight processes.  Being centrally involved in 
municipal budget oversight processes, the municipal managers, Provincial 
Treasury official and municipal councillors are also familiar with the associated 
complexities and challenges.  They are key knowledge reservoirs from which to 
obtain descriptive and exploratory views, insights, opinions, perspective and 
picture of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.   
  
Black (2010) lists the following advantages of purposive sampling:    
 Purposive sampling is one of the most cost-effective and time-effective 
sampling methods available 
 Purposive sampling may be the only appropriate method available if there 
are only a limited number of primary data sources who can contribute to 
the study 
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 This sampling technique can be effective in exploring anthropological 
situations where the discovery of meaning can benefit from an intuitive 
approach. 
 
This above inference is supported by Berger and Luckmann (1966: 61) who state 
that “experienced reality is a result of social construction”.  It is also important to 
keep in mind that the objectivity of the institutional world, however massive it may 
appear to the individual, is a humanly produced, constructed objectivity.  
Although constructed, reality can thus still be conceived as objective reality by 
humans, but this objectivity is a social product build in relationships. 
 
Table 2: Municipal Managers who Participated in the Study 
Interviewees Gender Experi
ence  
Category of 
Municipality 
Participant 1: MM 1 
Date:  28/10/2016 
Interview Duration: 1:50:08  
Male >10 
years 
Local 
Municipality 
Participant 2: MM2 
Date:  12/11/2016 
Interview Duration: 1:30:15 
Male >10 
years 
Local  
Participant 3: MM3  
Date: 17/11/2016 
Interview Duration: 1:45:07 
Male 9 
years 
District  
Participant 4: MM4 
Date: 06/12/2016 
Interview Duration: 1:37:24 
Male 7 
years 
Local  
Participant 5: MM 5 
Date: 19/07/2017 
Interview Duration: 1:34:14 
Male >10 
years 
Local  
 
Of the 11 budget oversight principals who participated in the study, 10 were 
municipal councillors from different municipalities and 1 participant was an official 
from the Provincial Treasury.  These councillors were mainly recruited from the 
same municipalities as participating municipal managers.  The Provincial 
Treasury official is located in the Local Government Budget Office, in the Western 
Cape Provincial Treasury.         
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Table 3:   An Interview List of Oversight Principals  
Interviewees Gender Experience From 
Principal 1:  PT 
Date: 06/12/2016 
Interview Duration:  
1:35:02 
Male > 5 Years Provincial Treasury 
Principal 2: CL 1 
Date:  26/06/2017 
Interview Duration:  
1:08:04 
Male > 6 years Local Municipality 
Principal 3: CL 2 
Date:  26/06/2017 
Interview Duration: 
1:04:20 
Male > 6 years Local Municipality 
Principal 4: CL 3  
Date: 27/06/2017 
Interview Duration: 
1:04:40 
Female >7 years District Municipality 
Principal 5: CL 4 
Date: 27/06/2017 
Interview Duration: 
45:08 
Male >5 years District Municipality 
Principal 6: CL 5 
Date: 27/06/2017 
Interview Duration: 
1:21:17 
Male >5 years Local Municipality 
Principal 7: CL 6 
Date: 27/06/2017 
Interview Duration: 
1:05:12 
Male >5 years Local Municipality 
Principal 8: CL 7 
Date:  06/07/2017 
Interview Duration: 
1:32:12 
Male >5 years Metro Municipality 
Principal 9: CL 8 
Date: 07/07/2017 
Interview Duration: 
1:08:46 
Male > 15 years Local Municipality 
Principal 10: CL 9 
Date: 07/07/2017 
Interview Duration: 
1:14:38 
Male > 15 years Local Municipality 
Principal 11: CL 10 
Date: 05/09/2017 
Interview Duration: 
1:40:14 
Male >5 years Local Municipality 
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4.4.4 RECRUITMENT OF PARTICIPANTS 
The participation of municipal managers, Provincial Treasury and the municipal 
councillors was solicited through a telephone call and an email stating the 
purpose of the interview and requesting their consent to be interviewed.  Those 
participants who agreed to participate were sent a consent form and the interview 
participation sheet prior to the interview session.  All participants were allowed to 
decide on the time and venue for the interviews.   
   
The municipal councillors proved difficult to recruit for the study.  This is because, 
unlike municipal managers, councillors were required to obtain permission from 
their political parties to participate in the study.  Thus, it took a while for 
councillors to agree and make themselves available for the study.  It is also 
important to note that the high level of turnover of municipalities made it difficult 
to get relevant and appropriate councillors in some municipalities.   
 
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS  
I utilised the qualitative data analysis approach to analyse data from the 
interviews.  Qualitative data analysis is defined as “an approach that emphasises 
the role of the investigator in the construction of meaning of texts” (Kohlbacher: 
2006: 11).  Bryman (2012: 542), on the other hand, refers to qualitative data 
analysis as an approach that allows categories and themes to “emerge out of 
data and on recognising the significance of understanding the meaning of the 
context in which an item being analysed appeared”.  Therefore, I utilised 
qualitative data analysis approach to deal with complex social phenomena such 
as municipal budget oversight by multiple principals (Kohlbacher, 2006).  
Similarly, the qualitative content analysis was used to its inclination to be a 
theory-guided approach or methods of analysing interview scripts.  
      
Qualitative data analysis involves “organising, categorising and identifying 
recurrent patterns presented in the data to explore the meaning and processes 
associated with the categories of behaviour” (Kelly, 1995: 287).  Accordingly, 
effective analysis of data requires a structured interpretation of data in order to 
understand the underlying meaning from the point of view of the participants who 
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live, feel and experience it.   An important aspect of data analysis in a qualitative 
case study is the search for meaning through direct interpretation of what is 
experienced and reported by the subjects. 
This study followed the six data analysis steps as provided for by Creswell (2012: 
236):    
a) Organising the data;  
b) Exploring and coding the data;  
c) Describing findings and forming themes;  
d) Representing and reporting findings;  
e) Interpreting the meaning of the findings; and  
f) Validating the accuracy of the findings.  
 
These above-mentioned steps were followed to enable the process of generating 
a meaning.  In terms of the steps outlined above, the analysis process started 
with transcribing, coding and development of themes and sub-themes. 
Therefore, this process of analysing data was guided by qualitative data analysis 
techniques and procedures.  These techniques and procedures are part of the 
data analysis process that includes transcribing, coding and developing themes 
from the data.   
 
I followed these techniques and processes to analyse the data collected from the 
interviews.  This process intended to listen, interpret and understanding the 
meaning, subtleties and the ambiguities expressed during the interviews.  The 
process is discussed below.    
 
4.5.1 TRANSCRIPTION OF DATA 
On completion of the interviews for this study, I commenced the data analysis 
process with the tedious exercise of transcribing multitudes of data from 
interviews.  The transcribing exercises entailed the transferring of audio material 
as well as field notes taken during the interview into a comprehensible written 
text.  To this end, I undertook a verbatim transcription of data to reduce, interpret 
and present what was originally unorganised data into visual, useable and 
complete data (Bailey, 2008).  
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The exercise of transcription required me to listen to the audio recordings and 
painstakingly type the conversations.  Accordingly, a considerable amount of 
time and effort was expended in this activity.  A total amount of forty five hours 
was spent listening and transcribing data from the sixteen interviews.  In some 
instances, it became difficult to hear clearly some words due to the background 
noise or the interviewee lowering the voice.  In these instances, I utilised the field 
notes to make sense of the missing dialogue.  
              
The completed transcripts were sent to the participants as per a prior 
arrangement.  In terms of this arrangement, the participants undertook to go 
through the transcripts and where necessary correct any misrepresentation.  
Follow-up telephone discussions were held with the three participants as the 
other thirteen participants indicated that satisfaction with the transcripts.  These 
participants made minor corrections to the transcripts.   
 
4.5.2 DATA CODING PROCESS 
Once the transcribing exercise was completed, I began with the coding.  Sutton 
and Austin (2015: 228) refer to coding as the “identification of topics, issues, 
similarities, and the differences that are revealed by the researcher”.   Data 
coding was conducted manually, as the transcribed interviews generated huge 
volumes of data to be analysed.  Thus, a simple coding was conducted 
classifying the data into a matrix table.  The flowchart below provides a sketch of 
the data coding process.  The development of the matrix table, an important 
aspect of coding in qualitative analysis, enabled me to reduce data (Sutton and 
Austin, 2015).   
 
I also conducted a descriptive coding stage entailed the utilisation of objective 
characteristics of the phenomenon to classify data.  Interpretive coding 
contributed a detailed layer of meaning to the descriptive analysis.  The 
interpretive exercise provided concepts as well as created pattern and themes.  
Accordingly, the themes arising from qualitative analysis of interview data 
provided insight into participant experiences and perceptions of critical issues 
relating to the municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.   
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4.5.3 Thematic Analysis 
As indicated above, qualitative data analysis involved the processes of 
developing themes.  A theme refers to an “attribute, descriptor or element” 
(Vaismoradi, Jones, Turunen and Snelgrove, 2016: 101). Themes are created or 
emerge when the researcher seeks to interrogate the underlying meaning of the 
participants’ words. (Gray, 1998).  It is also important to note that some of the 
key themes have ordinarily emerged from exploring the literature on oversight 
and multiple principals.     
        
Accordingly, I developed themes in order to establish the meaning embedded in 
the participants’ experiences and perceptions.  The development of themes is 
defined as a process of “drawing together codes from one or more transcripts to 
present the finding of the qualitative research in a coherent and meaningful way” 
(Sutton and Austin, 2015: 229).  In developing themes, I was able to organise 
codes and compare them in terms of similarities and differences.  These themes 
were as considered to encapsulate an explicit description and representation of 
the research question.  Consequently, the process of constructing themes 
resulted in the complete analytical description of the phenomenon being 
investigated.   
 
4.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A qualitative research design is often intrusive.  The conducting of a qualitative 
study means that the researcher interacts deeply with the participants, thus 
entering their personal domains of values and weaknesses, when collecting data 
using interviews.  For this reason, I was mindful of the fact that I was entering the 
private spaces of the participants.  In addition, I took very seriously the obligation 
to respect the rights, needs and values of the participants (Creswell, 2009).   
 
 In an effort to adhere to the ethical considerations, I dutifully informed all 
participants that their participation was voluntary.  I diligently informed the 
participants of the protocols and relevant ethical issues.  These were discussed 
with the participants, and all participants signed the consent forms.  I also 
requested that this part of the interviews be recorded on the audio tape with the 
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permission of the participants.  In addition to the audio recordings, I duly informed 
the participants that he will be taking notes on important issues as they were 
mentioned by the participants.   
 
The participation information sheet containing the purpose of the study and 
related information was provided to the participants prior to the interviews.  The 
sample of the participation information sheet is presented as Appendix 1.  In 
addition, informed consent was obtained from all the individual participants who 
participated in the study.  A sample of the consent form has been presented in 
Appendix 2.  In addition, both the participation information sheet and the consent 
form guaranteed the participants anonymity during the interview.  Furthermore, 
all possible identifiers were either disguised by using pseudonyms or completely 
protected with the strictest level.  In this way, confidentiality was maintained at 
all time.  
  
4.6.1 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
Reliability was a prime concern throughout the different activities on the thesis.  
In this regard, utmost care was exercised in ensuring that appropriate 
measurements and processes were applied consistently.  This means that 
whether the same results would be achieved if the measure was applied 
repeatedly (Creswell, 2009).  On the other hand, I ensured that relevant, reliable 
data were collected.  In particular, I made sure that the data collected addressed 
the research questions (Creswell, 2009).  Equally, in an effort to ensure that the 
study results are valid, I ensured that the interview questions were clear and 
comprehensible.      
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4.6.2 TRUSTWORTHINESS 
According to Holloway (1997:161), “trustworthiness is the truth value of a piece 
of research”. A research project is trustworthy when it reflects the reality and 
ideas of the participants (Creswell, 2009). Creswell (2009) adds that the 
trustworthiness of the research depends on the extent to which it delves into the 
participants’ experience.  In this study, trustworthiness was ensured by through 
laying aside my preconceived ideas about the phenomenon under investigation 
and by returning to participants to 
 
The following chapter (Chapter Five) presents the results of the data collected 
for the municipal managers.  These results will enable me to develop appropriate 
findings on the perceptions of municipal managers on municipal budget oversight 
by multiple principals.   
 
4.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter presented the research paradigm, design, and methods that were 
undertaken to the answer the research questions of this study.  More 
fundamentally, the chapter provided justification for adopting the interpretive 
paradigm.  Likewise, the chapter highlighted the reasons why I adopted in the 
qualitative exploratory and descriptive research approach.   In addition, the 
chapter indicated why the case study methodology was considered the most 
appropriate approach to employ because it provides a systematic way to collect 
data, analyse information. 
 
In a significant way, the chapter highlighted how I engaged in the qualitative 
interviews with the participants when collecting the primary data.  The 
participants in the study provided rich, invaluable data on their experiences and 
perceptions on municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  In addition, 
themes were constructed in order to present descriptions of participants’ 
experiences and perceptions in a manner that managed to reduce, organise and 
cluster data into themes generated from the interviews.   
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CHAPTER 5: MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT IN THE 
WESTERN CAPE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a descriptive overview of the governance of the municipal 
budget oversight in the Western Cape Province.  To understand and appreciate 
the experiences and perceptions of municipal managers, municipal councillors 
and Provincial Treasury on the multiple oversight principals model, and its 
manifestations, dynamics and effects on the municipal budget oversight, it was 
essential to develop a picture of the municipal budget governance environment 
of the Western Cape and participating municipalities. 
 
This chapter has two sections. The first section provides an overview of the 
governance environment of the Western Cape Province.  The second section 
identifies the municipal budget oversight principals.  This section will not repeat 
information already covered in Chapter Three of this thesis, but rather focuses 
more on the budget oversight role of provincial government departments.      
 
5.2 GOVERNANCE CONTEXT OF MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT IN THE 
WESTERN CAPE PROVINCE 
The Western Cape is one of the nine provinces of South Africa established in 
terms of Section 103 of the Constitution.  Like other provincial governments, the 
Constitution grants the provincial government of the Western Cape both 
legislative and executive authority (Section 104 and 125 of the Constitution).  
Consequently, the Western Cape derives its existence, powers and functions 
directly from the Constitution, and accordingly enjoys constitutional protection.  
 
The establishment of the provincial governments, like the Western Cape 
government, represents a fundamental transformation of the institutional 
architecture of the post-apartheid constitutional dispensation (Maré, 1991).  
Notably, provincial governments emerged during the negotiations to end 
apartheid in South Africa as a peace-making compromise to conciliate the 
divergent political and ideological positions (Maré, 1991).  In particular, provincial 
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governments represent one of the deal-breakers between the African National 
Congress centralist and unitary ideological inclination and obstinate federalists 
like the National Party and Democratic Party (Maré, 1991; De Villiers, (2007) as 
well as ethnic-based groupings from right-wing Afrikaners and Zulu nationalists 
(Steytler and Mettler, 2001).  De Villiers (2007: 3) argues that the issue of 
provinces was “the most contentious part of the negotiating process and had it 
not included the Interim Constitution, the negotiation process would have 
collapsed”. 
   
 Currently, the Western Cape Province has a population of 6,510,300, which is 
11.5% of the total population of South Africa (Statistics SA, 2017).  The Provincial 
Treasury (2017) attributes the growth of the population to net in-migration.  In its 
Provincial Economic Review and Outlook 2017, the Western Cape Provincial 
Treasury (WCPT) (2017a: 12) highlights that “almost two-thirds (64.1 per cent) 
of the provincial population resides in the City of Cape Town”. The population 
consists of a Coloured majority (3,174,269), followed by Black (1,796,247), White 
(1,071,087) and Indian (41,246) (Statistics SA, 2017).  The   official languages of 
the province are Afrikaans, IsiXhosa and English.   
 
According to Statistics SA (2017), the Western Cape Province is the third largest 
province in South Africa, and contributes about 14.4% to the national gross 
domestic product.   It has a strong economic mix, predominantly involving the 
agriculture, fishing and tourism sectors (Rakabe, 2017).  According to Rakabe 
(2017), the Western Cape is an urban province, despite being the second highest 
in agricultural output after KwaZulu-Natal.   
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5.2.1 DISTINCTIVE GOVERNANCE FEATURES OF THE WESTERN CAPE PROVINCE 
The governance context and dynamics of the Western Cape Province and its 
municipalities have distinct circumstances, capacities and challenges.  These are 
largely influenced by the fact that the Western Cape, like other provinces of South 
Africa, has unique “political variables, inherited institutional legacies and patterns 
of political contestations” (Levy, Cameron, Hoadly and Naidoo: 2016: 10).  
Similarly, the Western Cape has inherited distinctive institutional legacies and 
arrangements shaped along both “ethnic and geographical locales” (Levy, et al, 
2016).   These distinctive features are discussed below.  
   
 5.2.1.1 THE WESTERN CAPE CONSTITUTION 
The first distinctive feature of the Western Cape is that it is the only province 
which has its own provincial Constitution.  Though the KwaZulu–Natal province, 
dominated by the Inkatha Freedom Party provincial legislature, attempted to get 
its provincial Constitution certified, this was rejected by the Constitutional Court 
on 6 September 1996 (Simeon and Murray, 2001).  The Western Cape, on the 
other hand, persisted with the adoption of its provincial Constitution and 
ultimately managed to get it to pass the certification test by the Constitutional 
Court on 21 February 1997 (Murray, 2001). 
 
This Constitution of the Western Cape applies only to the Western Cape Province 
(Section 9 of the Constitution of the Western Cape).   It is important to note that 
though the Constitution of the Western Cape is  “the highest law in the Western 
Cape Province, it is still subordinate to the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa and accordingly, the obligations imposed by it must be performed diligently 
and without delay” (Section 9 of the Constitution of the Western Cape).  The 
significance of the Western Cape Constitution is that it enables the provincial 
government to institute minor contextual additions and innovations rather than 
rely completely on the default provisions prescribed for the provincial 
governments by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Murray, 2001). 
Other than the benign difference with the Constitution of the Republic, the 
Western Cape Constitution is characterised by many verbatim quotes copied 
directly from the South African Constitution (Murray, 2001).  Authors differ 
regarding whether the Western Cape Constitution establishes a federal or a 
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unitary state (Malherbe, 2008).  It is, however, important to note that both the 
New National Party, as erstwhile governing party after 1994, and the Democratic 
Alliance, the current governing party, have displayed tendencies that elevate 
provincial identity (Bekker, Leildé, Cornelissen and Horstmeier, 2000).   
Literature is replete with examples of constant conflict between the Democratic 
Alliance and national government regarding the devolution of powers to the 
Western Cape government. 
   
A noticeable but minor difference is that the Western Cape Constitution does not 
use titles such as the Executive Council and Member of the Executive Council 
(MEC) as provided in section 15 of the Constitution.  Rather, Section 35 of the 
Western Cape Constitution refers to Executive Council as the Cabinet and the 
MECs as Provincial Minsters.  Likewise, Section 104 of the Constitution refers to 
Provincial Legislatures while the Western Cape refers to it as a Provincial 
Parliament (Section 9 of the Western Cape Constitution). 
    
The Western Cape Constitution gives effect to the intergovernmental relationship 
between the provincial government and the municipalities.  Specifically, the 
provincial governments enjoy the authority to pass framework legislation dealing 
with national standards, minimum requirements and monitoring procedures for 
municipalities (Constitutional Court Judgement, 2010).  Accordingly, the 
oversight relationship between the province and the municipalities finds 
adequate expression in the Western Cape Constitution.  Words such as “support” 
(Section 52), “monitoring” (Section 54) and “supervision” (Section 59), and 
‘ensure effective performance’ (Section 54 (2)) describe the oversight 
relationship between the provincial government and municipalities.  Arguably, the 
Western Cape Constitution is bequeathed with both legislative and executive 
authority to exercise oversight on municipalities in the province.       
 
The Western Cape Constitution empowers the provincial government to provide 
for a framework and guidelines for how the provincial government should 
exercise monitoring of municipalities in the province (Section 54 of the Western 
Cape Constitution).  However, Mathenjwa (2015: 180) cautions that:  
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 “The power of provincial government to supervise local government 
does not entitle provincial government to compete with local 
government for the exercise of such power; instead, it requires a 
provincial government to coordinate its activities with local 
government in addressing any and all deficiencies that may exist in 
the functioning of local government.”  
 
In particular section 54 (1) of the Western Cape Constitution provides that; 
“Western Cape government must, by legislative or other measures, 
provide for the monitoring and support of local government in the 
Western Cape; and promote the development of local government 
capacity to enable municipalities to perform their functions and 
manage their own affairs.”  
 
In addition, the Western Cape Constitution provides conditions under which the 
provincial government can intervene in a municipality. In terms of Section   49 
(1) of the Western Cape Constitution:  
“When a municipality in the Western Cape cannot or does not fulfil 
an executive obligation in terms of legislation, the Provincial Cabinet 
may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of 
that obligation, including: 
issuing a directive to the Municipal Council, describing the extent of 
the failure to fulfil its obligations and stating any steps required to 
meet its obligations; and  
assuming responsibility for the relevant obligation in that municipality 
to the extent necessary -   
to maintain essential national standards or meet established 
minimum standards for the rendering of a service;  
(ii) to prevent that Municipal Council from taking unreasonable action 
that is prejudicial to the interests of another municipality or to the 
Western Cape as a whole; or (iii) to maintain economic unit.” 
 
 5.2.1.2   WESTERN CAPE MONITORING AND SUPPORT OF MUNICIPALITIES  
The second governance feature of the Western Cape is the specific provincial 
legislation regulating oversight between the provincial government and 
municipalities in the Western Cape.  Evidently, the Western Cape is the only 
province which has domesticated Section 154(1) and 155(6) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, which provide for provincial support and 
monitoring of municipalities.  Therefore, in addition to its provincial Constitution, 
the Western Cape government enacted the Western Cape Monitoring and 
Support of Municipalities Act of 2014 to provide for specific measures to support 
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municipalities, develop and strengthen the capacity of municipalities and to 
improve their performance.   
 
The Western Cape Monitoring and Support of Municipalities Act No 4 of 2014 
(2014) has been enacted to:  
“…further provide measures to support municipalities, to develop and 
strengthen the capacity of municipalities and to improve their 
performance in accordance with section 106(1) of the Municipal 
Systems Act, 2000.  In addition, the Western Cape Monitoring and 
Support of Municipalities Act also provides clarity and details for how 
the provincial government should implement the monitoring of 
suspected non-performance and maladministration in 
municipalities.”   
 
Fundamentally, Section 2 of the Western Cape Monitoring and Support of 
Municipalities Act empowers the Provincial Minister to:   
“…create opportunities for direct contact between municipalities and 
officials of the departments; and to at regular intervals convene 
meetings, workshops and information sessions where information, 
knowledge and views relating to the exercise of municipal powers 
and the performance of municipal functions can be shared.” 
 
 
Section 4 of the Western Cape Monitoring and Support of Municipalities Act also 
empowers any Provincial Minister to issue practice notes and circulars to 
municipalities in order to regularise support and monitoring system.  This 
provision allows the Provincial Minister to develop systems, standards, 
processes and activities for municipalities.  In terms of Section 4 (2) of the 
Western Cape Monitoring and Support of Municipalities Act, the “practice note 
must pertain to systems, processes, procedures or activities in general or best-
practice standards, as determined by the Provincial Minister”.  
 
The Western Cape Monitoring and Support of Municipalities Act provides 
guidelines on how the Provincial Minister may intervene in a municipality.  It is 
important to note that the power of the provincial government to intervene in a 
municipality is governed by Section 139 of the Constitution and the section 160 
of the Municipal Systems Act.  Accordingly, intervention should be based on 
objective assessment and investigations as contemplated by section 5 and 6 of 
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the Western Cape Monitoring and Support of Municipalities Act.  Consequently, 
the Western Cape Monitoring and Support of Municipalities Act does not allow 
for unilateral and arbitrary intervention in the municipality in terms of section 160 
of the Constitution.  Similar to section 139 of the Constitution, the Western Cape 
Monitoring and Support of Municipalities Act outlines stringent measures that 
must be adhered to before the Provincial Minister intervenes in a municipality.    
  
Accordingly, the interface between the provincial government and municipalities 
in the Western Cape is governed and regulated by an explicit provincial act.  It is 
worth noting that while other provinces rely on the Constitution and other national 
legislation to interact with their respective municipalities, the Western Cape 
Government has passed a provincial act, the Western Cape Monitoring and 
Support of Municipalities Act 4 of 2014, for this purpose.  Therefore, the Western 
Cape is unique in terms of using a provincial law to institutionalise the monitoring 
of municipalities by the provincial government.    
 
 5.2.1.3 MUNICIPALITIES IN THE WESTERN CAPE 
South Africa’s constitutional architecture and its transformation process has 
established district, metro and local municipalities in the Western Cape.  These 
jurisdictions are all constitutional creations vested with constitutional legislative 
and executive authority (section 151 of the Constitution; Section 8 of the 
Municipal Structures Act).   Each jurisdiction has its own municipal council, which 
serves as the legislative and executive authority of municipality, whilst the 
Executive Mayors have council-delegated executive functions to lead the 
executive structures of the municipalities.  
  
The Western Cape Province has 30 municipalities: 1 Metro; 5 District 
Municipalities; and 24 Local Municipalities.  These municipalities are depicted 
below: 
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Figure: 3:  Map of Municipalities   
 
 
 
 
 
 Source:  Muncipal Demarcation Board 
(http://www.demarcation.org.za/site/western-cape-2-2-2-2-3/) 
 
The Western Cape municipalities, like other municipalities across the country, 
are commonly classified according to a set of criteria.  In this classification, 
“municipalities are placed into one of the seven categories, namely, A; B1; B2; 
B3; B4; C1; C2” (Powell and O’Donovan (2015: 4).  Powell and O’Donovan 
(2015: 12) state that the “significance of this classification is that it highlights the 
population size, settlement, type administrative burden, service burden and well 
as the resource capacity of the municipalities”.  Powell and O’Donovan (2015: 
12) list the classification as follows: 
 A: Metropolitan Municipalities. 
 B1: Secondary cities; these are the local municipalities with the largest 
budgets. 
 B2: Local municipalities with a large town as core. 
 B3: Local municipalities with small towns, a significant urban population 
but no large town as a core. 
 B4: Local municipalities which are mainly rural with communal land 
tenure. 
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 C1: District municipalities which are not water service authorities. 
 C2: District municipalities which are water services authority.      
  
 
In terms of the above classification, all 5 district municipalities in the Western 
Cape are classified as C1 (Statistics South Africa, 2016: 2).   Furthermore, the 
Western Cape has 3 B1 local municipalities: Drakenstein Local Municipality, 
Stellenbosch Local Municipality and George Local Municipality (Statistics South 
Africa, 2016: 2).  The Western Cape also has 6 B2 and 13 B3 municipalities 
(Statistics South Africa, 2016: 2).  Evidently, and quite interestingly, the Western 
Cape does not have a B4 municipality, meaning that there are no rural 
municipalities in the Western Cape.   
 
It is also important to note that Western Cape municipalities do not have a legacy 
of homeland and Bantustan areas.  Therefore, the Western Cape, like the 
Gauteng Province, does not have organised traditional authority structures (Du 
Plessis and Scheepers, 1999).  Consequently, the Western Cape municipalities 
do not compete for leadership roles and responsibilities with traditional 
authorities (Lehman, 2007).  Likewise, municipalities in the Western Cape do not 
have the problem of divided affinity and loyalty between a democratically elected 
local municipalities and traditional institutions.   
 
Similarly, the Western Cape municipalities did not inherit the legacy of 
underdeveloped Bantustan areas (Levy, et al, 2016).  For this reason, Western 
Cape municipalities do not have “spatially dispersed populations with limited 
opportunities for revenue mobilisation due to a non-existent tax base” (Tullock, 
2017: 198).  Furthermore, Western Cape municipalities inherited adequate 
economic and social infrastructures, unlike municipalities under the former 
Bantustan areas.     
 
 5.2.1.4 FINANCIAL VIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITIES IN THE WESTERN CAPE  
Western Cape municipalities are widely reported to score the highest in terms of 
financial viability and their governance practice is regarded as sound.  This 
means the majority of municipalities in the Western Cape do not have a liquidity 
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problem and have substantial assets that make them solvent.  Khan (2017) 
states that six of the Western Cape municipalities are ranked top in the financial 
health index (Khan, 2017):   
“The financial health index] allocates each municipality a score out 
of 100 points based on five indicators: its audit outcome for 2014-15; 
whether it had a permanent or acting municipal manager and chief 
financial officer; how strictly it managed its debtors; whether it under-
or overspent its 2015-16 operational budget; and whether it spent its 
conditional infrastructure grants that fiscal year.”   
 
The table below indicates the nature and levels of budget revenue collected by 
individual municipalities in the Western Cape. The budget revenue collected is 
an indicator of the level of financial viability of municipalities.   
 
Table 4:  Sources of Revenue for Western Cape Municipalities 
R Thousands  Operating Revenue Capital 
 
Classification 
Own Transfer Own Transfers 
West Cost District C1   264,449 90,115 7,515 1,450 
Saldanha LM B2 875,184 85,553 154,527 34,626 
Swartland LM B3 530,200 117,773 46,167 35,076 
Cederberg LM B3 216,895 58,056 70,635 59,494 
Matzikama LM B3 234,267 57,074 9,190 34,819 
      
Cape Winelands 
DM 
C1 170,986 230,657 22,822 4,821 
Breede Valley L M  B2 800,673 148,473 67,821 131,633 
Stellenbosch LM  B1 1,299,704 128,242 197,920 60,137 
Drakenstein LM B1 1,887,845 219,262 40,000 84,347 
Langeberg  B3 527,661 116,406 22,286 33,598 
Witzenberg  B3 414,926 97,846 20,889 58,858 
      
Central Karoo 
District 
C1 45,572 26,705 253 1,155 
Beaufort West LM  B3 204,107 91,621 1,230 14,640 
Laingsburg LM B3 55,997 17,853 794 8,321 
Prince Albert LM B3 32,602 36,050 - 8,528 
      
Eden D M C1 192,284 152,945 2,459 - 
Knysna  LM B2 672,561 140,596 40,842 58,101 
Bitou LM B3 489,384 130,876 28,263 45,480 
Oudtshoorn LM B2 437,183 180,062 7,349 29,887 
George LM B2 1,317,926 417,341 90,717 320,315 
Kannaland LM B3 
 
- 
 
30,804 
Mosselbay LM B2 800,626 117,012 - 33,464 
Hassequa  B3     
      
Overberg DM C1 29,785 142,799 421 800 
Theewaterskloof  B3 350,085 129,26 14,887 61,805 
Overstand  B2 879,529 113,688 19,808 47,840 
Swellendam  B3 179,060 37,461 4,000 14,810 
Cape Agulhas  B3 293,765 55,134 9,034 12,969  
 
    
Cape Town Metro  31,836,600 6,455,942 1,774,986 2,268,835 
Source:  National Treasury - http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx 
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In terms of the above table, B3 municipalities in the Western Cape raise 
considerable amounts of revenue from their own revenue streams.  Arguably, 
though these municipalities still receive grants and transfers, they can however 
be considered financially viable.  A presentation by the National Treasury at the 
Municipal Managers’ Forum on 31 August 2017, titled “State of Municipal 
Finances and Expenditure as at 30 June 2017”, describes the financial viability 
and sustainability of the municipal budget in terms of its ability to meet its 
expenditure obligations from its revenue and transfers (National Treasury 2017).    
 
 5.2.1.5   ELECTORAL DYNAMICS OF THE WESTERN CAPE MUNICIPALITIES 
The Western Cape has unique electoral politics.  Africa (2010: 5) states that “the 
Western Cape is a political unique province where electoral trends stand in sharp 
contrast to those in the rest of South Africa”. Similarly, Levy et al (2016) state 
that “Western Cape electoral politics has been characterised by robust inter-party 
political competition”.  Africa (2010: 7) argues that the uniqueness of the Western 
Cape electoral dynamics are as result in its higher voter turnout compared to 
national patterns as well as the “extreme competitive elections notably in an 
attempt to capture the coloured vote” which forms the majority of the voter base 
in the Western Cape (Africa, 2010: 7).   
     
Notably, this intense electoral completion has often resulted in a number of 
municipalities being governed through coalitions.  This phenomenon of coalition 
governments was more prevalent during the 2006 municipal elections (Russon 
2011).  According to Russon (2011), the 2006 local government elections 
resulted in only four out of 30 municipalities in the Western Cape securing an 
outright majority, while the other 26 municipalities were governed by a coalition 
involving one two or more parties.   
  
Notably, the period between 2006 and 2011 was characterised by a destabilising 
political environment emanating from the expedient coalition agreements and 
trade-offs between political parties and/or individuals.  These coalitions were 
frequently changing, resulting in constant regime changes in the political 
leadership of municipalities.  Consequently, the senior administrations of many 
municipalities were also subjected to frequent changes.  Russon (2011: 80) 
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depicts the electoral contestation between the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the 
African Congress (ANC) as follows: 
 
Table 5:  Percentage of Votes Won by the DA and ANC  
Elections ANC DA 
Year  - 2000 39.7% 49.9% 
Year  - 2006 40.2% 39.3% 
Year – 2011 34.07% 57.08% 
Year – 2016 26.22% 63.33% 
Sources: IEC - https://www.elections.org.za/lgedashboard2016/leaderboard.aspx#   
 
The Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) (2016) shows the results of the 
2016 local government elections as follows: The Independent Electoral 
Commission of South Africa (2016: 74) reports that “voter turnout in the 2016 
Local Government Elections was highest in the Western Cape at nearly 64%”.  
As indicated in the above table, the Democratic Alliance (DA) dominates the 
political landscape of the Western Cape.  Having won outright 19 municipalities 
and governing through coalitions another six municipalities, during the 2016 
municipal elections, the DA controls most of the municipalities in the Western 
Cape (Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2016).  This victory 
has also resulted in the DA governing all the district municipalities and the City 
of Cape Town, the only metro in the Western Cape.       
 
 5.2.1.6 PERFORMANCE OF WESTERN CAPE MUNICIPALITIES 
Another important feature of the Western Cape is the culture of performance in 
the municipalities.  Municipalities in the Western Cape are widely reported as 
performing relatively better than other provinces.  According to the Yende (2016), 
the Government Performance Index has found that nine out of the top performing 
10 municipalities in the country are in the Western Cape Province.  This report 
further indicates that the Western Cape municipalities generally performed well 
with regard to service delivery, municipal administrative capacity and financial 
soundness.  Similarly, the Western Cape Local Government Annual Report - 
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2015/16 (2017) cites reports such by Municipal IQ and Stats SA as indicating 
that municipalities in the Western Cape Province are functional and in the main 
fulfil their constitutional obligations of providing basic service delivery. 
  
With regard to audit performance, the Auditor-General – MFMA (2016: 13) 
indicates that the Western Cape continued to produce the best results with 85% 
and 52% clean audits, respectively.  The Auditor-General –MFMA (2016) 
attributes this achievement of both to the role of leadership, in particular by 
executive council, provincial treasuries and premiers in instilling a culture of 
accountability and the promoting sound administration.    Similarly, there are high 
levels of consistent financial compliance by most municipalities in the Western 
Cape.  In this regard, the Auditor-General – MFMA report (2012-13: 8) indicates 
that the Western Cape has experienced a continuous positive trend towards 
clean administration.   
 
Furthermore, the Auditor-General indicates that “it is pleasing to note a steady 
improvement in the systems and skills required for planning, collating and 
reporting of annual performance, which continued to contribute to the improved 
quality of annual performance reports” (Auditor-General MFMA report, 2012-13: 
8). With regard to the capacity of municipalities in the Western Cape, the Auditor-
General–MFMA (2017: 79) nots that the Western Cape is “the only province 
where 100% of the auditees produce financial statements without material 
misstatements”.   
 
In addition, Auditor-General MFMA, (2012-13: 8) report further states that the 
Western Cape has displayed basic: 
  
“…financial disciplines and monthly processing and reconciling of 
transactions, regular preparation of credible financial and 
performance reports, as well as the effective implementation of 
checklists to ensure compliance with laws and regulations, was 
implemented at the municipalities that attained and maintained clean 
audit outcomes”  
 
The recent audit reports indicate that the municipalities in the Western Cape were 
receiving better audit opinions as compared with other provinces (Auditor-
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General, MFMA - 2015/2015 (2016).  This report indicates that the “Western 
Cape province is the highest at 73% of the proportion of municipalities receiving 
clean audits”.  This means that 22 out of 30 municipalities in the Western Cape 
received a clean audit for the 2014-2015 financial year (Auditor-General – MFMA 
(2016: 16).  In addition, the latest report highlights that “the Western Cape 
continued with setting the pace by increasing their clean audit opinions to 80% 
of their municipalities” (Auditor-General –MFMA (2017:10).   
 
Though the above-stated performance could be attributed to various provincial 
and municipal factors, it is worth noting that the Auditor-General MFMA-
2015/2016 (2017) singles out the Western Cape as the only province that deals 
decisively with municipal officials for deviation, non-adherence and non-
compliance with financial discipline.  The Auditor-General MFMA-2015/2016 
(2017: 175) states specifically that;      
“In the Western Cape, many municipalities have demonstrated 
accountability and good governance, which has led to an overall 
outcome of clean audits for the majority of municipalities. A further 
indication of accountability is the implementation of consequences 
for transgressions. Many municipalities have instituted disciplinary 
action, resulting in the dismissal of employees and recovery of 
losses, thereby setting the tone from the top that action will be taken 
where transgressions occur.” 
 
5.2.1.7 MUNICIPAL BUDGET GOVERNANCE  
It was indicated in Chapter Three of this thesis that the governance of the 
municipal budget is critical for promoting effective resource mobilisation, sound 
fiscal management, transparency and accountability.  While the framework for 
the municipal budget process is generally regulated by the MFMA, the WPCT 
(2017b) through its Local Government Budget Overview has institutionalised 
within the provincial budged governance Provincial Strategic Goal (PSG) 5.   
 
The budget governance of the Western Cape municipalities is one of the key 
aspects of the Provincial Strategic Goal (PSG) 5 (WC Department of the Premier, 
2016).  The Provincial Strategic Goal (PSG) 5 is intended to “embed good 
governance and integrated service delivery through partnership and spatial 
alignment” (WC Department of the Premier 2016: 55).  Essentially, the PSG 5 
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constitutes a response to lack of coordination between provincial department and 
municipalities as well as reduce “fragmentation, wastage and duplication” (WC 
Department of the Premier (2016: 56) by “institutionalising joined-up governance 
and approach which constantly strives to improve the alignment of policy making, 
planning and budgeting between the provincial and local spheres of 
government”.  In addition, this institutionalisation facilitates collaboration in the 
accountability of the municipal budget process (WC Department of the Premier, 
2016). 
 
Evidently, the PSG 5 emphasises intergovernmental integration, alignment and 
coordination between the municipalities and different provincial government 
departments in the municipal budgeting process.  The Auditor-General-MFMA 
(2016: 116) states that the Premier of the Western Cape continued to use the 
Premier’s Coordinating Forum to coordinate and monitor the municipal 
governance review and outlook.  As the custodian of the PSG 5, the Premier of 
the Western Cape ensures coordination, alignment and complementarity of 
efforts of the provincial government department in order to promote effective 
oversight on municipalities (Auditor-General MFMA, 2016).   Fundamentally, this 
strategy creates an environment in which the governance of the municipal budget 
promotes intergovernmental political steering and coherence.  
 
As part of this coordination, Provincial Treasury convenes the Local Government 
Medium-Term Expenditure Committee (LG MTEC), which consist of a high profile 
provincial departmental delegation from the Provincial Treasury, Department of 
Local Government, Department of Environmental Affairs Planning and the 
Department of Economic Development (WCPT -Circular MUN No 40/2015).  The 
LG MTEC is essentially a consultative forum that precedes the municipal budget 
process in order to enable the provincial government to assess the municipal 
planning and budgeting (WCPT–Circular No 78/2016 (2016).  Furthermore, the 
WCPT - Circular No 8.26 (2016: 7) highlights that the LG MTEC is facilitates a 
“technical engagements that are pitched at a strategic level” hence, the 
representation consist of senior officials from various government department 
while municipalities are represented by municipal managers and senior 
managers from the budget, treasury offices.   
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5.3 MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS IN THE WESTERN 
CAPE  
Chapter Three of this thesis highlighted that the authority to exercise municipal 
budget oversight derives directly from various laws, which include MFMA, 
Municipal System Act and Municipal Budget Reporting Regulations.  Individually, 
these laws instruct different political structures to exercise oversight on drafting, 
approval, implementation and auditing of the municipal budget.  In terms of these 
laws, the municipal council and host of other principals exercise municipal budget 
oversight.  The WC Department of Local Government annual report (2017c) 
states that that in the Western Cape   provincial departments, such as the 
Provincial Premier, Treasury and Local Government departments are active in 
municipal budget oversight. 
   
5.3.1.2   WESTERN CAPE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
The role of the Western Cape department of Local Government in municipalities 
is two-fold, namely, oversight and support.  Both the oversight and support roles 
are general, and therefore, not confined to the municipal budget.  With regard to 
the oversight role, the annual report of the Western Cape Local Government’ 
2015/2016 (2016) describes its role as to regulate the performance of the 
municipalities in the terms of their functions listed in schedule 4 and 5 of the 
Constitution.  In addition, the department states that it has the responsibility to 
intervene where there is non-fulfilment of legislative, executive or financial 
obligation (Western Cape Local Government, 2016).       
 
The department is very active in supporting the municipalities with the Integrated 
Development Plan.  The Western Cape Local Government (2016) reports that it 
is leading the process of ensuring that municipalities comply with the legislative 
requirement regarding Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and that IDPS are 
aligned to service delivery.  The department also ensures that the IDP processes 
are participative by hosting a series of strategic engagements between provincial 
departments and municipalities as a way of strengthening municipal planning 
and budgeting. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
103 
 
 
5.3.1.2 WESTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL TREASURY  
It was highlighted in Chapter Three of this thesis that Section 216 of the 
Constitution entrusts the National Treasury to introduce measures to ensure 
transparency and compliance.  Thus, constitutionally, the National Treasury as 
the ultimate custodian of fiscus is required to monitor the budget of municipalities 
to promote good budget and fiscal management and prevent deviation from the 
treasury’s established uniform norms and standards (Section 5 of the MFMA).  It 
was indicated that Section 5 (3) of the MFMA instructs provincial treasuries to 
assist the National Treasury in enforcing compliance within nationally established 
measures, norms and standards.  Therefore, the authority of provincial treasuries 
to exercise budget oversight derives mainly from the MFMA which empower the 
Provincial Treasury to exercise oversight on the drafting, approval, 
implementation and auditing of the municipal budget process.  
  
The relevant data on the municipal budget oversight role and activities of the 
Western Cape Provincial Treasury (WCPT) is contained in its Annual Reports, 
Annual and Performance Plans and Circulars.  These documents constitute the 
authoritative representation of municipal budget oversight activities of the 
Western Cape Provincial Treasury. The municipal budget oversight role of the 
WCPT is clearly articulated in its annual report WCPT (2017c: 19) which states:  
“The Provincial Treasury must inter alia monitor compliance with the 
MFMA by municipalities and municipal entities in the province, 
monitor the preparation of the municipal budgets, the monthly 
outcomes of these budget and submission of reports by 
municipalities as required in terms of the MFMA.  It may also assist 
municipalities in the preparation of their budgets; further exercise any 
powers, perform any duties delegated to it by National Treasury in 
terms of the MWFMA and may take appropriate steps if a 
municipality in the province commits a breach of the MFMA.”  
    
In terms of the above statement, the WCPT exercises different measures of 
oversight on the stages of the municipal budget process in order to mitigate non-
compliance.  At the core of these measures, is the ability of the WCPT to compel 
municipalities to provide relevant, appropriate and timeous information on the 
stages of the municipal budget.  It was illustrated in Chapter Three that access 
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to appropriate, relevant and timeous information is critical in oversight in order to 
address information asymmetry.      
 
In addition, the WCPT utilises circulars to provide budget information, instructions 
and binding guidelines to municipalities.  Notably, the wording of the circulars is 
obligatory and peremptory.  In addition to being prescriptive, circulars are non-
negotiable and reflect a predisposition to unconditional compliance.  
Consequently, the requirements are also stringent and do not offer opportunities 
for municipalities to deviate or not comply.  In terms of mitigating non-compliance, 
the WCPT (2017d: 29) regularly issues:   
“…clear guidelines for the tabling, adoption, submission and 
reporting guidelines for development of municipal budgets, SDBIPs, 
In-year reports and Annual Reports, training and advice to 
municipalities and processes to be followed in the event of non-
compliance”.   
  
In terms of the oversight on the draft budget, the WCPT assist municipalities in 
the budget preparation during the annual planning and budget process.  For 
instance, the WCPT (2017d) instructs municipalities to align their planning 
priorities and development strategies with those of the provincial departments.  
The requirement to align the planning of the municipalities to that of the provincial 
government is effectively a way of exercising ex-ante oversight on the 
municipality.  It has the ability to prescribe and shape the behaviour of the 
municipal manager beforehand.  
  
For example, the WCPT Provincial Treasury Circular MUN No 7-2011 (2011:12) 
instructs all municipalities to “accurately complete the required list of A-
Schedules in full and failure to do so will constitute non-compliance with the 
Municipal Budget Reporting Regulations”.  In addition, the circular makes it 
compulsory for all municipalities in the Western Cape Province to utilise a specific 
format and form to prepare their annual budgets.   
 
The WCPT Circular MUN No 7-2011 (2011:12) further provides that:   
“Municipalities are required to utilise the A1-Budget Summary and 
A10-Basic Service Delivery Measurement Schedules to enable the 
Provincial Treasury to analyse the extent to which municipalities 
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utilise the allocated equitable share funding towards the provision of 
free basic services. Incorrect or unavailable information reported by 
municipalities in these schedules consequently prohibits the 
Provincial Treasury from conducting credible and accurate analysis.” 
 
As part of the WCPT assisting municipalities with the preparation and monitoring 
of the efficient and effective implementation of the budget, the WCPT Circular 
MUN NO. 13/201 (2018: 20) states that the WCPT   
 “…receives budget documents during their tabling in a municipal 
council meeting in order to start with the assessment process.  In 
order to facilitate this, the Provincial Treasury deploys officials to 
attend the budget tabling proceedings and collect the tabled budget 
documents.”     
   
Equally, the WCPT is actively involved in the oversight of the implementation the 
municipal budget.   According to the WCPT (2017c) monthly, quarterly financial 
statement as well as mid-year reports are analyses by a specific unit within the 
WCPT.  These reports are used by the WCPT to determine compliance and 
integrity of reports, as well as structure their engagement with municipalities.  
With regard to auditing, the WCPT ensures that the financial reporting of 
municipalities and compliance with financial norms and standards.  The WCPT 
ensures the quality and integrity of financial accounting and reporting to fully 
reflect all transactions (WCPT, 2017c).  The Auditor-General–MFMA (2016) 
states that the success of the municipal budget oversight and accountability of 
the Western Cape municipalities can be attributed to the nature and level of 
support provided by the WCPT during the auditing stage.  In terms of this report, 
the WCPT “ensures the credibility of the province financial statements’ and 
performance reports and compliance with legislation” (Auditor-General MFMA, 
2016: 66).  
     
5.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the particularities of the Western Cape Province with the 
aim of outlining the factors that have the potential to influence the oversight and 
accountability environment in the Western Cape.  In particular, the governance 
context and legislative environment was briefly described.  The chapter also 
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identified the role and activities of principals involved in exercising municipal 
budget oversight.    
 
Notably, the chapter established the municipal council and the WCPT as key 
principals exercising oversight on the municipal budget.  Essentially, the chapter 
illustrated the oversight role of the WCPT in the drafting, implementation and 
auditing of the municipal budget process.  In this regard, the chapter managed 
to answer the question regarding the quantitative aspect of the municipal budget 
oversight principals in the Western Cape.   
 
The next chapter explores the experience and perceptions of municipal 
managers of the multiple principals exercising municipal budget oversight in the 
Western Cape Province.   
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CHAPTER 6: MUNICIPAL MANAGERS’ PERCEPTIONS AND 
EXPERIENCES OF BUDGET OVERSIGHT BY MULTIPLE 
PRINCIPALS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
The chapter presents the results of the interviews conducted with municipal 
managers who participated in the study.  This chapter has three key sections.   
The first section provides a brief description of the specific environment in which 
interviews with municipal managers were undertaken. The description of the 
environment, especially in relation to the timing of the interviews, is significant for 
understanding the possible psychological state of the municipal manager during 
the interviews.   
 
The second section provides a brief description of municipal managers who 
participated in this study, developing profiles from information gathered from 
them during the interviews.  The third section presents the analysis of data from 
the interviews with municipal managers.    
  
6.2 DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW ENVIRONMENT  
Five municipal managers (MMs) were interviewed individually.  The first four 
interviews were held from 28 October to 6 December 2016.  The last interview 
was held on 19 July 2017.  It is worth noting that the first four interviews were 
conducted within four months of municipal elections held on 3 August 2016.  
Thus, the first four interviews took place during a busy transition period that 
imposed additional responsibilities for municipal managers.             
 
Municipal managers play a critical role in managing this transition process after 
the municipal elections – including conducting hand-over reports from the 
previous structures of the municipality, as well as presiding over the election of 
the speaker of the municipality during the first sitting of the municipal council 
(Steytler and De Visser, 2009).  SALGA (2016) states that, immediately after the 
first meeting of the council, the MMs are required to arrange the induction of 
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incoming councillors.  The induction should familiarise incoming councillors with 
council meeting rules, key institutional processes and priorities for their term of 
office (SALGA (2016).  In terms of human resources-related duties, MMs are 
required to also assist with information pertaining to remuneration, tax 
declaration of interest and office accommodation (SALGA, 2016). 
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis stated that MMs are career administrative appointments 
contracted by the municipal council for a period aligned with its term of office.  
Procedurally, the new political leadership of municipalities after the elections 
embarks on a process of appointing new municipal managers. Consequently, 
this period is very stressful for MMs who are experiencing uncertainty and anxiety 
about their future as employees of municipalities.  
 
All the MMs were concerned about the ideological orientation and political 
agenda of the new political leadership in the municipality.  In particular, MMs 
highlighted doubts regarding the commitment of the new councillors to the budget 
adopted by the previous municipal council.  In addition, they also highlighted their 
fears around the attitudes of the new councillors, especially leadership of political 
parties to MMs and the administration in general. The MMs raised their 
uneasiness about the political atmosphere that would prevail in the municipal 
council between the DA and the ANC.    
 
6.3 PROFILES OF MUNICIPAL MANAGERS 
As indicated in Chapter Four of the study, interview participants requested 
anonymity.  Thus, any information that was likely to identify them was either 
concealed or totally avoided.  In keeping with the request to grant municipal 
managers anonymity, codes were used to identify the participants.  The numbers 
on the codes indicate the sequence in which the municipal managers were 
interviewed.  The codes were MM1; MM2; MM3; MM4; MM5). 
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The first municipal manager interviewed (MM1) was from a local municipality in 
the Western Cape.  He manages a municipality with a substantial tax base and 
a rapidly-expanding economy.   MM1 has served as the municipal manager in 
several municipalities within and outside the Western Cape Province.  MM1 
considers himself more than adequately experienced in the management of a 
municipality since he has been in the current municipality for ten years, and 
previously served as an administrator in two municipalities that were placed 
under Section 139 of the Constitution.  
 
MM1 indicated that under his leadership of the municipal administration, the 
municipality has received an unqualified audit opinion for six consecutive years 
and a clean audit status two years in a row. MM1 indicated that he served under 
both the ANC and DA thereby indicating his ability to serve professionally. Given 
his long experience and deep knowledge, his views on oversight are especially 
pertinent to this thesis.  
 
Although MM2 has been with his current local municipality for three years, and 
previously served as a municipal manager in another for seven years. MM2 
considered himself both adequately qualified and experienced.  Moreover, he 
has been a municipal manager of municipalities led by the ANC as well as the 
DA, and thus has much experience in navigating political conflicts and dynamics.  
MM2 highlighted that he is leading a grade two municipality which, unlike MM1, 
has a much smaller tax base (the municipality is listed as a B3 municipality).  
Because of this limited tax base, the municipality receives extensive grants and 
other transfers from a number of government departments within the national 
and provincial spheres of government. He highlighted that his municipality has 
received an unqualified audit report for the 2015/2016 financial year.  This is the 
third consecutive clean audit for the municipality.  MM2 attributed this success to 
effective internal controls and his ability to lead a highly-qualified senior 
management team. This MM was generally very positive about his role and 
relationship with his political oversight structures.   
 
The third municipal manager interviewed (MM3) was from the district 
municipality.  MM3 has been in the employ of the current municipality for nine 
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years.  MM3 comes from a municipality that is highly grant-dependent.  Its 
revenue consists of 55% grants, with a further 32% coming from other 
intergovernmental transfers.  MM3 indicated that because she is managing a 
grant-dependent entity, she is accountable to a number of grant-transferring 
authorities.   
 
MM3 considered himself both adequately qualified and experienced and this 
municipality has received an unqualified audit report for the 2015/2016 financial 
year.  He attributed this achievement to leading a politically stable municipality 
with a well-functioning administration.  MM3 claimed to have managed to steer 
the district municipality and develop an environment in which good governance, 
sound financial management and internal controls are non-negotiable and 
entrenched pillars.   
   
MM4 has been in the employ of his municipality for the past 28 years.  He has 
been a municipal manager for 7 years.  MM4 indicated that under his 
administrative leadership, the municipality has received a clean audit for the 
2015/2016 financial year. MM4 emphasised that he has instilled a culture of 
compliance with Municipal Finance Management within the municipality. He also 
highlighted his experience and knowledge of municipal governance as one of his 
most valuable assets.  He worked under the ANC during the previous term, but 
is currently serving under the DA.   
 
MM5 has been a municipal manager of the local municipality for fifteen years.  In 
his years of experience, the municipal manager highlighted that he has ensured 
that the municipality was financially viable and sustainable.  MM5 highlighted his 
outstanding achievements as consecutive clean audit reports.  Additionally, MM5 
indicated that he has been instrumental in establishing structures, processes and 
mechanisms for effective accountability of municipal financial resources. MM5 
claimed that he has managed to maintain a good relationship with the municipal 
council, the provincial government and some national government departments.   
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6.3 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH MUNICIPAL 
MANAGERS 
This section presents an analysis of the data from the interviews conducted with 
the five participating municipal managers.  The data are presented according to 
the three research questions of the study and their related key themes.   
 
6.4.1 QUESTION 1:   
The first question was divided into two parts.  The first part explored the 
participants’ understanding of the municipal budget oversight while the second 
part focused on their experiences and perceptions of municipal budget oversight.       
 
Part One 
The first part of the question was: What is the Municipal Managers’ 
understanding of municipal budget oversight?   
All the participants had a similar understanding of budget oversight.  Key themes 
that emerged from their responses were: (1) monitoring of the budget decisions 
and activities; (2) control of the budget; and (3) compliance.    
 
6.4.1.1 MONITORING OF BUDGET ACTIVITIES   
All MMs described municipal budget oversight as monitoring. Such monitoring, 
they believed, was exercised by political structures to assess budget decisions 
and activities of the municipal managers.  MM1 in particular understood and 
perceived municipal budget oversight in the following terms:   
 
“The political structures have the responsibility to monitor me as the 
municipal manager. I make budget decisions or implement 
resolutions of the council, Executive Mayor and mayoral committee, 
and therefore, they monitor me to assure themselves that these 
decisions are implemented according to their instructions.”   
 
MM2, MM3 and MM5 described their understanding in a similar manner as all of 
them emphasised monitoring as what is textually mentioned in the MFMA.  
According to them, budget oversight is monitoring to ensure good fiscal 
stewardship and value for money.      
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MM2 articulated his views on monitoring much more starkly: 
“Municipal budget oversight is about the political structures 
monitoring what we do as the administration.  It is about being vigilant 
and watching us like hawks.  They do oversight in order to know how 
every cent belonging to the municipality is being spent.”   
 
 
In more or less the same way, MM3 used the word “monitoring” and ‘verification’ 
to describe budget oversight.  MM3 explained his thinking in the following 
manner: 
“Budget oversight in my municipality is essentially monitoring by 
leadership in order to verify my effectiveness.  They cannot just hope 
that my activities are correct, they have an obligation to verify the 
appropriateness of my activities.”            
 
6.4.1.2 CONTROL OF THE BUDGET  
MM1, MM2, MM3 and MM4 also described budget oversight as control. The MMs 
indicated that the political leadership in the municipality have the legislative 
authority to control the budgeting process of the municipality in order to 
addresses their legal and political agenda.  MM1 put it simply: 
“Budget oversight is about controlling the resource mobilisation and 
distribution process and outcomes.  It is about directing the municipal 
budget process and controlling the purse.”  
 
    
MM2 explained the issue of control in a more practical way.  According to MM2 
the budgeting process in a municipality is a political, democratic and legal 
process that requires steering and control from the Executive Mayor.  MM2 
explained that:  
“Municipal budget oversight is fundamentally about how the 
Executive Mayor provides leadership by aligning and controlling the 
collective efforts of both the councillors and the administration to 
realise the municipality’s aspirations and the objectives.”   
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6.4.1.3 COMPLIANCE  
All five MMs stated that they also understand municipal budget oversight as 
compliance.  In more or less the same way, MMs highlighted budget oversight 
as a way of ensuring conformance with norms and standards regarding reporting.      
 
Expressing his view, MM2 said: 
“Municipal budget oversight is too legalistic and compliance-
oriented.  Every process and activity is strictly prescribed by law or 
regulations. All we must do is to comply or risk being declared 
offside”.     
 
MM1, MM3 and MM4 uttered similar views regarding budget oversight as a way 
of adhering to the rules and regulations.  These MMs indicated that their activities 
are determined by laws, regulations and guidelines, therefore, oversight is to 
ensure that they comply with these laws.   
 
MM4 described budget oversight as an aspect of the performance contract that 
he signed with the municipality.  MM4 explained his views as follows: 
“My political masters have the responsibility to make me behave and 
respect according to my employment contract.  They also need to 
ensure that there is consistency between my decisions and their 
instructions-and/or expectations, at least.”  
 
When asked about their perceptions of municipal budget oversight, all the MMs 
highlighted the prescriptive nature of the laws and regulations governing the 
municipal budget oversight. MM1 remarked: 
“You must adhere to the circulars, formats and guidelines.  Municipal 
budget oversight is too legalistic and compliance-oriented.  There are 
many laws and regulations prescribing reporting procedures in a rigid 
manner, what must be in the report and how information should be 
presented.”     
 
In their explanation, MM2, MM3 and MM5 indicated that they perceive budget 
oversight as being about compliance.   MM2 stated: 
“To me budget oversight is compliance.  Budget oversight is 
compliance; it is a Western Cape syndrome.  We do not exercise 
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budget oversight in order to comply, we do it as the most important 
thing so that we can claim good governance.”    
  
Similarly, MM5 claimed that the orientation of municipal budget oversight in the 
Western Cape is “obsessively” about compliance.  He expressed his perception 
as follows: 
“Budget oversight is compliance-driven and has become so inflexible 
and oblivious of the peculiarities of my municipality.  You must 
adhere to the circulars, formats and guidelines.  Otherwise, you get 
into trouble for non-compliance.”  
 
MM5 was very critical and described the fixation with compliance as the “Western 
Cape syndrome”.  He expressed his frustration as follows: 
“In the Western Cape, budget oversight is about coercing municipal 
managers into conformity that is inflexible and oblivious of the 
peculiarities of my municipalities.” 
   
Part Two 
The second part of the research question asked the MMs to describe [their] 
experiences and perceptions on the design of municipal budget oversight.  
Responses to this question produced two: (1) several political structures; (2) 
authority of budget oversight structures.  
 
6.4.1.4 SEVERAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES 
All the participants indicated that municipal budget oversight is designed to 
involve several political structures.  MMs identified the following as political 
structures exercising municipal budget oversight:    
a) The municipal council.  
b) Section 79 council committees.   It was indicated in Chapter Three of this 
thesis that Section 79 committees are council committees constituted 
mainly by non-executive councillors.  The municipal council to strengthen 
its oversight role on the different processes of the municipality establishes 
these committees.   
c) The Executive Mayor, Mayoral Committees and Section 80 committees.  
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d) National and provincial government departments, especially, Cooperative 
Governance and Treasury.   
 
When asked to describe the different municipal budget oversight structures, 
participants differentiated them in terms of their relationship with the municipal 
managers.  MM2 was of the opinion that: 
“These oversight structures are essentially political structures and 
interact with me without the assistance and support of government 
officials.  Another category of oversight structures are those at the 
provincial and national government departments which utilise the 
expertise of government officials to exercise oversight with the 
municipal budget.”   
    
All the MMs mentioned the Executive Mayor as enjoying a close oversight 
relationship with the municipal manager on the municipal budget. Unlike, 
councillors whose engagement with the municipal manager is through the council 
or committees of council, the Executive Mayor directly oversees the municipal 
manager.   According to the MMs the proximity of the Executive Mayor to the 
municipal manager was a way of ensuring that the budget process does not 
deviate from the approved integrated and development plan (IDP) and the ruling 
party’s manifesto. 
 
MMs also mentioned that the municipal councillors as exercising the budget 
oversight through the council and their respective Section 79 committees.  They 
emphasised the key role of the municipal council in municipal budget oversight. 
MMs in different ways articulated the fact that the municipal council is the ultimate 
budget authority of the municipality. All the participants explained that the 
municipal council without which these decisions are irregular and invalid must 
make all budget decisions. 
      
MMs also highlighted that the Provincial Treasury exercises budget oversight 
over the municipality, but mainly over the municipal manager.  Participants 
described this budget oversight arrangement as legislatively prescribed.  MM1 
describes the involvement of the Provincial Treasury as follows: 
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“Various laws and regulations require the Provincial Treasury to 
exercise oversight on the municipal budget.  I am compelled by the 
law to account to the provincial department by providing regular 
reports.”   
 
All the MMs indicate that within the Provincial Treasury there are at least three 
units dealing with different areas of the municipal finance: the budget unit, which 
focuses on the compliance of the budget rules; accounting unit, which deals with 
the Annual Financial Statements; and the supply chain unit that ensures that 
municipalities adhere to the procurement processes.         
When asked about their perceptions regarding these several oversight structures 
that are involved in the municipal budget oversight, four participants described 
the model as creating diverse centres of power.  MM2’s description below aptly 
articulates this sentiment.   
“There are different oversight structures within the Provincial 
Treasury.  They all interact with me as separate stovepipes, though 
they are from the same provincial departments.  The same thing 
happens with the provincial COGTA, where there are different 
officials demanding different information and reports from me.”   
 
MM5 described this model of multiple oversight principals as complex.  He 
articulated this complexity in the following manner: 
“I honestly feel like these budget oversight structures perform the 
same function.   The difference between the oversight role of the 
council and that of Provincial Treasury is artificial.  It is not as if the 
municipal council is prevented from doing what the other oversight 
structures are doing.  I really do not understand the rationale between 
for having so many oversight structures.”   
 
All participants expressed a concern that the multiplicity of oversight structures 
does not necessarily result in quality oversight.  Some participants suggested 
that effective municipal budget oversight could be achieved with fewer oversight 
structures. However, MM4 appeared to support the variety of the oversight 
structures:  His logic was follows:   
“I do not see anything wrong with the many oversight structures, 
especially the Provincial Treasury.  I think the Provincial Treasury 
contributes towards ensuring a comprehensive view of the municipal 
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budget process.  It would have otherwise been too much for a 
municipal council.”  
     
6.4.1.5 SHARED OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY BY DIFFERENT POLITICAL STRUCTURES  
All the MMs indicated that the Municipal Finance Management Act grants the 
same municipal budget oversight authority to different structures.   MM3 shared 
his experience: 
“It is actually difficult to distinguish between the oversight authority of 
different oversight structures.  I am not aware of the differences.  It 
is as if all these structures are vested with the same authority to 
ensure I do not incur fruitless, irregular and unauthorised 
expenditure.”    
  
Likewise, MM4 expressed this issue of same budget oversight authority as 
follows: 
“In my observation, the budget oversight authority of the municipal 
council and the Provincial Treasury is the same.  The laws and 
regulations grant both the municipal council and the Provincial 
Treasury the same authority to demand budget reports, investigate 
and call the municipal managers to account for budget-related 
matters.”       
MM3 remarked: 
“I serve too many masters.  I have a contract with the municipal 
council, which must be respected.  I also worked very closely with 
the Executive Mayor. Equally, the provincial and national 
departments have some authority over me.”   
  
From the responses, it became evident that most of the participants perceived 
the Provincial Treasury to have too much power on municipal budget oversight. 
In describing their perceptions of the relationship among the oversight structures, 
some participants indicated that the provincial government is too dominant.  MM1 
described this issue through the following sentiments: 
“The Provincial Treasury has completely annexed all the municipal 
budget oversight authority.  When the officials from the Provincial 
Treasury engage with you, there is no appreciation that the 
municipality is a sphere of government on its own.  They do not 
engage with you as equals.  They prescribe to you what to do.  The 
same can be said about the National Treasury.” 
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All participants indicated that the political dynamics in the Western Cape have 
made the provincial government a dominant oversight structure.  According to 
MM1: 
“The Executive Mayor and the municipal council consider 
themselves subservient to the provincial government department.  
You must remember that the oversight structures at the provincial 
level are also their leaders within the political party.  Therefore, there 
is no distinction made when it comes to governance issues.  The 
structures in the municipality do not want to be seen defying the 
provincial leadership.”  
     
MM1 utilised words such as ‘asymmetry’ and “benign dictatorship” to describe 
the distribution of oversight among the structures overseeing the municipal 
manager during the municipal budget process. 
“I think the Constitution and MFMA have created asymmetry in the 
allocation of budget oversight authority.  For some unexplained 
reasons, the authority between the municipal council and the 
Provincial Treasury is unequal.  The Provincial Treasury has more 
powers.  The Provincial Treasury utilises its oversight authority to 
exercise benign dictatorship.  You will not see it easily, it is concealed 
as supervision or monitoring, but is ultimately about control.”   
 
All the participants expressed a concern about the oversight arrangement that 
has tilted the oversight authority in favour of the provincial government 
departments.  All participants mentioned that the intervention powers of the 
provincial government to dissolve the municipal council makes provincial 
government too powerful. MM5 described the ferociousness of the powers to 
dissolve the municipality as follows:       
“When there is a budget activity problem in the municipality the 
municipal council can take a decision about the municipal manager.  
However, when the province intervenes, it may dissolve the entire 
municipality and appoint the administrator to exercise executive 
responsibilities of the municipal council.”   
MM5 described the Provincial Treasury as “authoritative”.  He stated: 
“The Provincial Treasury has too much authority.  In my view, the 
Provincial Treasury does not respect the autonomy of the 
municipality.  If you do not do as they wish, irrespective of what you 
believe is right, you get a non-compliance letter.  We do things even 
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if we do not understand them or agree with them.  It is their way, you 
must follow the command.”   
  
When asked to describe how they feel about the number of oversight structures 
who have more or less the same budget oversight authority, participants 
indicated that it is confusing and unnecessary.   
MM5 expressed his views in the following way: 
“It is very distressing to report to these different oversight authorities.  
It is a complete scramble for attention and influence on me. Each of 
these oversight structures wants me to feel their authority.  I am being 
tossed around like a headless chicken.”  
          
Some participants highlighted that these oversight structures with the same 
authority over the single municipal manager were promoting multiple centres of 
power and entrenching the individualistic mindset of different oversight structures 
– especially the Provincial Treasury.  MM3 expressed his view in the following 
manner:     
 “These oversight structures are many but individualistic.  Each 
oversight structure develops and implements its own oversight 
authority.  Meaning, it is a replication of the same thing.”    
 
 6.4.2   RESEARCH QUESTION 2  
The second research of the study is: What are the experiences of municipal 
managers regarding the multiplicity of oversight principals during the different 
stages of the municipal budget process?  The individual responses of the 
participants were clustered into three themes: (1) distinct oversight measures; 
(2) overlapping oversight measures; (3) relationship among oversight principals.    
 
6.4.2.1 DISTINCT OVERSIGHT MEASURES 
All the MMs indicated that each oversight structure is driven by their own partial 
objectives and standpoint.  The MMs highlighted that it is difficult to find a 
common purpose among the oversight principals.    MM1 articulates his views on 
this matter as follows:    
“I deal with principals pursuing different oversight objectives and 
agendas during the drafting, approval, implementation and auditing 
of the municipal budget process.   For example, the objectives and 
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focus of my oversight structures during the drafting of the budget are 
so many.  I am expected to adhere to the National Treasury 
instructions during the preparation of the annual budget.  I am 
required to adhere strictly to National Treasury budget forms, 
schedules, guidelines and formats. The municipal council does not 
care about these things.  In fact, municipal councillors are not even 
aware of some of these requirements from the National Treasury. As 
a result, I have never been asked by my council if I have used the 
formats and guidelines from the National Treasury.”  
   
Similarly, MM3 provided a long narration of distinct oversight measures as 
follows:    
“Some municipal councillors are more concerned with service 
delivery.  Other councillors are only obsessed with what their political 
parties want. Some councillors focus more on the services for 
communities and their specific wards.  When they exercise oversight 
on the draft budget, they want to know about how much is budgeted 
for which projects in their wards. On the other hand, the Provincial 
Treasury just focuses on compliance. When they exercise oversight 
during the implementation of the budget, they are more interested in 
knowing when the budgeted projects are commencing in their 
wards”.   
    
Two participants indicated that oversight principals have different political 
intentions; hence they focus on different issues during the different stages of the 
municipal budget.  MM4 described different political intentions as follows:  
“My principals have different and conflicting objectives.  The 
Executive Mayor and the municipal council are more concerned 
about the output of the budget.  These principals want to see us 
utilising the money to perform what they promised to the community.  
On the other hand, the Provincial Treasury is more concerned with 
compliance.  To them, compliance is at the top of the list of priorities.
”  
 
 
All the participants explained that the Democratic Alliance at the provincial level 
has a goal of ensuring that all municipalities in the Western Cape achieve clean 
audits.  According to the participants, this objective features strongly on its 
election campaign strategy.  Therefore, the Provincial Treasury puts pressure on 
the municipal managers to focus more on clean audits.   
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All five participants indicated that the Provincial Treasury is primarily concerned 
with compliance for a clean audit.    MM1 explained the Provincial Treasury’s 
“fascination” with compliance in the following manner: 
“Most of the responses that I receive from the Provincial Treasury on 
the draft budget are related to compliance.  Firstly, the province spent 
a considerable amount of effort in ensuring that the audit queries 
from the previous financial year are addressed.    Secondly, the 
Provincial Treasury gets nervous on anything that is likely to attract 
a non-compliance query from the Auditor-General.”   
 
6.4.2.2 OVERLAPPING OVERSIGHT MEASURES 
Participating MMs emphasised that the oversight structures do not engage with 
the municipal manager in a coordinated manner.  All the participants identified 
overlapping measures as one of the key experience during the different stages 
of the municipal budget process.  All participants indicated that the municipal 
council and the Executive Mayor do not work together on how to exercise budget 
oversight on the municipal manager.    
  
 MM2 explained: 
“What I have observed is that the Executive Mayor and the municipal 
council work at cross purposes when it comes to oversight of the 
municipal budget.  Immediately after the approval of the budget, the 
Executive Mayor only deals with me on the budget issue.  In fact, the 
Executive Mayor tends to perceive the budget oversight questions as 
directed at or an attack on him.”     
  
Participants revealed that even within the Provincial Treasury department, each 
of the units focuses on its own oversight measures.  MM1 cited an example with 
the Provincial Treasury: 
“Within the Provincial Treasury, there are different units that regularly 
engage with me.  There were instances whereby a unit from the 
provincial budget unit will meet with my team and me.  Then the 
following day, another unit from the financial accounting unit also 
comes to meet with us.”   
 
When asked to describe their perceptions of the overlap, participants voiced their 
frustration with big delegations from the provincial government during the 
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drafting, implementation and auditing of the budget process.  MM2 described the 
regular visits from the province as: 
“Feeling under siege.  You have this big delegation engaging with 
you all at once.  Though on the surface, these visits are projected as 
consultative, in essence, they are compliance driven.  You are 
expected to reconsider what has been debated and approved by the 
municipal council.  This means that the inputs from the provincial 
delegation must be adhered to and implemented.”    
         
 Another interesting comment was provided by MM2:     
“I feel like I am being watched by people who do not know each other.  
The manner in which the province, especially the Provincial Treasury 
exercises its budget oversight activities, it does not appreciate that 
the municipal council also has oversight obligations in the budget.  I 
sometimes feel like the province does not even recognise the 
municipal council.”       
 
 
6.4.2.3 RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE BUDGET OVERSIGHT STRUCTURES  
All the participants indicated that they were not aware of interactions among the 
oversight structures.  MM1 was more vehement when highlighting that:    
“There is no relationship between the oversight structures.  In fact, I 
am not aware of a practice whereby the municipal council engages 
the Executive Mayor on how to exercise budget oversight on any of 
the budget stages. I am also yet to experience the interaction 
between the National Treasury and the municipal council on issues 
concerning the oversight of the oversight of the municipal budget.” 
 
MM2 observed the unstructured, siloes and individualism of the oversight 
structures as follows: 
“These guys exercising oversight on me have never been in a single 
meeting together.  Yes, I sometimes invite the Executive Mayor when 
the province convenes a meeting with me.   But there is no gathering 
of political oversight structures to discuss how they exercise 
oversight of the municipal budget.  Each of the structures is not 
aware of the engagements between the municipal manager and 
each of them.”   
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6.4.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 3 
Research question 3 of the study was divided into two parts.  The first part of the 
question was:  What do municipal managers experience and perceive as the 
possible positive effects of multiple principals on municipal budget oversight?   
The data from the participants’ responses generated one key theme, namely, 
complementing the oversight capacity.   
 
6.4.3.1 COMPLEMENTING THE OVERSIGHT CAPACITY  
A common issue that emerged in all the interviews with municipal managers was 
the capacity of the oversight municipal councillors.  Participants also highlighted 
that municipal oversight is too complex to expect political structures to perform it 
without any assistance from the officials.  Participants also indicate that they are 
not expected to assist councillors to exercise oversight due to their potential 
subjectivity and conflicts of interests.  
 
MM1 captured this sentiment, stating:   
“The municipal councillors as well as the Executive Mayor do not 
know what oversight questions to ask, what information to demand 
and how to critically interpret the reports provided.   This problem 
results in a situation where the political structures within the 
municipality are less informed about the actual nature of the issues 
in order to exercise oversight on the budget of the municipality.  
Therefore, councillors need support from other structures.”     
       
MM4 expressed his views regarding the capacity of the oversight principal in the 
following manner:   
 “The system of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals is 
based on an assumption that these many political principals will add 
value to the drafting, implementing and accounting of the municipal 
budget.  The fact of the matter is that not all of these structures and 
committees have either the requisite capacity or the motivation to 
exercise oversight on the budget process.”   
       
All the participants stated the municipal councillors do not have an understanding 
of what constitutes satisfactory conduct by the municipal manager during the 
various stages of the municipal budget process.  MM4 stated: 
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“The municipal council is very obscure.  In fact, I can say that the 
municipal council is not only invisible but also ineffective in exercising 
meaningful budget oversight.  Very little in terms of input or 
objections are received from the municipal council during the budget 
drafting processes.  Therefore, the other principals, mainly the 
Provincial Treasury Department, complement and address the 
oversight deficit on the municipal level.”  
     
Participants indicated that most municipal councillors were dormant in the 
oversight role during the implementation of the budget.  According to the 
participants, municipal councillors lack interest in engaging with the monthly and 
quarterly financial reports.  MM4 remarked: 
“It is very rare that you encounter municipal councillors interrogating 
the report and doing some research to verify the content of the report.  
I actually doubt that municipal councillors read the financial reports 
that are presented in council.” 
 
It was also clear from the municipal managers that even other municipal council 
committees such as the Municipal Public Accounts Committees are displaying 
very little interest and ability to scrutinise the financial reports. MM1 stated: 
“I have noticed high absenteeism on the meetings of the Municipal 
Public Accounts Committee.  On several occasions, the committee 
does not meet because it fails to quorate.  Even when reports are 
presented to the committee, there is usually very little follow-up.”          
MM1 also felt: 
“The municipal council does not have the same level of capacity, 
skills and commitment as the Provincial Treasury for effective 
oversight.  In particular, the municipal council and in some instances, 
the Executive Mayor have limited capacity to exercise oversight on 
the different stages of the budget process. It is unfair to expect the 
municipal council and the Executive Mayor to exercise extensive 
oversight of the budget because they do not have the necessary 
technical skills to do that.  In addition, these principals would have to 
rely on the municipal manager to provide with information which they 
use to exercise oversight.”    
 
MM4 explained: 
The Provincial Treasury has the necessary political distance from the 
municipality.  In addition, they have at their disposal technical expertise from 
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officials in their department to enable them to interrogate the legal and technical 
aspects related to budget oversight.     
  
NEGATIVE EFFECTS 
The second part of the research question focused on what municipal managers 
experience and perceive as the negative effects of multiple principals on the 
municipal budget oversight. Participants’ views were clustered in the following 
six main themes:  (a) duplication of oversight measures; (b) too much oversight; 
(c) confusing; (d) time-consuming; (e) costs; and (f) conflicting oversight 
mechanisms.    
 
6.4.3.2 DUPLICATION OF OVERSIGHT MEASURES 
Three participants indicated that budget municipal budget oversight by multiple 
principals causes duplication and overlap of oversight efforts.  MM1 explained: 
“Lack of coordination among the principals results in many unrelated 
oversight activities.  Each principal is doing its one little thing and 
completely oblivious to what the other principals are doing.  During 
the different stages of the budget, you provide the different principals 
with the same information.”   
 
6.4.3.3 Too Much Oversight 
All the participants expressed a common view that the multiplicity of principals 
entails an increase in the scope, the number of reports and oversight meetings.  
All municipal managers highlighted their concerns regarding the over-regulation 
of the municipal budget.  According to the municipal managers, this level of over-
regulation is too much, onerous and cumbersome.  MM3 indicated: 
“When your municipality is grant dependent, the number of principals 
also increase and this increases the number of oversight reports to 
various principals.  As the municipal manager, the increase in the 
number of the report to different oversight principals becomes 
excessive”.  
    
MMs indicated that the many oversight principals force the municipal manager to 
manage diverse oversight relationships.  Participants emphasised that the 
numerous initiatives and engagements between the various oversight principals 
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lead to the oversight fatigue, confusion and inevitably contribute towards non-
compliance rather than compliance. MM2 stated: 
“For a small municipality like mine, the oversight demands are very 
costly and unaffordable.  The resources that are spent on compliance 
are exorbitant.  I am now also using consultants because of the 
internal capacity constraints to address the excessive oversight 
requirements.  You must remember that this is not only excessive but 
also highly inflexible.  The oversight requirements do not correspond 
with available capacity in the municipality.”   
  
Participants perceived the paradox that excessiveness of the oversight 
measures causes inefficiency of the municipal managers.  Participants 
emphasised that the multiplicity of reports results in them not producing quality 
reports. MM1 said: 
“I often produce poor reports due to the frequency and number of 
reports demanded by oversight structures.  I find that the number of 
reports creates a conflict between me and the Chief Financial Officer 
of the municipality.”    
MM3 expressed his frustration as follows: 
“As municipal managers, we have endured a protracted period of 
municipal financial accountability reforms that have substantially 
increased the complexity of accounting for the financial transactions 
of the municipality.  Since the adoption of the MFMA in 2003, 
municipal managers have found themselves under the tremendous 
burden of many reporting regulations that have made our work 
unbearable.”  
  
When asked about their perceptions of the nature of oversight mechanisms 
related to multiple principals, all participants mentioned that is too complex.  
Participants emphasised that as municipal managers they are being made to 
respond to different requests from different principals at the same time. They 
argue that despite oversight measures becoming progressively more complex, 
this has not improved budget discipline in municipalities.     
MM3 described this complexity as:  
“Juggling different balls at the same time.  You must remember that 
at any given time, you have both stages of the budget process 
happening parallel to each other. So as you try to respond and 
address oversight requests related to the draft budget, you are also 
expected to deal with queries and issues pertaining to 
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implementation of the current budget.  Similarly, as you are engaged 
in the budget audit queries, you are also dealing simultaneously with 
the budget implementation issues requiring submission of different 
reports to different principals.”      
All the participants raised and emphasised the issue of the complexity of the 
multiplicity of principals exercising municipal budget oversight.  These 
participants claim that for the municipal manager, dealing with multiple principals 
effectively means being responsive and compliant with diverse and conflicting 
principals.  The principals indicated that this is too demanding and tends to put a 
lot of pressure on them.   
 
MM1 emphasised that:  
“The budget process itself is complex.  The complexity is 
compounded further by having these many oversight principals.  
While every effort is made to respond to each and every demand 
made by these principals, it is often not possible to satisfy all of them.  
One of them is likely to be very aggrieved if there is a perception that 
more respect or attention is given to the other principals.” 
Similarly, MM4 explained: 
“Serving multiple principals is very demanding and complex.  It is 
impossible to keep all the principals happy. Oftentimes their 
instructions contradict.”   
     
All the participants agreed that the principals’ behaviour is very complex for the 
municipal manager.  In particular, the participants commented that the multiplicity 
of principals has made the exercise of municipal budget oversight more complex. 
MM1 articulated the complexity as follows: 
“With many principals come many monitoring mechanisms and 
reports.  I report to the Executive Mayor, but I am accountable to the 
Municipal Council.  Yet I get more questions, responses and requests 
for more information from the Provincial Treasury.  The nature and 
level of scrutiny from the Municipal Council and the Mayor is 
extremely weak.”  
  
The participants also agreed when explaining the degree of complexity involved 
in being a municipal manager in the Western Cape Province, as they often find 
themselves in the middle of conflicting priorities between the provincial and 
national government.  MM2 explained: 
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“You sometimes feel like you are right in the middle of two bull 
elephants fighting for the supremacy of municipal budget oversight 
the authority.”  
   
Participants highlighted the issue of oversight relationship with all these 
principals as complex.  Participants expressed an unpleasant position of the 
municipal manager within the multiplicity of principals exercising oversight of the 
municipal budget.  They described the principals’ behaviour as having trapped 
the municipal manager between principals with too many divergent objectives 
MM1 stated: 
“You can be in the good books of the Provincial Treasury because 
you have managed to obtain a clean audit for the municipality.  But, 
at the same time, you can be fired or get suspended for a minor 
violation concerning the budget implementation. Most alarming is 
that you get a terrible audit opinion from the Auditor-General for non-
compliance, irregular or unauthorised expenditure but still receive no 
sanction from either municipal council or the Executive Mayor”. 
   
Participants indicated that their satisfactory engagement and compliance with the 
Provincial Treasury instructions does not guarantee their employment as the 
municipal managers.  The participants highlighted that if the municipal council or 
the ruling political party is not happy with the municipal manager, irrespective 
their ability to tick all the boxes regarding the budget and financial regulations, 
the municipal council can employ different norms or contradictory criteria to 
dismiss the municipal manager.   
  
Participants indicated that the instructions and prescription from National and 
Provincial treasuries and municipal council cause confusion.  It is not clear who 
has the responsibility to ask for what information.  Most participants indicated 
that different principals introduce changes to the reporting requirement 
frequently. MM1 gave an example: 
“I have lost track of the changes made in the different budget 
documents.  The National Treasury is constantly and unilaterally 
prescribing new format and guidelines for budget and reporting. As 
we speak, the National Treasury has introduced one called MSCOA.”    
       
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
129 
 
Participants indicated that they found it difficult to respond to the oversight 
demand of the principals.  All participants indicated that the National Treasury 
regulations, rules, circulars, guidelines, and formats are confusing and 
burdensome.  Moreover, participants highlighted that the interpretation of these 
prescriptions is confusing. MM1 stated: 
“Too much of a good thing is bad.  Instead of the oversight measures 
promoting good governance and financial accountability, they are 
becoming confusing and burdensome. In fact, I despise all these 
oversight measures from principals during the budget process.  I am 
becoming inefficient as the municipal manager because of this 
oversight.”  
       
MMs indicated that oversight structures have the ability and tendency to veto 
each other. Most participants indicated that both internal and external oversight 
structures do not often agree among themselves.   
MM4 explained that:  
“The Executive Mayor hardly agreed with what the individual 
councillors, municipal council or its committees demand from the 
municipal manager in terms of oversight of the budget-related 
matters.  The Executive Mayor will tell you to let him handle the 
matter.” 
 
Frustrated by the multiplicity of principals exercising oversight during different 
stages of the municipal budget process, all participants highlighted that 
paperwork, prescriptions and demands by the oversight principals take them 
away from the delivering services to the community.   
Four participants stressed that municipal budget oversight by multiple principals 
contributed towards unfunded costs and constitute a significant financial burden 
for municipalities.  According to most participants, the principals do not factor or 
consider the burden of oversight requirements placed on the municipal manager.  
The principals just directly request information, data, reports, visits and oversight 
imbizos without considering the impact of these oversight activities.  
 
All participants unanimously expressed frustration with multiple principals 
involved in the exercising oversight on the different stages of the municipal 
budget process.  The oversight requirements are unclear, overlapping and often 
ambiguous.  
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6.4.3.5 TIME CONSUMING 
All participants also indicated that they spend too much time producing reports.  
They emphasised that the reporting obligations are time-consuming and taxing 
on human resources.  When asked to quantify in percentage terms the amount 
of time per month spent on producing a report or ensuring that reports are 
produced. Participants responded as follows: 
 MM1: 30% of the senior staff. 
 MM2 35% of senior staff. 
 MM3: 30% of senior staff. 
 MM4: 25 of senior staff.     
 
MM1 stated: 
“Myself and my team must prepare volumes of documents in order 
to develop periodic (monthly, quarterly and annual financial) reports.  
In addition, their other reports and visits from different principals that 
must be prepared and submitted in different formats.  Qualitatively, 
these reporting requirements are lengthy are complicated and often 
resulting in costly and unsustainable workloads.  Staff members are 
not being utilised effectively due to oversight demands from different 
principals.  The sheer number of reports, consultations and meetings 
has resulted in staff devoting less time to issues of service delivery.”  
   
Most participants claimed that reporting requirements are very rigid.  According 
to these participants, any attempt to be innovative in presenting reports in a 
manner that saves time and human resources results in a negative opinion from 
the Auditor-General.  Participants explained that every action and deviation 
required complex and time-consuming reports.  According to the participants, the 
time spent on preparing reports shifts the focus of the administrative staff.  They 
emphasised that they spend more time on these reports and less time on other 
important service delivery matters.   
 
6.4.3.6 COSTLY 
All participants indicated that municipal budget oversight by multiple principals is 
costly for their municipalities.  The number of oversight reports, the expertise 
required to prepare the reports is very costly for the municipality.   Accordingly, 
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all participants perceive the municipal budget oversight by multiple principals as 
draining their human and financial resources.    
MM2 expressed a concern: 
“The high costs of procuring assistance for preparing the many 
different oversight reports. I spend a lot of money just to get a 
consultant to prepare the annual financial statement.  This report is 
highly technical and the required capacity is not available in my 
municipality.” 
MM4 indicated that  
“The oversight and compliance costs are excessive for his 
municipality. The hours spent on preparing reports can easily be 
quantified into a substantial monetary loss for the municipality.  If 
were to factor this issue in our financial accounting it would reflect 
huge losses for the municipality.”       
MM3 indicated that the municipal budget by multiple principals is not only costly 
in term of monetary terms but also emotionally draining.   
“This nature and type of oversight affects your confidence.  The 
number of likely errors and misstatements in the reports affects your 
self-confidence and credibility.”   
 
6.4.3.7 CONFLICTING OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS  
All five participants mentioned that they experience conflicting oversight 
mechanisms during the different stages of the municipal budget process are 
conflicting. MM3 described the contestation dramatically as follows:  
“Can you imagine being sandwiched between bulls that are very 
combative and openly hostile?  There is absolutely no consensus 
among these bulls.  These bulls do not like each other.  Each of these 
bulls is not entirely happy with how other bulls influence and control 
me as the municipal manager.” 
 
Two MMs indicated that the contestation is greater during the budget approval 
stages.  This is because the Provincial Treasury looks at different things before 
they approve the municipal budget.  For instance, the municipal council tends to 
focus on policy issues linked to service delivery.  On the other hand, the 
Provincial Treasury is more interested in amounts and financials in the budget.   
MM2 explained the tension between the principals as follows:   
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
132 
 
“You can be in the good books of the Provincial Treasury because 
you have managed to achieve a clean audit.  But at the same time, 
you get suspended or even dismissed by your municipal council for 
a violation related to the budget.  Similarly, you can get a bonus from 
the municipal council even though you have numerous non-
compliance letters from the Provincial Treasury.”        
 
MM1 presented his experience as follows:  
“There is often a subtle war going on between the municipal council 
and the Executive Mayor concerning the draft budget.  The municipal 
council considers itself the constitutional authority of the municipal 
budget and a primary source of budget authority of the municipality, 
whilst the Executive Mayor has a mandate by the MFMA to 
coordinate the budget process.  When the municipal council exercise 
oversight on the draft budget, the executive feels undermined.  When 
other council members do not want to approve the budget, the 
Executive Mayor perceives that as protest directed against him.”   
 
MM1 highlighted that despite codified financial ratios used to analyse and 
interpret the budget report, the municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury 
do not agree on these ratios.  For example, the municipal councillors do not agree 
with the Provincial Treasury on the norm for the liquidity ratio.  Participants 
mentioned that the municipal council considers the ratios as being unreasonable 
and “anti-developmental”.   MM1 explained: 
“When I prepare financial reports in terms of the Provincial Treasury 
instructions, I get into trouble with the Executive Mayor and the 
municipal councillors.  For example, when you respond to the 
Provincial Treasury by moderating your budget, the municipal 
councillors get very upset with you.  When you take instructions from 
the Provincial Treasury on being decisive on the collection of rates 
and taxes, the local principals do not necessarily provide the required 
support.”   
MM2 identified another source of contestation between the Executive Mayor and 
the provincial structures in the following manner:    
“Ever wonder why there are no consequences of the findings of the 
Auditor-General on the municipal finances? It is because both the 
Executive Mayor and the municipal council are averse to taking 
instructions from the other principals – more so if they were not 
consulted.” 
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6.5 CONCLUSION 
The chapter explored the experiences and perceptions of municipal managers 
regarding the key aspects of the municipal budget oversight.   The exploration 
was guided by the study’s three research questions.  With regard to the first 
research question, participants described the municipal budget oversight as 
monitoring and compliance.   In addition, participants highlighted municipal 
budget oversight as exercised by a number of political structures.  It also 
emerged that these structures are vested within the authority, which they 
individually exercise.  
 
The second research question addressed what the participants understand and 
perceive concerning the multiplicity of municipal budget oversight principals on 
the different stages of the municipal budget.  This section highlighted that 
though the oversight principals are many they operate individually during the 
different stages of the municipal budget.  Further, participants described the 
multiplicity of principals as deliberately creating overlaps. Lastly, this section 
identified lack of relationship as an important and defining feature of the 
multiplicity of principals during the stages of the municipal budget.  
    
The third research question demonstrated what the municipal managers 
understand and perceive as the positive and negative effects of multiple 
principals in the municipal budget oversight.  While complementarity was 
highlighted as a positive effect, participants listed a litany of negative effects of 
the municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  Participants listed 
duplication, too much oversight, confusion and costly time consuming as the 
key negative effects of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals. 
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CHAPTER 7:  PRINCIPALS’ EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIONS 
OF THE MANIFESTATIONS AND DYNAMICS OF MUNICIPAL 
BUDGET OVERSIGHT BY MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS: DEFLATING 
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter explores the Provincial Treasury and the municipal councillors’ 
perceptions of oversight by multiple principals during the municipal budget 
process.  This chapter has three key sections: the first provides a brief description 
of the interview environment; the second presents the profiles of oversight 
principals who participated in this study; and the third section presents an 
analysis of data from the interviews with the Provincial Treasury and municipal 
councillors.  
 
7.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEW ENVIRONMENT 
The interviews with the Provincial Treasury official and the municipal councillors 
were conducted between December 2016 and September 2017.  It is important 
to note that the interview with the participant from the Provincial Treasury was 
held on 2 December 2016, while the interviews with municipal councillors were 
held after 27 June 2017, after councillors had served at least a year in office.    
  
It is also important to highlight that the high turnover of municipal councillors 
during the municipal elections presented a recruitment challenge in selecting 
suitable participants for this study, as per the purposive sampling strategy 
outlined in Chapter Four of this study.  This challenge was highlighted in Chapter 
Five of this thesis, quoting the Auditor-General MFMA 2015/2016 (2017: 172):   
“After the local government elections in August 2016, there was 
significant movement in the political leadership at the municipalities 
in the Western Cape province, with new speakers at 25 
municipalities, new mayors at 22 municipalities, and 55% newly 
elected councillors overall.”  
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Secondly, the practice of municipal councillors having to first secure permission 
from their political parties before availing themselves for an interview, caused 
considerable delays.  In some instance, invited municipal councillors serving on 
Finance Portfolio Committees or Municipal Public Accounts Committees were 
unable to get permission from their respective political parties in time to 
participate in the planned interviews.  
 
Thirdly, a number of municipal councillors were reluctant to participate in the 
interviews due to what they referred to as limited knowledge of and an aversion 
for municipal finance and accounting.   Thus, it took a considerable amount of 
time to convince the potential participants to participate in the study.  Some 
municipal councillors also requested that a list of questions be sent to them first 
before deciding to participate in the study.  
  
7.3 BUDGET OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS 
Oversight principals who participated in the interviews were granted anonymity 
and allocated codes from P1 to P11.  The allocation of codes was in keeping with 
the ethical decision of not disclosing the names of participants; possible 
identifiers of participants were carefully concealed.  A table detailing these 
participants is in Chapter Four of this study. 
       
Principal 1 (P1):  Participant 1 is a senior official in the Provincial Treasury 
department responsible for providing municipal budget support and monitoring.  
This official has been with the department for more than five years, and is actively 
involved in the support and monitoring of municipalities throughout the Western 
Cape Province.         
 
Principal 2 (P2):  Participant 2 is from the same municipality as MM4.  He was 
a municipal official from 2006 and subsequently become the ANC councillor in 
2011.   Principal 2 has served in various municipal committees and positions, 
including being a chief whip of the ANC in the District Municipality.  This 
participant served as the chairperson of the Municipal Standing Committee on 
Public Accounts of the local municipality.  
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Principal 3 (P3):   This participant is also from the same municipality as MM4. 
He is an ANC councillor.  He has been a municipal councillor of the ANC since 
2011.  The councillor has served in different municipal council committees.  He 
has also represented the municipality in the District Municipality.     
 
Principal 4 (P4):   Participant 4 is from the same municipality as MM3.  She was 
first an ANC councillor in 2011.  She is currently a DA councillor for the District 
Municipality.  She also serves as chief whip of the DA in the District Municipality.       
         
Principal 5 (P5):  This participant is from the local municipality that falls under 
the District Municipality of MM3.  He is a DA municipal councillor.  He has only 
been a municipal councillor since 2014, and described himself as still learning 
about municipal finances.  He has attended training for Municipal Public 
Accounts Committees.   
 
Principal 6 (P6):  This participant has been a municipal councillor in the local 
municipality under the District Municipality managed by the MM3.  He has been 
an ANC municipal councillor since 2015, and has served on two portfolio 
committees.  
 
Principal 7 (P7):  Principal 7 is an ANC municipal councillor.  He has been a 
municipal councillor since 2007, and has served in various positions.  This 
councillor described himself as interested in municipal finance.      
 
Principal 8 (P8):  This participant has been a municipal councillor since 1996.  
He has served as an ANC councillor in different positions including being the 
Executive Mayor, chairperson of MPAC and chief whip.  He is currently the chief 
whip of the ANC as the main opposition in the municipality. This participant 
comes from municipality that has 13 councillors, of which at the time of the 
interview 4 were ANC and 9 were DA.   
 
Principal 9 (P9):   This councillor comes from the same municipality as P8.   He 
has been a municipal councillor since 2000.  He has served as the deputy mayor 
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and speaker.  In 2007, he resigned from the ANC and become a councillor for 
the Congress of the People.  In 2016, he was appointed as the mayoral 
committee member for the DA.  He is currently a DA member serving on the 
Mayoral Committee.       
        
Principal 10 (P10):  This participant was the only participant from the Metro 
Municipality.  He has been with the municipal councillor for 6 years, of which the 
first five years he was an ANC councillor.  He is currently a DA councillor serving 
as the chairperson of the Municipal Scopa.   
Principal 11 (P11):  This participant is a DA municipal councillor for the local 
municipality.  He is from the same municipality as MM2.  The principal serves as 
the chairperson of the finance committee of the municipality.  
  
7.4 Presentation of Results from Budget Oversight Principals 
This section presents the results from the interviews conducted with the 
Provincial Treasury official and the municipal councillors.  The results are 
subjective experiences and perceptions of the representative from the Provincial 
Treasury and the municipal councillors interviewed for this study.   
 
7.5.1 QUESTION 1: MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT  
Participants were asked to describe their understanding of “municipal budget 
oversight”.  The aim of this interview question was to introduce the topic and 
focus the interview.  This question was also used to develop a rapport with the 
participants. Responses to the question generated two main themes: (1) tool for 
monitoring service delivery; (2) compliance.   
 
7.5.1.2 TOOL TO MONITOR SERVICE DELIVERY 
Three municipal councillors stated very clearly that they understand municipal 
budget oversight as a tool to monitor service delivery.  Four municipal councillors 
indicated that budget oversight enables them to keep track of what is being 
achieved with the municipal finance in order for them to report back to 
communities.  P10 noted: 
“We need information in order to make decisions about service 
delivery. We have made promises and commitments to our 
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communities, we need to go back regularly to inform them about 
progress.  We can only do that if we exercise oversight on where and 
how the money is spent.”   
 
These councillors indicated that budget oversight is what helps them to compare 
what is in the budget to what municipal services and projects are delivered to 
communities. 
P6 stated: 
“I have been working with sports bodies in my ward.  We look at what 
is in the budget for sports facilities in my ward and physically go and 
check if services such as irrigation of fields, lighting and maintenance 
of these fields are done.  If not done, then I demand responsible 
people be brought to account.”    
 
7.5.1.2 COMPLIANCE 
Seven municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury stated that they 
understand the municipal budget oversight as primarily about legal compliance.  
Municipal councillors stated municipal budget oversight is what they are required 
to do to enforce compliance.  These councillors were clear that budget oversight 
is about making the municipal manager adhere to the specified financial and 
budget rules.   
When asked about their perceptions of the elevation of compliance in the 
municipal budget oversight, municipal councils raised concerns and 
reservations. These councillors stressed that service delivery to communities is 
conceptually different from legal compliance.  P8 stated: 
 
“Our municipal budget oversight efforts and effectiveness are 
determined by how well we enforce compliance with the laws and 
regulations.  The issue is to us that the legal compliance on its own 
does not address the social-economic challenges of communities.  
Our communities are poor and need services; not just effective 
compliance”.  
 
Five municipal councillors expressed a concern that the critical governance 
issues were being overlooked in favour legal compliance.  P2 expressed his 
concern as follows: 
“Municipal budget oversight is about compliance.  Compliance is 
alpha and omega of municipal budget oversight.  It is the ultimate 
thing.  This overemphasis on compliance with the law and numbers 
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is limiting and liquidating our political influence.  We are politicians 
and not financial accountants.  It has come to the point that if you 
cannot count, you cannot monitor.” 
       
One municipal councillor explained his displeasure about the compliance as legal 
requirements that are centrally determined and imposed on the municipality.    P2 
expressed his frustration with compliance as follows:     
“From what I have seen, the National Treasury has the authority to 
prescribe financial and budgetary processes for all the spheres of 
government.  This has made the Minister of Finance very dominant 
in issues including the municipal budget oversight.”  
 
The Provincial Treasury gave a more technical response to the question 
regarding its understanding of municipal budget oversight.  The Provincial 
Treasury focused on being informed about the diligently the municipality is 
complying with the provisions of the law.  P1 stated: 
“My understanding of the municipal budget oversight is to see to it 
that the municipality complies with the law and budget instructions 
through the budget process.”    
   
The Provincial Treasury also indicated that it understands budget oversight as 
accessing and reviewing financial information and reports in order to assist 
municipalities to comply with the law and regulations. The Provincial Treasury 
insisted that compliance is an objective way of improving municipal financial 
management and accountability.  P1 stated: 
“There are a common set of compliance requirements for municipal 
budget oversight.  These are helpful determining to what is right and 
what is wrong.  Compliance helps to ensure and enforce conformity 
with rules and regulations.”   
 
P1 emphasised compliance with the law as a guiding principle informing the 
purpose of the Provincial Treasury.  He highlighted that the Provincial Treasury 
conducts its municipal budget oversight to assist municipalities to get clean audit 
reports.   He also indicated that the purpose of the Provincial Treasury is “to 
contribute towards making municipalities in the Western Cape the top-
performing, and corruption free.”   
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7.5.2 MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT ENVIRONMENT  
When asked to describe their experiences and perceptions of municipal budget 
oversight environment, participants’ responses produced three themes.  These 
themes are: (1) multiplicity of oversight principals; (2) authority of oversight 
principals; and (3) the relationship between the oversight principals.             
 
7.5.2.1 MULTIPLICITY OF PRINCIPALS  
This theme described the understanding and perceptions of both the Provincial 
Treasury and municipal councillors of the model for the municipal budget 
oversight.  This theme relates to the social architecture of municipal budget 
oversight and provided a description of the oversight principals.  
  
The Provincial Treasury official indicated that there a number of government 
structures that oversee the municipal budget.  P1 provided a long list which 
included: the portfolio committees and opposition parties; councillors; Section 79 
committees; Municipal Standing Committee of Public Accounts (MSCOPA); the 
Premier, Provincial and National Treasury; National and Provincial departments 
of Local Government and Cooperative Governance.  P1 also included the 
Auditor-General as municipal budget oversight principal.   
 
When asked about how he feels about the multiplicity of municipal budget 
oversight principals, P1 said: 
“The budget oversight issues in municipalities require a range of 
support from different government structures.  I think it is 
understandable and necessary to deploy diverse resources to 
address oversight and accountability challenges faced by 
municipalities.  I do not think that one oversight principal is enough 
for these challenges.”    
 
The majority of the municipal councillors listed the municipal council, the 
Executive Mayor and the Provincial Treasury as the municipal budget oversight 
principals.  Two councillors included the national departments of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs and National Treasury.  Only one councillor 
said insisted that the municipal council is the only oversight principal.  
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When asked how they felt about the number of municipal budget oversight by 
multiple principals, municipal councillors were divided.   Five municipal 
councillors – interestingly, all from the Democratic Alliance – expressed 
appreciation for the involvement of the Provincial Treasury.  These councillors 
stated that they value the involvement of the Provincial Treasury as it contributes 
towards restoring the credibility of the municipal budget oversight system.      
 
However, five municipal councillors – mostly from the African National Congress 
(ANC) – expressed discomfort with the involvement of the Provincial Treasury in 
local government matters.  These municipal councillors felt that the involvement 
of the Provincial Treasury creates unnecessary parallel processes and 
duplication.  
 
7.5.2.2   AUTHORITY OF THE OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS 
Participants used the word “authority” regularly.  In describing their authority, both 
the representative of the Provincial Treasury and municipal councillors indicated 
that they have authority to exercise budget oversight over the municipal 
manager.   
  
P1 stated that the Provincial Treasury has the legal authority to exercise 
municipal budget oversight.  He expressed his view in the following manner: 
“The Provincial Treasury through its various units conducts municipal 
budget oversight as directed by the MFMA and various National 
Treasury regulations. These legislative provisions grant us the legal 
authority to monitor the municipal finances.  We interrogate their 
financial and budget reports, advise and support them.  When they 
fail to correct or change their non-compliant decisions, we apply 
sanctions against them.”   
 
 
When asked to describe the budget oversight authority of the municipal council, 
P1 stated: 
“I do not really know what municipal councillors are supposed to do 
regarding budget oversight. I know that they have authority to 
oversee the budget.   I am also not sure about the authority of the 
portfolio committees and Municipal Scopa concerning municipal 
budget oversight.”         
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When describing their municipal budget oversight authority, three municipal 
councillors stated that they have political as well as legal authority to exercise 
budget oversight on the municipal manager.  These councillors were of the 
opinion that only the municipal council has the authority to appoint the municipal 
council and therefore is required to ensure that municipal managers exercise 
municipal council resolutions on the budget.  P10 expressed his understanding 
of the budget oversight authority of municipal councillors as follows: 
“We adopt resolutions.  These must be implemented by the municipal 
manager.  Our [duty] is to ensure that the municipal manager 
implements our resolutions.  If he fails to implement these resolutions 
we make him account by demanding answers and explanations.  If 
the answers are not acceptable to us, we have the authority and 
obligation to impose consequences.”    
 
In much the same way, three municipal councillors mentioned that they have a 
contract with the municipal manager to perform financial management functions.   
These municipal councillors indicated that the performance contract signed by 
the municipal manager facilitates an oversight authority between the municipal 
manager and municipal council.       
 
When asked about their perceptions regarding the dispersion of municipal 
budget oversight authority to different principals, six municipal councillors 
expressed frustration at the multiple-principal model.  P7 stated 
“It is very difficult to understand who has power to monitor the 
municipal manager on municipal budget processes.   In fact, I do not 
know where our oversight authority starts and ends.  The Provincial 
Treasury seemed to have the same if not more budget oversight 
authority than us.”     
 
Three councillors expressed a concern that the Provincial Treasury has the 
authority to refuse to approve the municipal budget even though the municipal 
council has approved it.  These municipal councillors seemed to be troubled by 
the impression that Provincial Treasury does not acknowledge and respect the 
autonomy of municipalities. P2 articulated this frustration as follows:  
“I do not have a problem with the multiple budget oversight principals 
– as long as they respect the autonomy of the municipal council and 
stop second-guessing its budget decisions.”   
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These councillors were mostly aggrieved by the ability of the Provincial Treasury 
to make adverse decisions on the municipal budget without even engaging with 
the municipal council or the Executive Mayor. Two municipal councillors 
expressed displeasure about the authority that allows the provincial government 
departments to veto and undermine their budget oversight decisions of the 
municipal council. 
 
Two municipal councillors stated that the arrangement of different government 
departments having budget oversight authority creates an environment in which 
the oversight structures are contending over the control of the municipal budget 
and municipal manager.  According to these participants, granting all the 
structures  the same authority promotes a competitive spirit among the oversight 
principals      
P5 stated:  
“The municipal manager is accountable to many of us.  I do not think 
the Provincial Treasury recognises us.  The Executive Mayor and the 
provincial government want to overwhelm us and push us to the 
periphery of the municipal budget process.”  
 
These participants commented that the dominance of the Provincial Treasury 
has wrestled the budget oversight authority out of the requisite control municipal 
councils.   A widely shared view from the participants was that the dispersion of 
the oversight authority to many oversight structures undermines the authority of 
the municipal council.  P6 explained this view in the following manner: 
“In fact, the Provincial Treasury is hiving off the powers of municipal 
councils to exercise municipal budget oversight on the municipal 
manager.  I feel like our budget oversight role has been liquidated.”   
 
Likewise, P8 stated: 
“I feel like the Provincial Treasury has annexed to itself the authority 
to exercise municipal budget oversight. The Provincial Treasury has 
monopolised the process.  It has defined itself as the center and we 
as municipal councillors have been relegated to the margins. Our 
views and inputs are insignificant.”   
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All principals articulated very strongly the fear of losing legitimacy to their 
constituency for not exercising oversight on the municipal budget.  According to 
the councillors, the design of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals is 
such that, should a principal not exercise its budget oversight authority, it runs 
the risk losing its credibility.    
 
7.5.2.3   RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS 
This theme describes the nature of relationships between the various political 
oversight principals.  All the principals described in more or less the same way 
that the nature of the relationship among the oversight principals is usually very 
hostile.  These councillors indicated that the political relationships between 
parties have a tendency to shape how parties view and engage with the 
municipal managers.   
 
Three councillors explained that politically the DA recruits the municipal 
manager, and that the municipal manager works closely with the Executive 
Mayor.  These councillors described the nature of budget oversight relationship 
between the ruling party and the municipal manager as very relaxed.  These 
councillors claimed that that the municipal manager performs the instructions of 
the DA-run municipality.  These councillors explained that in most instances the 
DA and the municipal manager are involved in a corrupt relationship.  P2 
described the relationship between the municipal manager and the DA as 
follows: 
“These people have generally corrupt relationship with the municipal 
manager.  I am telling you, this relationship in incestuous.  It is so 
wrong and defeats the efforts of budget oversight.”     
 
 
Two of the DA councillors stated that the caucus of the DA interprets oversight 
on the municipal manager as exercising oversight on them.  
P4 explained: 
“We as the ruling [DA] party see and interact with the municipal 
manager as our deployee.  According to us, it is the role of the 
opposition parties to scrutinise and monitor the municipal manager.  
It is not our role to assist them.  In fact, where possible, we frustrate 
them.”  
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P4 added:   
“We cannot work with opposition. We see them as opponents, 
opportunist and sensationalists.  We have a duty as a caucus not to 
give opposition credibility and profile.”   
        
When describing the relationship between the Provincial Treasury and the 
municipal councillors, the Provincial Treasury was supportive and understanding 
of the relationship.  The P1 described the relationship between the Provincial 
Treasury and the municipal manager as a professional relationship.   According 
to this participant, the relationship between Provincial Treasury and the municipal 
manager is characterised by respect.  This participant emphasised that the 
Provincial Treasury does not act like a big brother to municipal managers.  P1 
stated: 
“Though we are considerate and willing to engage, it does not mean 
that we are not decisive.  When we feel that the municipal manager 
is not willing to correct wrong decisions, we act by sending a non-
compliance letter and reporting them to the committees of the 
provincial legislature and the National Treasury. We also recommend 
to the Provincial Department of Local Government that action must 
be taken against failure to comply.”    
 
P1 also remarked that the municipal council and its various structures have their 
own oversight arrangements that have nothing to do with the Provincial Treasury.  
This participant stressed that the municipal councillors have their own processes 
and their own boxes to tick.   
 
The majority of the municipal councillors indicated that there is no relationship 
between them and the Provincial Treasury.  The councillors stated that they have 
never been in meeting with the Provincial Treasury.  P2 expressed his views as 
follows: 
“There is no institutional relationship between us as municipal 
councillors and the Provincial Treasury.  These folks from the 
Provincial Treasury come here to our municipality regularly, but have 
never met with us.”           
 
P5 stated: 
“The Provincial Treasury does not even have basic collegiality for us 
as the municipal councillors. It is as if we do not exist. I do not think 
that they even consider the reciprocity of oversight activities.”   
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Two municipal councillors alluded to the Provincial Treasury insisting too much 
on its autonomy.  These councillors felt that the Provincial Treasury have an 
exaggerated view of its institutional identities.  P2 remarked: “The Provincial 
Treasury is unavailable to us as municipal councillors.  It is very disconnected.”         
  
7.5.3   QUESTION 2:  THE BEHAVIOUR OF MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS ON THE 
MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT 
The P1 was asked to reflect and share his experiences and perceptions of the 
manifestation and dynamics of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals 
during the municipal budget process.  The responses to the question produced 
five thematic issues.  These thematic patterns are: (1) different political agenda; 
(2) different cultures; (3) different oversight approaches; (4) different municipal 
budget oversight mechanisms and activities; and (5) capacity of oversight 
principals.    
 
7.5.2.1   DIFFERENT POLITICAL AGENDA  
The majority of the participants mentioned that oversight structures do not share 
the same political agenda for exercising oversight on the different stages of the 
municipal budget.  The majority of the municipal councillors were of the opinion 
that each political party has its own reasons for exercising municipal budget 
oversight.   
 
P3 remarked: 
“There is no common political purpose for municipal budget oversight 
in the municipal council.  We as councillors do what is prescribed by 
our different political parties.”    
       
P4 shared her views by stating the following:   
“The agenda of the DA regarding municipal budget oversight aligned 
to the manifesto of their political party.  Our manifesto states that 
where we govern there must be clean government attaining clean 
audit reports.”  
 
The municipal councillors seemed to be not in favour of an arrangement that 
require them to have a shared oversight purpose during different stages of the 
municipal budget process.  P7 explained his experience as follows: 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
147 
 
“We have different agenda as political parties.  What the other party 
see as a problem, we see that as advancing our agenda.  Therefore, 
it is impossible to have a common oversight purpose on the municipal 
budget process.” 
 
When asked about the oversight agenda of the Provincial Treasury, most 
municipal councillors stated they do not know.  P4 stated: 
“I do not know but I think the agenda of the Provincial Treasury is to 
make sure that municipalities do not abuse the finances of the 
municipality.  You must remember that there is a perception out there 
that municipalities are corrupt.  Therefore, my view is that Provincial 
Treasury is making sure that we do not abuse the finances of the 
municipality.”   
   
When two municipal councillors were asked about their perceptions regarding 
budget oversight agenda of the Provincial Treasury, they responded that they do 
not know about it, and are therefore unable to express an opinion.     
The Provincial Treasury admitted to not knowing what the political agenda 
municipal councillors on the municipal budget oversight.  P1 expressed his 
perceptions as follows: 
“Knowing or not knowing the budget oversight agenda of the 
municipal council does not impact on my work.  Yes, I respect them, 
but the Provincial Treasury has its own agenda for exercise budget 
oversight.”    
         
Both the Provincial Treasury and the municipal councillors appear nonchalant 
about not knowing of each other’s political agenda for exercising budget 
oversight.   All the participants were unconcerned by the fact that they operate 
as political principals in the same space but do not know what each as doing.  In 
fact, some councillors stated that it does not worry them to know that what the 
Provincial Treasury is doing.   
 
Five municipal councillors commented that the DA’s political agenda influences 
the nature of municipal budget oversight.  These councillors protested that the 
political power of the DA is limiting the ANC’s influence on the municipal budget 
oversight process.  P2 expressed his frustration as following: 
“The DA councillors use their majority to dictate what budget 
oversight issues receiving attention from the municipal council. 
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Issues that make them uncomfortable are not supported by the DA 
majority even if these issues require investigation”.         
 
 
7.5.2.2 Different Cultures 
Municipal councillors described cultural differences between them and the 
provincial government, especially, the Provincial Treasury as a dynamic that 
must be managed.  Four municipal councillors mentioned cultural difference as 
presenting a challenge in terms of how councillors and provincial treasuries 
exercise oversight on the different stages of the municipal budget process.  P2 
related: 
 
“The Provincial Treasury uses the officials to exercise oversight on 
the different stages of the municipal budget process.  Their attitudes 
and norms are very different from how we do our own oversight.  The 
manner in which these Provincial Treasury officials relate to the 
municipal officials is also different from how us.” 
 
P4’s experience of different culture was related to political parties in the 
municipality: 
“I have been a member of both the ANC and DA.  I have experience 
how as member of these political organisations we behave in relation 
to others when exercising budget oversight.  What I have observed 
is that we were very relaxed and did not care much about what is 
happening in different stages of municipal budget oversight.  
Currently, as a DA member and Member of the Mayoral Committee, 
I have a different experience.  There is eagerness to know what is 
happening with the finances of the municipality.  We question the 
municipal manager.”   
       
P6 shared his experiences of racialisation of oversight and deemed corruption: 
“You see, the DA is a white party.  They do things differently.  They 
have their own way of doing things and want things done their way.  
We never agree with these people.  If the municipal manager is white 
they trust the MM, but if he is black they relate to him as a potential 
criminal.  They are always scratching and searching to prove that he 
is stealing the money.”         
Most municipal councillors admitted that cultural incompatibility exists among the 
principals exercising oversight on the municipal budget.  Three municipal 
councillors related instances of behaviour difference between the way the 
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municipal councillors exercise oversight and the manner in which Provincial 
Treasury conducts its oversight business.    
 
When describing his experiences of how principals behave during the different 
stages of the municipal budget process, P3 stated: 
“These guys mean business.  They do not come here to the 
municipality for nothing. If the municipal manager does not adhere to 
their advice, they take action.  We are always bickering amongst 
ourselves.  Something is right to some and wrong to others.  That’s 
why the officials do not respect us.  We encourage wrongdoing by 
the way we behave.”       
P7 stated: 
“We as councillors are not proactive.  We react when we hear that 
something is wrong.  Half or most of the time we do not know what 
is happening.  We do not have a shared and institutional culture of 
oversight.  Do not get me wrong, each political party represented in 
the municipal council has its own culture and behaves in accordance 
with that culture, but there are no shared and overarching values and 
norms guiding us on how to exercise municipal budget oversight.”    
       
The majority of the municipal councillors hinted that the culture that existed 
between the oversight principals was that of mutual distrust.  The councillors 
indicated that not working together had become a way of doing things like 
oversight.  Some of these councillors stated that there is no such thing as 
collaboration culture.  They emphasised that they would rather fight amongst 
themselves than work together.           
 
7.5.2.2 DIFFERENT MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT APPROACHES  
Both the Provincial Treasury and the municipal councillors revealed they follow 
different approaches to exercise oversight on the municipal manager during the 
different stages of the municipal budget process.  The approach refers to how 
the principals pursue oversight on the municipal manager during the stages of 
the budget process.       
P1 stated that the approach of the Provincial Treasury to municipal budget 
oversight was to ensure compliance.   P1 articulated the following description of 
the Provincial Treasury’s approach to municipal budget oversight: 
“We look for non-compliance in the draft municipal budget.  When 
non-compliance is detected, we engage the municipal manager and 
correct it.  We also monitor compliance with the approved municipal 
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budget.  We utilise periodic financial reports from municipalities to 
ensure that collection and spending of municipal finances do not 
deviate from the approved municipal budget.  We are also very active 
in ensuring that municipalities comply with the concerns and 
recommendations of the annual audit reports issued by the Auditor-
General.”    
                  
The Provincial Treasury indicated that its approach is geared more towards 
supporting municipalities. P1 described the support approach during the budget 
process as follow: 
“We support municipalities by helping them to prevent non-
compliance. We detect problems and deviations early and help 
municipalities to correct in time.  If a municipality does not cooperate, 
we reinforce our support by increasing visits and demanding 
additional reports.”    
P1 commented further:   
“We have mechanisms to ensure non-compliance is detected and 
corrected early.  Starting with draft budget, we provide a professional 
and depoliticised feedback to municipal managers.  I can say that, 
throughout the budget process, we prevent political parties in 
municipalities from abusing their political dominance by approving 
and implementing irregular and illegal budgetary decisions.”   
 
The P1 mentioned that the Provincial Treasury focuses on financial data and 
information contained in various reports.  He emphasised that his Provincial 
Treasury focuses on getting timely and accurate information on the municipal 
budget on all stages of the municipal budget process.  P1 emphasised that 
because the Provincial Treasury wants to be objective, it focuses on the content 
of draft municipal budgets, the information contained in Section 71; 72 and 
annual financial reports.  
      
When asked about the type of information the Provincial Treasury demands from 
the municipal manager, the P1 explained as follows: 
“As the Provincial Treasury, we focus on the numbers in the budget. 
Our work is aimed at ensuring that the numbers in the draft budget, 
budget implementation reports and annual financial statements 
comply with financial management standards and rules, and other 
National Treasury norms.” 
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The P1 stated that the focus of the Provincial Treasury concentrates more on 
financial decisions and behaviours during the drafting, implementing and auditing 
of the municipal budget process.  P1 explained:  
“We at the Provincial Treasury focuses on ensuring that the 
municipal manager complies with the budget guidelines from the 
National Treasury and the general accounting norms and standards.”   
   
The municipal councillors admitted that oversight structures do not have a 
uniform and clearly articulated approach to municipal budget oversight.  
Municipal councillors indicated that in terms of their experiences, the oversight 
approach is mainly about influencing the budget allocations during the 
preparatory or planning stage of the municipal budget process.  P6 stated: 
“Our approach is mainly about controlling the municipal budget 
before it is approved by the municipal council.  As municipal 
councillors, we fight to ensure that our issues and needs are catered 
for in the municipal budget. My experience is that once the budget is 
approved, there is a decline of interest and activity on the municipal 
budget oversight.”   
 
Six municipal councillors acknowledged that they were not active in terms of 
exercising meaningful oversight during the budget implementation.  When 
probed further on lack of active oversight during the implementation of the 
budget, municipal councillors stated that this issue does not receive attention 
from the caucuses.  P7 commented as follows: 
“As councillors, we do not pursue individual issues.  Our caucuses 
strictly prescribe for everything that we do, individual as well as the 
party.  Even our oversight activities must be endorsed by the party 
first.  It has come to the point where even what you say in council 
meetings and committees must first be sanctioned by the party.  
Even if I want to raise concerns about any budget issue, I need to 
get the approval of my political party.”         
 
The municipal councillors highlighted that each political party, especially, the 
opposition, focuses more on exposing corruption by the majority party.  P9 
explained this issue in the following manner: 
“The opposition parties in the municipal council compete about 
exposing the corruption of the ruling party.  These parties see the 
municipal manager as part of the ruling party.”  
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Most municipal councillors acknowledged that the focus of their oversight is more 
political.  These councillors indicated budget oversight is used for political 
conflict.  P8 explained: 
“We often refuse to vote for the approval of the budget as a way of 
intensifying our political agenda against the ruling party.  We do 
oversight in order to get information that we can expose and attack 
the ruling party.”   
  
 
Municipal councillors conceded that their oversight approach is unstructured and 
largely influenced by external pressures such as media reports alleging 
corruption in their municipality.  P8 expressed his thoughts as follows: 
“Our Section 79 committees such as Oversight Committees and 
Municipal Public Accounts Committees do not have structured way 
of exercising municipal budget oversight.  I have seen these 
committees summon the Executive Mayor, municipal manager to a 
hearing.  I have also not seen a report from these committees to 
council.”    
      
Municipal councillors expressed conflicting perceptions of the budget oversight 
approach of the Provincial Treasury.  Some councillors were of the opinion that 
the oversight approach of the Provincial Treasury is different from theirs.  
However, other councillors claimed to not know the specific approach followed 
by the Provincial Treasury.   
      
 
When asked about the focus of their oversight approach, it became clear that the 
oversight principals (both the Provincial Treasury and municipal councillors) 
focus on different things when exercising oversight on the municipal budget 
process.  
  
7.5.2.3 DIFFERENT MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT MEASURES AND ACTIVITIES   
The question: “How do principals exercise oversight during the stages of the 
municipal budget process?” generated interesting responses.  In the main, the 
responses demonstrate that each oversight principal has its own oversight 
activities that they use during the different stages of the municipal budget.  I will 
begin with the drafting stage and then move to implementation. 
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 The P1 stated that the Provincial Treasury is implementing its own oversight 
activities during the draft municipal budget, budget implementing and budget 
auditing processes.  This participant expressed ignorance about what the internal 
oversight principals were doing concerning budget oversight.  P1 explained: 
“To be truthful, we as the unit within the Provincial Treasury that is 
responsible for municipal budgets, do not know what the municipal 
council, its committees do regarding oversight the different stages of 
the municipal budget process.  In fact, I doubt if they do proper 
scrutiny of the draft budget and the Section 71 and 72 reports 
because if we do not intervene, municipalities will experience high 
levels of non-compliance.”  
      
The Provincial Treasury was more detailed in responding to the question 
regarding its oversight measures and activities during the different stages of the 
municipal budget process.  One such detail, which emerged during the interview 
with the Provincial Treasury official, was that of monitoring.  P1 described 
monitoring as: 
“A system of tracking budget documents; financial transactions; 
procurement documentation; periodic reports.  The monitoring 
provides the Provincial Treasury unit with current data regarding the 
draft budget; budget implementation and response to audit queries 
and recommendations.”  
           
In responding to the question of what municipal councillors do to exercise budget 
oversight during the drafting stage of the municipal budget process, most 
councillors indicate that during the drafting stage they participate in the imbizos, 
municipal councillors’ workshops and part caucuses to influence the draft budget.  
Most councillors also mentioned that they use the Integrated Development 
Planning (IDP) processes to influence the draft budget.        
On the other hand, during the budget implementation, municipal councillors 
mentioned that they use the SDBIP to monitor budget activities.   P8 stated: 
“We conduct budget oversight during the budget implementation 
though considering the monthly and quarterly reports.  To be honest 
with you, these reports are just presented to in our municipal council 
meetings for noting.  It is a ritual that has made us passive.”   
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When asked to describe their oversight activities, most councillors indicated that 
the respective portfolio committee and Municipal SCOPA do engage in some 
oversight activities.  Some councillors indicated that some budget oversight 
related questions and issues are raised during the plenary meeting of council.  
However, all councillors indicated that there are formal process where they are 
able to field budget oversight questions directly to the municipal manager during 
the different stages of the municipal process.  
    
Most councillors explained that they construe their oversight activities in their 
own particular ways.  In particular, councillors stated that they structure their 
respective oversight activities not to be necessarily in conflict with other principals 
but according to their own “culture”, capacity, rules and processes. 
      
Most participants admitted not knowing what the other principals are doing in 
exercising oversight on the budget preparation, implementation and auditing.  
Principals indicated that the oversight activities of different principals during the 
different stages of the budget process are directed at municipal managers.  The 
majority of the participants indicated that what each principal is doing with the 
municipal manager is a private activity between them.   P10 offered an example:  
“Only the municipal manager knows the oversight mechanisms and 
related communications utilised by the Executive Mayor.  Equally, 
the oversight mechanisms used by the Provincial Treasury are 
known only by it and the municipal manager.”    
 
P2 used the metaphor of someone visiting your house explaining that:  
“The Provincial Treasury is like people who come to your house and 
talk to your tenant about the problems of your house.  If you are lucky, 
the tenant will inform you about his discussion and instructions from 
the external people.”     
Most councillors appeared ignorant of what the Provincial Treasury did during 
their regular visits to the municipality.  They indicated that they were not aware 
of meetings where the Provincial Treasury and other oversight structures of the 
municipality negotiate processes and mechanisms to exercise oversight during 
the budget process.  P11 commented that: 
“I will be lying if I say I know what exactly what the Executive Mayor 
and the Provincial Treasury are doing regarding oversight on the 
budget process.  Since being a councillor in my municipality, I have 
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never been in meeting with the Executive Mayor in discussion of 
budget oversight.  I have also not seen a report from the Executive 
Mayor or the Provincial Treasury talking to what oversight activities 
they are performing against the municipal manager”.  
  
When asked about how they felt about the municipal budget oversight activities 
of the oversight principals in general, most of the participants felt that the 
Provincial Treasury was serious about rigorously conducting its oversight 
activities.  These participants used terms such as the Provincial Treasury was 
“process-driven” “coercive” and “results-oriented” when exercising its budget 
oversight activities.  
  
When asked to provide their perceptions of the budget oversight activities of the 
municipal councillors, most municipal councillors themselves expressed 
dissatisfaction with their own budget oversight activities on municipal budget 
process.  P6 stated: 
“We lack the political will to develop and implement meaningful 
municipal budget oversight activities. We are not serious about 
exercising municipal budget oversight.”    
      
The majority of the councillors felt that the stringent behaviour of Provincial 
Treasury relegates them as subordinate to the Provincial Treasury despite the 
intergovernmental system that speaks of local government as a sphere of the 
state.  P2 explained:   
“The Provincial Treasury has the authority to reject and nullify our 
decisions regarding the budget. We are expected to change and 
align our oversight strategies in terms of what the Provincial Treasury 
deemed appropriate.  The design does not allow us to disagree with 
the Provincial Treasury.”   
    
7.5.2.4 DIFFERENT LEVELS OF CAPACITY FOR OVERSIGHT 
P1 indicated that, as the Provincial Treasury is well versed with the treasury 
norms, rules and laws regarding municipal budget oversight.  
“We make an effort to read and understand the National Treasury 
circulars, regulations, notes and guidelines regarding municipal 
budget oversight.  In some instances, we enlist the support of other 
organisations to train us on how to properly understand the law and 
regulations prescribe as our role in exercising municipal budget 
oversight.”  
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However, many municipal councillors admitted to having limited skill and/or no 
capacity to do financial oversight. Some councillors indicated that they do not 
have an idea of what they are supposed to know.  P3 commented: 
“Though I have an idea regarding municipal budget oversight, I 
cannot recite the specific laws and regulations for municipal budget 
oversight.  All I know is that we need to comply with the Municipal 
Finance Management.”   
            
Some councillors mentioned that they were provided with a booklet from the 
South Africa Local Government Association explaining the role of municipal 
councillors on municipal budget oversight.  These councillors indicated that they 
could not understand the information provided in the booklet, as it was not written 
in simple English.  
      
Municipal councillors who serve on the Municipal Public Accounts Committee 
indicated that though they attended a three-day training programme, it did not 
adequately equip them with all the relevant information on how budget oversight 
is exercised. No continuous learning/coaching approaches were provided. P4 – 
a councillor serving on the committee – explained that: 
“I am not a stupid person.  I have a matric qualification, but the 
training that was provided was just too complicated for me.  I am not 
a financial person and will accordingly just need someone to explain 
some of the financial terminologies for me. These GRAPs and 
financial ratios were too high for me.”  
             
Most councillors say their inability to exercise budget oversight forces them to 
shy away from responsibility.  For example, P5 expressed his decision to not 
participate in municipal budget oversight processes.   
“I do not get the support and I do not have the required skills.  That 
is why I have been thinking that I should not waste my time trying. I 
do not even try do report on municipal financial issues to my ward.  I 
stay away from financial matters at all costs.”   
     
This honest admission is exceptionally important in deflating the assumptions of 
our entire democratic system and especially the often exaggerated expectations 
of South Africa’s “local participatory democracy.  It speaks to a broader argument 
of lack of capacity to exercise effective budget oversight made in this thesis which 
I will revisit in the final chapters. 
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Participants indicated that they had come to terms with the fact that municipal 
councillors are unable to hold officials to account; therefore, the Provincial 
Treasury must take that responsibility.  Participants emphasised that because of 
the possibly inherent lack of capacity and continuous learning support to exercise 
effective budget oversight during the implementation and auditing of the 
municipal budget, the authority of the municipal council would always be 
significantly undermined. 
  
Furthermore, participants, especially, municipal councillors, take a conspiratorial 
view that they believe that the lack of capacity and support for municipal 
councillors is deliberately and “strategically” being used to allow the province to 
ultimately prescribe and govern municipalities. Several participants indicated that 
the feel like they have lost authority to the provincial government.  According to 
these participants, the provincial government is remotely controlling 
municipalities.   
                
Moreover, some councillors also indicated that the dominance of the Provincial 
Treasury in the municipal budget oversight has made them “feel useless.”  These 
councillors strongly believe that the lack of capacity and support to exercise 
effective budget oversight is affecting their credibility as elected representatives.  
In addition, these councillors stated that the dominance of the Provincial Treasury 
has a demoralising effect and diminishes their commitment to municipal budget 
oversight. 
       
All participants recognised that municipal budget oversight is generally a 
complex exercise.  Participants felt that the involvement of multiple principals 
was worsening it and making them “confused.”  Therefore, confusion was 
considered by many participants as one of the abiding realities and features of 
the governance system of a multiplicity of principals.  This confusion is systemic 
and amply reflected in participants’ description and statements.  The principals 
were unanimous in explaining the multiple-principal model and their behaviour 
as creating an oversight space where it is not clear who has the authority to do 
what.   P10 explained the confusion as follows: 
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“We are expected to be effective in implementing something that is 
so unclear to most of us.  There is no clarity regarding how we as 
councillors must related to the Executive Mayor and the Provincial 
Treasury during the municipal budget process.  I have experienced 
a lack of relationship and cooperation among the councillors, the 
Executive Mayor and the Provincial Treasury being accepted for so 
long that it has become a culture.”   
 
 
7.6 QUESTION 3:  WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF MUNICIPAL BUDGET 
OVERSIGHT BY MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS? 
 
POSITIVE EFFECTS 
Participants were asked to describe the positive effects of municipal budget 
oversight by multiple principals.  The thematic analysis from the response on 
questions related to this question, produced three themes that reflect positive 
effects of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  Themes are: (1) 
enhances respect for the municipal budget oversight system; (2) availing of 
additional expertise; (3) reliability of the oversight system.  The themes are 
discussed below. 
    
7.6.1 ENHANCES RESPECT FOR THE MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT SYSTEM  
The enhancing the respect for the municipal budget oversight system is the first 
theme that describes some of the participants’ experiences and perceptions of 
the positive effects of multiple-principal model and behaviour of principals 
involved in municipal budget oversight.  Participants used the word “respect” to 
explain how the model and practice of municipal budget oversight by multiple 
principals promotes the integrity of the municipal budget oversight system. 
    
The Provincial Treasury indicated that the role of different oversight principals in 
the municipal budget oversight promotes public confidence in the finance 
management.  P1 stated: 
“The involvement of different oversight principals ensures that non-
compliance is detected easily and corrected early.  Starting with draft 
budget, different oversight principals offer different oversight 
strengths to ensure nothing escapes the required scrutiny.” 
    
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
159 
 
The Provincial Treasury stated as a matter of fact that its extensive involvement 
in the draft, approval, implementation and auditing stages of the municipal budget 
process has contributed to the municipal managers in the Western Cape 
Province managing the municipal finances with integrity and good stewardship.  
According to the Provincial Treasury, its municipal budget oversight and tutelage 
activities have ensured that municipal managers in the Western Cape comply 
with the audit recommendations of the Auditor-General.     
      
P1 further remarked: 
“The truth of the matter is that our involvement is often expressed as 
negative thing. However, it is widely accepted that by many in 
municipalities or political parties that we have rescued and 
intervened in municipalities where there is legacy of serious internal 
budget oversight failures.  In some instances, the internal oversight 
structures are not acting in good faith.  In this regard, our 
interventions have helped to restore public confidence in the 
management of municipal finances”.     
             
P1 emphasised the fact that without their “intrusive” involvement, municipal 
managers would not be subjected to the required stringent scrutiny.  P1 stated: 
“I do not think that municipal managers were going to be made to 
provide the required level of details in their reports.  But now that they 
know there are other structures such as the Provincial Treasury who 
look into the reports, these municipal managers provide the 
information that is required.”  
 
P1 indicated that visits and requests for information from municipal managers 
ensured that the required information was collated and made available.  The 
Provincial Treasury believed that they are able to get additional information from 
the municipal managers.    
P1 further motivated the role of the Provincial Treasury in municipal budget 
oversight in benign terms: 
“Municipal budget oversight is very complex for the municipal 
councillors.  Our involvement provides an additional pair of eyes on 
what is happening with the finances of the municipality.  My 
experience is that our involvement helps to get the municipal 
manager to respond.”   
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P1 felt that the proximity and the relationship between the municipal manager 
and the municipal councillors and Executive Mayors makes the municipal 
manager resistant or just too comfortable.  But “when we raise issues, it becomes 
difficult for the municipal managers to evade our scrutiny”.  This is a vital 
observation that undermines the conventional wisdom that “local is always 
better” and that those closest to the problem are best able to deal with it. 
    
Five municipal councillors also admitted that the Provincial Treasury is “useful” 
in moderating unreasonable budgetary decisions of the municipal councils.  P4 
shared her experience: 
“I think the Provincial Treasury helps in making sure that the 
municipal budget processes are respected.  It is widely known that 
as councillors we do not have the capacity to perform financial 
related functions.  You must also be mindful that the public does not 
trust us as councillors.  The narrative out there in the public is that, 
we are corrupt.  So the Provincial Treasury, especially the Western 
Cape Provincial Treasury is highly respected.   Therefore, the public 
get to relax when they know that our finances are also scrutinised by 
the Provincial Treasury.”  
     
When asked whether the model and practice of principals inspires confidence in 
municipal finance management, some municipal councillors expressed positive 
opinions.  These councillors indicated that the Provincial Treasury restores 
confidence in the municipal budget oversight processes.  They indicated that the 
kind of finance mismanagement and irregularities that the Provincial Treasury is 
able to expose and address has taken place under the watch of the municipal 
councillors.  These participants emphasised that these financial irregularities 
happen because the municipal council and its committees are dysfunctional or 
have failed to pick up or address these irregularities.  
  
Most municipal leaders acknowledged that they do not do much to ensure 
openness and transparency during the different stages of the municipal budget 
oversight.  The councillors believed that the Provincial Treasury was good at 
shining the light on all the areas and aspects of the municipal budget.  The 
councillors felt that the Provincial Treasury know what they are looking for and 
that the municipal managers find it difficult to conceal information.  
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Both the Provincial Treasury and municipal councillors stated that they have 
experienced the involvement of the Provincial Treasury as contributing towards 
making the municipal budget process to be legitimate.  According to the 
participants, the involvement of the Provincial Treasury helps to prevent 
corruption and maladministration in the municipality.  P4, P9 stated that without 
the involvement of the Provincial Treasury, it would not be possible to ensure 
that municipal managers follow and adhere to the guidelines during the drafting, 
approval, implementation and auditing stages of the municipal budget process.  
  
The Provincial Treasury’s perception of legitimacy was justified by their belief 
that the model and practice that allows them to oversee municipal managers 
ensures the authenticity of the financial report. P1 stressed: 
“You must remember that we come across municipal financial 
reports that are incorrect, inconsistent with the guidelines and some 
instances crossly and intentionally misrepresent the actual financial 
situation in the municipality.  Our ability to detect and get municipal 
managers to address these financial reporting irregularities 
strengthens the authenticity of the municipal finance reports.”        
 
7.6.2   SUPPORT FOR MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS AND SOURCES OF DATA 
Support to municipal councillors by external agents was highlighted as a positive 
effect of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  Most participants, 
especially municipal councillors highlighted the scarce expertise provided by the 
Provincial Treasury as having a positive on municipal budget oversight. 
P11 stated the following: 
“Even though we have issues with the Provincial Treasury’s big 
bother mentality, they know what they are doing.  They have the 
expertise that we do not have.  I guess with without their involvement 
in the municipal budget oversight, we will be in a serious trouble.”   
     
P1 confirmed that the Provincial Treasury has the adequate human and financial 
resources to support its oversight role, and shared the following: 
“We are a team of highly qualified people with the requisite skills and 
expertise.  Our unit, which is called the Budget Unit within the 
Provincial Treasury, has resources to enable us to visit, inspect, and 
investigate the budget issues of all municipalities in the Western 
Cape.” 
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P4 went to explain the experience she had with the Provincial Treasury in the 
following manner: 
“Amazing. I was impressed with the level of detail the Provincial 
Treasury provided on our draft budget.  When the Provincial 
Treasury’s inputs and comments were presented to us as the 
mayoral committee members, I realised that these people know their 
staff.  Their inputs were so useful and well-constructed.” 
 
Participants describe the multiplicity of oversight principals as enhancing the 
capacity of municipal councillors in the exercise of municipal budget oversight.  
Most councillors stated that, in their experience, the Provincial Treasury was 
complementing their efforts and lack of effective budget oversight skills and 
capacity.  All municipal councillors indicated that they did not have the necessary 
capability to exercise meaningful budget oversight.  The reason, according to 
them, was that councillors lack the required qualifications, training and 
experience required to understand the finance and accounting issues.  The 
second reason was that the committees established to exercise budget oversight 
are not effective.   
 
Most councillors expressed the lack of the required information and infrastructure 
for exercising meaningful oversight on municipal budget oversight.  Councillors 
explained that it is difficult for each political party and individual councillors to get 
relevant information to use to exercise oversight on the officials.  P6 stated: 
“We rely on the reports from the officials and the Executive Mayor to 
generate relevant and appropriate information for oversight.  In most 
cases, the officials do not provide us with accurate and organised 
information.  We are not in position to verify the information that 
officials provide.”   
      
Most councillors reported that they do not have the required infrastructure such 
as independent people providing them with the support to exercise oversight.  
Most councillors revealed that they rely on the information provided by the 
municipal officials to exercise oversight on them and therefore do not have 
independent sources.  P6 stated: 
“How on earth can the municipal manager give us information that 
can be used against him? We are not sure of the objectivity, 
accuracy, reliability of the information provided to us by the municipal 
manager.”   
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Municipal councillors expressed a belief that the Provincial Treasury enjoys more 
and better support to enable it to exercise effective oversight on the budget 
processes.  Most principals highlighted that the Provincial Treasury has a 
dedicated support staff supporting the MEC.   
 
P10 also shared an experience of the valued contribution of the Provincial 
Treasury in his municipality: 
“As I indicated to you, I have been a councillor in this municipality 
since 2000.  In 2007, our municipality was one the worst performing 
municipalities in the Western Cape.  I have experienced the benefits 
of the direct involvement of the Provincial Treasury in our 
municipality.  In the last three financial years, we have received clean 
audits and our finances are in good shape.”       
 
Most councillors mentioned the problem of having very few people in their 
respective municipal councils and their committees who are capable of 
understanding and interpreting financial reports.  Most municipal councillors 
described the lack of capacity to exercise municipal budget oversight as the most 
significant impediment.  Some councillors frequently identified the Provincial 
Treasury as having better budget oversight capabilities.  
     
A recurrent issue raised by some municipal councillors was that the Provincial 
Treasury assists in constraining arrogant and unaccountable municipal 
managers.  P5 commented that:  
“I am not confidant enough to engaging with the municipal manager 
and other senior officials due to my limited knowledge and ability to 
understand and articulate financial and budgetary issues. The lack 
of capacity has dampened our enthusiasm.  That is why we are weak 
in exercising budget oversight, especially, during the implementation 
of the budget.”    
  
Participants indicate that availing additional expertise assist in sharing of the 
burden of oversight facilitate by partnership as one of the benefits of municipal 
budget oversight by multiple principals.  Very few municipal councillors 
expressed negative comments regarding their experiences and perceptions of 
the sharing of the burden of oversight by multiple principals as having a positive 
effect.  
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Most of the responses from municipal councillors ranged from acknowledging the 
huge responsibility for municipal budget oversight is huge, to the lack of oversight 
capacity in municipalities.  P7 illustrated the advantage of sharing the burden of 
oversight in the following manner:  
“I really do not see us as councillors being able to exercise 
comprehensive oversight on the municipal budget oversight.  This 
thing is massive.  It requires the involvement of structures such as 
the Auditor-General and Provincial Treasury.”           
P6 stated 
“It is only now that I understand why our laws have made it is 
requirement for the other structures to be involved in the municipal 
budget oversight.  It actually makes sense that other structures share 
the burden with us.  Otherwise, we were going to fail.”  
  
7.6.3   DIFFERENT LENSES AND A BACKUP FOR THE MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS  
The other theme that emerged from the interview in terms of the positive effects 
of multiple principals was that, it serves as a backup in the budget oversight 
system.  This theme relates to the ability of the multiple-principal model to avail 
the Provincial Treasury as a backup in instances when the municipal councillors 
do not exercise effective oversight.  Three participants indicated that Provincial 
Treasury reliability is important in preventing a total failure by ensuring that the 
municipal councillors do not paralyze the entire municipal budget oversight 
system. 
   
P1 highlighted the independence of Provincial Treasury as having a positive 
effect on the reliability of the multiplicity of municipal oversight.  P1 stated: 
“Imagine the Executive Mayor was able to prescribe to the Provincial 
Treasury how to exercise municipal budget oversight.  We need to 
appreciate the fact that the Provincial Treasury performs its own 
independent oversight on the budget of the municipality.  In this way, 
we are confident that the oversight principals are not going to collude 
and manipulate the municipal budget oversight process.” 
          
P1 indicated that the coverage of the municipal budget oversight landscape 
promoted the reliability of municipal budget oversight.  He explained that the 
multiplicity of principals allows the municipal council and the Provincial Treasury 
to focus their oversight efforts on the different stages of the municipal budget.   
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Municipal councillors referred to the way the Provincial Treasury and the 
municipal councillors focus on different issues during the budget process.  P11 
offered an interesting comment: 
“Our mandates to the municipal manager are not the same.  The 
Provincial Treasury looks at balancing the books and adherence to 
financial prescriptions.  We are politicians on the ground.  We focus 
on real issues.  Our people our struggling and want to get water and 
electricity.  When we do our oversight, we want to ensure that 
services are affordable and accessible.  The Provincial Treasury can 
focus on numbers and processes.”   
       
Most of the municipal councillors were of the view that different eyes of the 
different principals ensure that nothing goes on undetected.  This view is 
reflected in the following statement from P9: 
“My feeling is that the many constant prying eyes scrutinising the 
municipal managers during the budget process ensures nothing can 
be hidden.  These two structures have the ability to pay adequate 
attention the activities on the municipal manager.  These oversight 
structures complement each other in ensuring that a 360-degree 
oversight on the budget process is exercised”.  
    
Seven municipal councillors felt that without the Provincial Treasury, it would be 
hard for the municipal councillors to monitor all aspects of the budget.  These 
participants perceived the Provincial Treasury as useful in focusing their 
individual investigations into different areas of budget process.  The participants 
indicated that there is no way that the municipal managers can escape the 
scrutiny of the Provincial Treasury.  
          
Some councillors acknowledged that the involvement of the Provincial Treasury 
in exercising various oversight measures on different stages of the municipal 
budget process is useful in closing the oversight gaps and failures of the 
municipal councillors and their various committees.    According to councillors, 
the involvement of the Provincial Treasury is preventing the total failure of the 
municipal budget oversight system.  
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Most councillors agreed that if the province was not exercising oversight on the 
municipal budget, there was going to be a serious problem of non-compliance in 
municipalities. It was clear from the majority of councillors that they attribute the 
audit outcomes to the involvement of the Provincial Treasury.  
                       
Also related to the backup of the oversight was the ability of the Provincial 
Treasury to veto and reject the decisions of the municipal council as a positive 
effect of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  Two participants 
explained that the ability to reject the budget decisions enables the Provincial 
Treasury to continue executing its oversight roles and responsibilities when the 
municipal councils and the Executive Mayors fail to exercise effective and 
meaningful oversight.   
The P2 commented: 
“It is strategic that the Provincial Treasury is able to override the 
internal oversight principals and perform municipal budget oversight.  
If this was not the case, I can assure that there will be a lot of non-
compliance in municipalities.  If the province did not have the 
authority to reject, there will be a widespread failure of the municipal 
budget oversight.”    
 
The P2 explained further that the Provincial Treasury perceived the ability to 
override the other principal as acceptable and necessary.  He stated: 
“I think it is working very well in the Western Cape.  I think it is 
because the system allows us to takeover when the municipal 
councillors fail.  The fact is, the financial systems of both Kannaland 
Municipality and Oudtshoorn Municipality would have totally 
collapsed if the Provincial Treasury was unable to override the 
councillors in these municipalities.”  
  
Three municipal councillors mentioned that the ability to override is necessary to 
address the situation where one principal is abdicating its oversight 
responsibility.  A common example from most participants was that it should not 
be possible for the behaviour of one oversight principal to impact negatively on 
the quality of the entire municipal budget oversight system.  
 
These participants felt that the ability to override enables positive competition 
between municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury.  Participants 
reiterated that the municipal councillors are getting tired of being overruled by the 
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Provincial Treasury and are accordingly taking budget oversight seriously.  
According to these participants, when municipal councillors realise that the 
Provincial Treasury is receiving positive publicity for its work in municipalities, the 
municipal councillors try to emulate the work done by the Provincial Treasury. 
 
The ability of the Provincial Treasury to override the municipal councillors instils 
some discipline and commitment among the municipal councillors.  As P4 said: 
“Some councillors, especially those from opposition want to the 
wrestle the authority of the provincial government on the municipal 
processes.  This makes them to be very active in municipal budget 
oversight in order to limit the involvement of the provincial 
government.  This has made the councillors from the ruling party to 
be more concern about corruption and for them to be the first to raise 
issues and get publicity.”   
   
It is also the perception of some participants that the ability to override has 
improved financial discipline in the municipality.  Participants commented that 
councillors know that the provincial government will intervene and possibly 
dissolve the municipality if financial systems collapsed in the municipality.   
   
However, some municipal councillors were not in favour of the Provincial 
Treasury’s power to override the municipal councillors, but did agree with it when 
the need arise.  P2 commented as follows: 
“We do not feel good when the Provincial Treasury overrides us.  It 
makes us feel insignificant.  However, the truth of the matter is that 
we often do not take oversight seriously. We are weak, very few of 
us can engage meaningfully with the financial reports.  In addition, 
some of us are contributing participating to wrongdoing in the 
municipality.  So it becomes necessary for the Provincial Treasury to 
save the situation even if it means overriding us.  It is an effective 
way of reassuring the voters that the financial resources are not at 
the mercy of corrupt officials colluding with municipal councillors.” 
 
Equally, P8 stated: 
“I do not think it is done properly.  I do have an experience of the 
Provincial Treasury going beyond their scope.  The authority to 
override grants the Provincial Treasury [the power to] undermine the 
local democratic processes.  They need to support us, not take over.  
They are not our bosses the community is.”      
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NEGATIVE EFFECTS  
When asked to describe their experience and perception of the negative effect 
of the municipal budget oversight by multiple principals, participants’ responses 
produced five themes: (1) overlapping oversight activities; (2) blame shifting 
between the municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury; (3) confusion 
among the oversight principals; (4) relegation of oversight authority of the 
municipal council; and (5) transfer of municipal budget oversight authority to the 
Provincial Treasury. 
 
7.6.4   OVERLAPPING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES 
P1 mentioned the negative effect overlapping oversight activities.  He indicated 
that there is no clearly-articulated and separated oversight competencies. 
Consider the following statement by P1: 
“Our responsibilities and activities are the same.  There is no line 
differentiating between our oversight responsibilities and activities. In 
most instance, the Provincial Treasury is entitled or getting the same 
reports as us.  The financial and budget information reports that are 
tabled in municipal councillors are identical to those sent to the 
Provincial Treasury.”   
 
P1 was of the opinion that they do not have to check what municipal councillors 
were doing to exercise municipal budget oversight.  P1 stated:  
 
“We do not exercise oversight on the oversight activities of municipal 
councillors, we exercise oversight on the process and the content of 
the municipal budget.  Even where there is evidence of the municipal 
councillors not exercising budget oversight, there is nothing we can 
do.”  
        
7.6.5   INFIGHTING AMONG BETWEEN MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS AND 
THE PROVINCIAL TREASURY  
Most councillors explained that they experienced infighting and clashes among 
themselves when attempting to exercise budget oversight.  The infighting was 
reported to be more prevalent between the municipal councillors from the ruling 
party and those from the opposition party.  Eight participants mentioned 
experiencing opposition parties blaming those in the ruling party for lack of 
effective municipal budget oversight.          
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Some participants indicated that the councillors from the ruling party are to blame 
for lack of effective budget oversight in municipalities. P2 stated that councillors 
from the ruling party prevent other councillors from questioning wrong doing in 
the municipality.  He indicated that: 
“The municipal councillors from the ruling party insist on voting 
against the need to question financial irregularities in the 
municipality.  That is how they obstruct us from scrutinising the 
finances of the municipality.”       
 
P2 remarked that, in some instances municipal councillors are complicit in the 
wrongdoing and lack of compliance by the municipal manager.  Often, some 
councillors, especially those from the majority party are reluctant to sanction the 
municipal manager from deviant behaviour.  
    
Participants seemed to be divided in their views on what causes infighting among 
the principals during the municipal budget process.  Some participants 
expressed an experience of municipal councillors being engaged in perpetual 
infighting and failing to find common footing during the draft budget process.  
Municipal councillors from the ruling party felt that their colleagues from the 
opposition parties were being destructive and making it difficult for the municipal 
councils to agree on the draft budget.  P4 and P9 stated that opposition parties 
in the municipalities have reduced the budget process to a political contest.  P4 
stated: 
“We have failed to agree on what are the most important issue to be 
included in the municipal budget.  There is not unity among us as 
councillors.  We are so divided and fought unnecessarily over the 
budget.”   
 
Budget priorities seemed to be the biggest reason municipal councillors and the 
Provincial Treasury fought during the drafting states of the municipal budget 
process.  Municipal councillors from the opposition parties expressed 
apprehension that they were not being treated as elected public representatives 
having the right to participate in setting budget priorities of their respective 
municipalities. There was also one councillor from the ruling party who reported 
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that even within the ruling party itself, there was infighting and opposition against 
the dominance of the Executive Mayor on the draft budget. 
 
Most municipal councillors indicated that they have their own individual issues 
with the Provincial Treasury.  The behaviour of the Provincial Treasury was 
presented as a factor which created tension among the oversight principals 
during the municipal budget processes.  P2 stated: 
“How the Provincial Treasury behaves during the budget process 
divides us as principals.  What annoys me the most is the behaviour 
of the Provincial Treasury that is not consensus based.  Compliance 
is doing things their way.”   
 
7.6.6 CONFUSION AMONG THE OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS  
Participants articulated their experiences of confusion by referring to the issues 
of competition or cooperation during the stages of the municipal budget process.  
Most of the participants explained that they are not sure as whether they 
supposed to differ or cooperate with each other as principals.  The municipal 
councillors emphasised the importance of being different.  Most expressed the 
fear of losing their institutional identity and integrity if they do not emphasise their 
independence and autonomy.   
 
P1 was also of the opinion that allocating oversight responsibilities among the 
different principals is causing confusion.  This principal felt that the Provincial 
Treasury was made to feel that it was encroaching the oversight space of the 
municipal council.  Therefore, according to this participant, the Provincial 
Treasury is always accused of not respecting the territorial space of the municipal 
council.  Interestingly, P1 noted the unintended consequences of their approach: 
“As the Provincial Treasury we often question our role in the 
municipal budget oversight process.  We often feel that our approach 
is encouraging the municipal council, individual councillors and 
council committees to sit back and not take their oversight 
responsibilities seriously.”        
P1 stated: 
“How we perceive procedural process and how those in 
municipalities do things present strong contradictions. As the 
Provincial Treasury we have our own preference according to our 
understanding of legislation.  What we have found is that, the 
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structures in municipalities have their own budget oversight 
behaviours that contradict ours”. 
        
The majority of the participants admitted that these contradictions are making it 
difficult to distinguish the budget oversight approaches that are effective from 
those causing problems in municipalities.  This belief is reflected in the following 
P11 statement: 
“The Auditor-general is often lambasting the leadership in 
municipalities as not being active and effective in exercising budget 
oversight.  Many people also think that we as municipal councillors 
are contributing towards the problem of lack of municipal financial 
accountability.  For me, the issue is that our budget oversight 
approaches are clashing and causing problems in municipalities.”  
   
When asked whether there is a possibility of integrating their budget oversight 
approaches, all the principals expressed lack commitment.  Some municipal 
councillors claimed that integration was possible if both the municipality and the 
provincial government come from the same political party.  
       
7.6.7 RELEGATION OF MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS IN THE MUNICIPAL BUDGET 
OVERSIGHT  
Five participants made reference to the relegation of the authority of the 
municipal council to the periphery of the budget oversight environment as 
manifesting from the multiplicity of oversight principals.  Participants claimed to 
have an experience of the municipal councillors having relegated their budget 
oversight authority to the Provincial Treasury.  These participants expressed that 
that though the Provincial Treasury has dominated the oversight space, the 
municipal councillors have also failed to exert its budget oversight authority.          
 
Some councillors in the study stated that the Provincial Treasury has 
appropriated to itself the status of super budget oversight authority and principal.  
Participants expressed concern that the Provincial Treasury has the tendency to 
monopolise and veto the authority of the internal budget oversight principals, 
especially the municipal council.  
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The dominance of the Provincial Treasury has pushed out the municipal council 
and its committees in the budget oversight processes.  Some councillors 
explained the relegation of the municipal council from the centre of the budget 
oversight space is voluntarist, politicised and thus not sustainable and 
democratic.   
 
P2 articulated a view regarding the relegation of the municipal council in the 
following manner: 
“You see, this behaviour of the provincial government through the 
Provincial Treasury represents a hostile takeover.  The Provincial 
Treasury has invaded the municipality.  They have seized power 
unconstitutionally with the support of the ruling DA in the 
municipality.”   
 
Six municipal councillors complain that the ability of the Provincial Treasury to 
veto their decisions is effectively undermining their authority.  According to these 
councillors, the municipal managers tend to listen more to the Provincial Treasury 
rather than the municipal councillors.  P8 expressed himself as follows: 
“The problem here is that the relationship between the municipal 
council and the provincial government has deviated from the 
Constitution.  The relationship between the municipality and 
provincial government, especially the Provincial Treasury does not 
any longer allow for diversity and autonomy of the municipality, but 
for the Provincial Treasury to monopolise the municipal budgeting 
process, as well as how oversight is exercised.  The way things are 
currently, the agenda and political ideology of the provincial 
government has become the overriding concern.”         
 
Three municipal councillors referred to the annexation of the budget oversight 
authority from them.  P3 remarked: 
“The involvement of the Provincial Treasury in the municipal budget 
oversight has resulted in the authority for municipal budget oversight 
completely being relocated to the provincial government, especially, 
the Provincial Treasury.  Even our municipal manager looks up to the 
Provincial Treasury to pronounce on the appropriateness of the 
budget activities and decisions.  We are insignificant.”    
 
Most councillors in the study complained that the municipal budget oversight 
budget is now firmly in the hands of the Provincial Treasury.  Most councillors 
stated that the Constitution has given the authority the employ and exercise 
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oversight on the municipal manager.  They also explained that the political 
process at the provincial government and some municipalities have moved the 
budget oversight authority to the Provincial Treasury.  According to these 
councillors, the Provincial Treasury has taken advantage of their capacity 
challenges to move the budget oversight capacity to Provincial Treasury.  These 
participants stated that they need assistance and support, not for the Provincial 
Treasury to remove authority from them in this manner.    
 
Some participants felt that the transfer of the municipal budget oversight authority 
to the Provincial Treasury has not been negotiated in terms of the 
intergovernmental relations framework.  This particular issue was raised by a 
number of participants who indicated that they did not know how it had happened 
that the real budget oversight authority had moved to the Provincial Treasury. 
   
7.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter presented the findings of the study accordance with the key 
questions of the study.  The findings described how municipal manager as 
participants in the study perceive municipal budget oversight by multiple 
principals.  The participants’ description of the multiple-principal model, the 
behaviour and effects of multiple principals provided important and rich 
knowledge and understanding of this phenomenon and complemented the 
literature discussed in Chapters Two and Three of this study.   
 
The following chapter presents the summary of the findings and related 
discussion.  The discussion will also follow the themes generated through data 
organisation and analysis.     
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CHAPTER 8:  DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter discusses the research findings in relation to this study’s three 
research questions of the study.  Relevant explanations that emerged from the 
interviews are highlighted on each of the questions.  In addition, the chapter 
interprets the findings against and in conjunction with the theoretical framework 
and the literature presented in this thesis.  The presentation of the chapter is 
guided by Sandelowski (1995 as cited in Thorne, 2008: 47)  Sandelowski (2000 
as cited in Thorne, 2008: 47) suggestion that the discussion chapter must enable 
the transformation of findings emerging from the study, from “telling what it is to 
interpreting and concluding what might this mean and why it matters”.  
     
The chapter commences by reinstating the research purpose.  The section is 
followed by a discussion on the findings relating to both the municipal managers’ 
and oversight principals’ experiences and perceptions of municipal budget 
oversight by multiple principals.  The multiple principal-agent theory framework 
and the research method employed for this study will be utilised to validate the 
findings.   
 
8.2   PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of this study was to understand municipal budget oversight by 
multiple principals.  To address this purpose, the experiences and perceptions of 
the participants were explored by capturing their views, expressions, feelings, 
opinions and beliefs on the oversight model, its manifestations, dynamics and 
effects on the municipal budget process.  Accordingly, the interpretation and 
discussion of the findings entails an iterative process anchored in reflective 
exploration and description of the narrative expressions the participants made 
during their individual interviews. The following section presents the 
interpretation and discussion of the findings.    
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8.3 UNDERSTANDING OF MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT  
Participants in the study demonstrated different understandings of municipal 
budget oversight.  Their individual responses revealed that municipal managers 
and Provincial Treasury understand municipal budget oversight more or less the 
same way, while municipal councillors demonstrated a different understanding.  
Both the municipal managers and the Provincial Treasury emphasised and 
displayed a fascination with adherence to legal requirements; regulatory 
prescriptions and compliance as what they understand municipal budget 
oversight to consist of. 
 
The commonality between the municipal managers and the Provincial Treasury 
official’s understanding of municipal budget oversight could be attributed to the 
fact that both are appointed officials.  In this regard, their orientation and affinity 
to adherence and compliance to law and regulations is informed by their training, 
vulnerability to sanctions and their respect for the professional and ethical 
conduct. 
        
On the contrary, the municipal councillors were of the view that the unmitigated 
obsession with legal compliance erodes the democratic and political role of 
municipal councillors on the municipal budget process.  Councillors emphasise 
legal compliance as reducing municipal budget oversight to financial accounting. 
For councillors, fixation with legal compliance has made budget oversight a legal-
driven process that is of no interest to non-executive councillors.  
        
Interestingly, most participants perceived compliance as inducing an inflexible 
compliance environment intended to ensure the municipal manager’s behaviour 
on the municipal budget process is aligned and adhere to applicable laws, rules 
and regulations.  Consequently, the participants saw municipal budget oversight 
in the Western Cape municipalities as a ritualistic perpetuation of various 
provisions of the Constitution, the Municipal Systems Act and the Municipal 
Finance Management.  Participants stated that compliance has attained more 
prominence and significance than service delivery.   
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This finding on compliance confirms that the municipal budget design is 
configured and implemented as an inflexible legal bureaucratic process.  
Compliance was explained in this thesis as the state of being in accordance with 
established guidelines, norms or regulation.  Furthermore, it was emphasised 
that compliance can be obligatory in prescribing a specific behaviour pertaining 
the performance of a function.  This aspect of absolute compliance in the 
municipal budget oversight is consistent with Van der Waldt’s (2015) contention 
that oversight is one of the essential elements of South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy.  
  
Interestingly, as I anticipated, municipal councillors described municipal budget 
oversight primarily as a tool and process to monitor service delivery.  All 
municipal councillors described municipal budget oversight as enabling them to 
keep track of service delivery.  Equally, they described municipal budget as a 
useful way of getting information so they could account and report back to their 
communities. 
 
The municipal councillors confirmed that the relationship between the municipal 
manager and the political oversight principals on the municipal budget process 
is characterised by information asymmetry.  The municipal manager as the agent 
possesses superior expertise and knowledge, and the political principals have 
no or limited understanding of the municipal budget.    The oversight relationship 
between the municipal manager and the political principals is designed to 
address this inherent information asymmetry.  As highlighted in Chapter Two of 
this thesis, information asymmetry constitutes one the reasons for the principals 
to exercise oversight on the agent. 
                  
While the difference in the understanding of municipal budget oversight by the 
key stakeholders is understandable, it does however, demonstrate that fault lines 
between legal compliance and political decisions related service delivery are 
irreconcilable.  The obsession with either/or fails to harness the significant 
strength of both the legal compliance and political accountability for service 
delivery in the municipal budget oversight.  
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8.3.1 MULTIPLICITY OF MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS 
All the participants in the study described the nature of municipal budget 
oversight as involving a number of political oversight principals.  Participants 
listed the municipal council, the executive mayor, provincial governments and 
national government.  Understandably, municipal managers provided a much 
more comprehensive list of oversight principals, whilst both the Provincial 
Treasury and some of the municipal councillors were not aware of some of the 
other oversight principals operating alongside them.  
     
The description of multiple principals was considered to reflect Linstead and 
Thanem’s (2007) definition of multiplicity, which emphasises the quantitative 
increase of oversight actors.  This study’s findings align with an assertion made 
in the Chapters Two and Three of this study when stating that the proliferation of 
oversight principals is the reality of modern government, especially those like 
South Africa with a multi-sphere governance architecture.  In particular, the 
finding concurs with Dehousse’s (2008) suggestion that the multiplicity of 
principals is no longer an anomaly but an institutional architecture of how modern 
government constrain delegation to bureaucratic agents.   
   
Notably, participants perceived the multiple-principal model differently.  Some 
participants expressed frustration with the model whilst others believed that the 
model was progressive.  Municipal managers raised a concern about confusion 
related to which oversight principal to obey, highlighting that the confusion 
exposes them to possible conflict with the principal that felt undermined.           
With regard to municipal councillors, some municipal councillors, especially 
those from the DA, expressed appreciation for the involvement of the Provincial 
Treasury.  These councillors stated that they value the involvement of the 
Provincial Treasury as it contributes towards restoring the credibility of the 
municipal budget oversight system.  However, some municipal councillors, 
mostly those from the ANC, expressed discomfort with the involvement of the 
Provincial Treasury in municipal affairs.  These councillors felt that the 
involvement of the Provincial Treasury creates unnecessary parallel and 
duplication.  
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This finding highlights the heterogeneity of oversight by multiple principals.  This 
means that the multiple-principal model promotes variance and limits the 
possibility of destructive and collusive cooperation prevalent in collective 
principals.   However, irrespective of the perceived benefits of multiplicity of the 
principals in municipal budget oversight, some participants were apprehensive 
about the possible power struggle between the municipal council and the 
Provincial Treasury. 
 
The study also revealed how the number and diversity of the budget oversight 
principals reflects the complexity of the governance architecture, which entails 
the involvement of a number of independent multiple jurisdictions in municipal 
finance.  This arrangement was explained in this study as contributing towards 
the quantitative increase of municipal budget oversight principals.  In particular, 
Chapter Three indicated that the diversity of municipal budget oversight 
principals results from the law as well as transfers from provincial and 
government department to municipalities.  These arrangements inevitably 
contribute towards the stacking or layering of oversight principals who have the 
obligation to exercise oversight on the municipal manager.     
 
8.3.2 THE AUTHORITY OF MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS  
Most participants acknowledged that multiple principals involved in the municipal 
budget oversight have legislative authority to exercise oversight on municipal 
budget oversight, in particular on the municipal manager.  Municipal councillors 
highlighted that they have legal and political authority and obligation to exercise 
oversight on the how the municipal manager manages the financial resources of 
the municipality.  Equally, the Provincial Treasury official pointed out that the 
treasury has legal authority to exercise municipal budget oversight.  The 
emphasis on the legal authority highlighted that the authority is not arbitrary or 
dependent or influenced by political factors and issues.  Similarly, the Provincial 
Treasury perceived its legal authority to exercise oversight on the municipal 
manager as non-negotiable and dependent on its relationship with the 
municipality.  
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This study noted that participants understand that more or less the same budget 
oversight authority is dispersed to the different principals.  This was perceived in 
this study as creating complexity.  Chapter Two of this study suggested that an 
institutional arrangement consisting of heterogeneous and multi-jurisdictional 
structures exercising oversight on the single bureaucratic agent is manifestly 
complex (Raynard, 2016).  Clearly, the proliferation of the municipal budget 
oversight principals has not only polarised these principals, as well as the 
principals and municipal managers, but has also evolved into a complex design 
with no clarity regarding the actual holder of oversight authority and power. As a 
result, it can be concluded that complexity is inherent in an arrangement where 
the same authority is allocated to multiple, non-hierarchical and non-cooperating 
principals.   
         
Another issue raised by participants in this study was the authority of the 
Provincial Treasury in relation to the municipal councillors.  Many municipal 
councillors felt that Provincial Treasury has too much authority, which 
undermines and threatens their political legitimacy.  These councillors believe 
that the ability of the Provincial Treasury to veto the decisions of the municipal 
council creates some form of hierarchy, which militates against the autonomy of 
the municipality. 
   
This finding is significant in the sense that, it dispels an assumption that principals 
in the multiple-principal model have the same power and influence. What this 
study is showing is that the same budget oversight legal authority does not 
automatically translate into the same degree of influence.  The observation from 
the study was that power and influence was tilting more towards the Provincial 
Treasury. Consequently, it is important to consider that in addition to legal 
authority, principals in the multiple-principal model get involved in political power 
play aimed to influence or limit the influence of other principals.  It is very likely 
that between the municipal councillors and Provincial Treasury there will be 
competition, which should be moderated by legality and political legitimacy.   
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8.3.3 THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE OVERSIGHT 
STAKEHOLDERS  
Both the municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury indicated that they 
have oversight authority on the same municipal manager.  They also both 
indicated that they have a separate relationship with the municipal manager.  
However, both the municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury indicated 
that there is neither a structured relationship among them nor requirement for 
them to have a relationship with other oversight principals. Participants 
highlighted that they have a common purpose but no relationship. 
   
This finding concurs with my observation that within the multiplicity of oversight 
principals’ model there is no requirement for consent among the principals.  This 
finding highlights the predisposition of different political parties in pursuing their 
own sectarian interests.  Most municipal councillors stated that their oversight 
relation with the municipal manager is influenced by political party affiliation.  
  
Some councillors described the nature of oversight by opposition parties as 
usually very hostile and combative.  In addition, some councillors from the ANC 
indicated that there is generally an incestuous relationship between the municipal 
manager and the ruling DA.  These councillors explained that the municipal 
manager is the deployee of the DA as the ruling party and accordingly received 
protection from it.  These councillors stated that the caucus of the DA interprets 
oversight on the municipal manager as oversight on the ruling party.  
 
Another significant finding emerged from how municipal councillors perceived 
their relationship with the Provincial Treasury.  These perceptions include 
reference to the Provincial Treasury behaving as the big bother.  Some municipal 
councillors felt aggrieved by the ability of the Provincial Treasury to veto their 
decisions.  However, some councillors, acknowledged and appreciate the 
involvement of the Provincial Treasury.  These councillors perceived the 
Provincial Treasury as complementing their oversight efforts and capacity.  
 
This finding showed that though there is no structured legal relationship between 
the Provincial Treasury and municipal councillors, there are still political 
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relationships.  Participants who perceived the involvement of the Provincial 
Treasury as positive were mainly from the DA, indicating that the relationship 
between the principal in the multiple principals design cannot be deemed to be 
entirely apolitical.  In fact, it was clear from this study that the DA councillors did 
not perceive the Provincial Treasury as an “outsider”.  Similarly, the DA 
councillors seemed be more tolerant of the intrusive nature of the Provincial 
Treasury’s involvement in municipal budget oversight.  
     
8.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 2:  MANIFESTATIONS AND DYNAMICS OF 
MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT BY MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS  
The second research question focused on how the Provincial Treasury, 
municipal managers and municipal councillors experience and perceive the 
manifestations and dynamics of multiple principals during the oversight on the 
municipal budget process.  Their perspectives are divided into four sections: (1) 
Individual identity within a multiplicity; (2) different political agendas for oversight; 
(3) municipal budget oversight approach; and (4) municipal budget oversight 
measure and activities. 
 
8.4.1 INDIVIDUAL IDENTITIES WITHIN A MULTIPLICITY 
The study showed that the model and its practice of municipal budget by multiple 
principals manifest individual identity, values and processes for exercising 
oversight on the municipal manager during the municipal budget process.  The 
reinforcement of individual political identity reflected in the model is in line with 
objective of the MFMA which establishes “separate roles and responsibilities of 
municipal budget oversight structures” (National Treasury 2011: 74).  The 
political identities of different oversight principals is maintained through the 
constitutional autonomy as discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis.  
Accordingly, the multiple-principal model does not require any of the principals 
to alter their individual identities and behaviour.  Arguably, this model and its 
application is constructed to address the problem of an unprincipled principal 
(Brinkerhoff, 2000).    
An interesting dynamic that emerged from the study regarding individual 
identities is that the model and its practice induce tension among the principals.  
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The fact that there is no expectation on any principal to transform its interests, 
values and ultimately its behaviour in order to align with the collective, suggests 
that the model creates a deliberate disruptive measure intended to minimise 
collective obfuscation by the oversight principals.  Therefore, the relationship and 
the cohesiveness among the principals exercising municipal managers during 
the municipal budget process should be based on diversity, tension and 
constructive competition.  
         
8.4.1 DIFFERENT POLITICAL AGENDAS 
The majority of the municipal councillors identified the different political agendas 
as part of the environment of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  
Many participants expressed discomfort with allowing one principal to dominate 
and dictate the agenda for oversight in the different stages.  Consistent with the 
political contestations of the Western Cape, the views of the perceptions of the 
participants indicated animosity among the political oversight principals.  
   
This was highlighted by municipal councillors as creating power struggles 
between the different political parties in the municipal council.  According to the 
municipal councillors, this prevents them from collaborating when exercising 
oversight on the different stages of the municipal budget process.  Both the ANC 
and DA councillors were apprehensive about allowing each other to influence the 
municipal budget. Equally, municipal managers’ experiences concerning the 
constitutive behaviour of the multiple principals in the exercise of oversight of the 
draft, approval, implementation and auditing of the municipal budget process, 
was that the multiple principals pursue oversight in a manner lacking coherence, 
coordination and objectives.  The municipal managers felt that the DA was 
individually pursuing the objective of achieving clean audits. 
 
Most of the participants also highlighted the lack of coordination regarding 
interpreting and utilising the information for oversight purposes.  Participants 
indicated that there is no process to ensure that the submitted information is 
interpreted and analysed in a coordinated manner among the principals.  All the 
participants agreed that though regular reports are provided to the municipal 
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council and the executive mayor, they seldom detect and raise deviations from 
the budget.  
           
The prevalence of diverse oversight objectives and lack of coordination among 
the multiple municipal budget oversight principals was highlighted in the literature 
of this thesis as an explicit and deliberate feature of the multiple-principal model.  
This supports Linstead and Thanem’s (2007) contention that multiplicity of 
oversight principal must promote difference, which is invaluable in ensuring that 
multiplicity does not result in the usual destructive collective institutional action. 
Particularly, different political agendas are central to multiple principals 
exercising oversight on the drafting, approval, implementation and auditing 
stages of the municipal budget process.  This finding indicates that political power 
and how it is distributed among the principals is very important in terms of 
determining the interplay and agenda of oversight on the municipal budget 
process.   
    
This finding is significant in terms of explaining the conflict among the oversight 
principals.  In particular, it revealed the cause of the perennial conflict between 
the municipalities and provincial governments, especially, it they are governed 
by two different political parties.  Accordingly, this finding was useful in elevating 
some of the causes of territorial contestations between municipalities and 
provincial government during the municipal budget processes.  
 
In addition, the study highlighted conflict among the municipal councillors 
themselves.  Interviews indicated that conflict is being experienced between the 
executive and non-executive councillors and well as between DA and ANC 
councillors during the municipal budget process.   While it is tempting to refer to 
this conflict as distractive, it should however be considered to strategic facilitating 
negotiations, persuasion and coercion among the multiple oversight principals.  
Thus, the multiple-principal model does enable the principals to oversee the 
municipal manager as well as inter-oversight among the principals themselves.   
 
The study showed that conflict is an essential aspect of the model of multiple 
principals.  As indicated in subjective narration of the participants in Chapter Two 
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of this thesis, when the possibility of conflict among the oversight principals 
disappears, then there is a probability of complicity and capture.  In this regard, 
conflict among multiple principals during the municipal budget process serves to 
prevent incestuous and loyalty to one principal.  Equally, it can be considered as 
helping to prevent destructive predictability and collusion among the oversight 
principals.   
  
8.4.2 MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT APPROACH 
In this study, the participants indicated that different oversight approaches are 
pursued during the different stages of the municipal budget process.  The 
oversight approach was defined in chapter three of this study as providing 
politicians with the authority and opportunity to exercise “preventive and 
corrective review measures” on the specific policy to be implemented. (Larsen, 
1977: 4).  Oversight approaches were also explained as availing mechanisms 
and tools to identify, prevent and monitor the success or the subversion of the 
mandate or instructions of the legislative or political structure.  Bala and Deering 
(2013) identify police patrol and fire-alarm as two oversight approaches.  
  
The Provincial Treasury identified its approach as preventative, especially, 
preventative non-compliance.  The Provincial Treasury also emphasised that it 
has adopted a data-driven approach to municipal budget oversight.  This 
participant from the Provincial Treasury clarified that their oversight activities 
focused on what is contained in monthly and quarterly financial reports submitted 
by municipalities.  As indicated in chapter three of this thesis, section 5(4) of the 
MFMA, instructs the Provincial Treasury to  
“monitor compliance with the MFMA by municipalities and municipal 
entities in the Province, monitor the preparation of municipal 
budgets, the monthly outcomes of these budgets and the submission 
of reports by municipalities as required in terms of the MFMA.  This 
section further provides that the Provincial Treasury “may assist 
municipalities in the preparation of their budgets; further exercise any 
powers, and may take appropriate steps if a municipality or municipal 
entity in the Province commits a breach of the MFMA”. 
 
The municipal councillors indicated that its approach is mainly reactive and 
based on media exposure.  The municipal councillors indicated that as a result, 
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they do not have a structure oversight approach by focus more on the draft 
budget and on issues that are raised in the media.  The municipal councillors 
also mentioned that their approach focuses more on ensuring that their service 
and infrastructure demands are included in the annual budget.       
 
8.4.3 MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT MEASURES AND ACTIVITIES 
All the participants interviewed for this study stressed the different ways of 
exercising oversight during the stages of the municipal budget process.     
Municipal managers bemoaned the way that they are required to produce 
different kinds of reports for different principals throughout the preparation, 
implementation and auditing of the municipal budget.  All municipal managers 
stated that though some monitoring reports are regular and based on specific 
deadlines, other requests and instructions for reports, meetings, hearings and 
visits by oversight principals are unplanned.  Equally, the oversight principals 
admitted that they plan and implement separate budget oversight measures and 
activities.  Both the municipal councillors and Provincial Treasury justified the 
practice of undertaking different budget oversight measures and activities.  
       
Clearly, both oversight principals- in particular the municipal councillors and the 
Provincial Treasury – have different orientations and political rationalities.  The 
Provincial Treasury orientation and approach tend to be dominated by financial 
technical rationality.  The municipal councillors on the other hand are 
encumbered by political rationalities.  It is however, clear that these principals 
are not consciously harmonising, harnessing their separate rationalities to 
complement their oversight efforts during the different stages of the municipal 
budget process. As indicated in chapter two, the multiple-principal model and 
practice raises difficult questions for both the agent and the principals regarding 
who oversees the agent (Lane 2007).     
        
 
This finding is consistent with the James and Alley (2002) suggestion that when 
principals exercise oversight, they commonly use different oversight processes, 
mechanisms and procedures.  In this regard, where there is a constant overlap 
of ex-ante, concurrent and ex-post oversight measures and activities, a multitude 
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of oversight measures and activities are possible. Consequently,  this finding as 
it relates to the behaviour of municipal  budget oversight principals is that it does 
not impose a requirement for the municipal council, the executive mayor and the 
Provincial Treasury to coordinate their oversight activities and efforts during the 
different stages of the municipal budget process. Key to this finding is that the 
overlaps, duplications and redundancy as experienced by participants during the 
states of the municipal budget process are inherent in the behaviour of budget 
oversight principals. 
 
This finding is valuable for understanding the deliberateness of fragmentation of 
budget oversight measures and activities of municipal budget oversight by 
multiple principals.  While it has the possibility of weakening municipal budget 
oversight, it also has possibilities to enhance and strengthen it.  However, it is 
important that this inherent fragmentation is managed effectively to prevent 
systematic paralysis of municipal budget oversight.  
         
There is a groundswell of dissatisfaction among councillors regarding the 
unbridled involvement of the Provincial Treasury during the draft and 
implementation stages of the municipal budget process.  Most councillors stated 
that the Provincial Treasury takes advantage of their incapacity with regard to 
exercising effective budget oversight.  Some councillors indicated that the 
Provincial Treasury adopted absolutist tendencies.  In addition, municipal 
councillors claimed to have experienced aggression and unilateral engagement 
with the municipal manager.  
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8.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 3:  POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF 
MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT BY MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS 
The findings of this study showed there are fewer positive effects compared to 
negative effects of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  The 
positive effects are discussed below.   
  
8.5.1 POSITIVE EFFECTS OF MULTIPLE OVERSIGHT BY MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS  
Previous studies have identified the multiple principals as having a positive effect 
on oversight.  Chapter two of this study highlighted that oversight by multiple 
principals has comparatively more benefits than a single principal (McGovern, 
2009).  It was argued that oversight by multiple principals “create a trifecta of 
political presence” within the governance environment (Lane, 2007: 627).  It also 
indicated in Chapter Two that in addition to preventing possible capture by the 
agent, multiple principals creates an oversight arrangement that makes it difficult 
for the agent to drift and adopt undetected opportunistic behaviour.    
 
8.5.2 ENHANCING RESPECT FOR MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT 
It is apparent that almost half of the municipal councillors and the Provincial 
Treasury participating in the study perceived oversight by multiple principals as 
enhancing the respect for the system of municipal budget oversight and 
accountability.  Both the Provincial Treasury and municipal councillors 
highlighted the independence of the principals, the distance and expertise of the 
Provincial Treasury as enhancing respect for the municipal budget oversight.  
Therefore, this issue of strengthening the legitimacy and credibility of the 
municipal budget oversight is very important, considering the pervasive narrative 
of corruption in municipalities and the need to build public confidence in municipal 
finance.   
 
    
8.5.3 AVAIL ADDITIONAL AND SCARCE EXPERTISE 
Both the municipal managers and the oversight principals in this study identified 
the multiplicity of principals as bringing additional and scarce expertise to 
municipal budget oversight efforts.  Though the municipal managers referred to 
it as complementing oversight capacity, their experience was that multiple 
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principals provide the comprehensive skills, knowledge and energy to municipal 
budget oversight.  This finding is consistent with Ivanova and Roy’s (2007) 
argument that a multiple principals arrangement produces productive overlaps 
that enhance harness the relative expertise and commitments of the principals 
when exercising oversight. Likewise, it supports my view that behaviour of one 
principals in the multiple-principal model design can influence and help others 
learn between approaches and mechanisms for oversight.   
 
Chapter Three of this thesis demonstrated that municipal budget oversight has 
become progressively more complex.  Logically, it requires a variety of and levels 
of skills.  However, the fact that only the Provincial Treasury commands the 
requisite oversight skills and knowledge. Unfortunately, municipal councillors 
require support to participate meaningfully in municipal budget oversight 
processes.  Therefore, the need for and the value of additional and 
complementary oversight support must be understood within the context of weak 
internal oversight.  All participants acknowledged that municipal councillors do 
not have the required budget oversight skills. Municipal councillors themselves 
admitted to having limited or no requisite knowledge and skills to enable them to 
exercise meaningful and effective municipal budget oversight.  
  
The municipal managers indicated that the current oversight processes, 
mechanisms and tools were designed for people with superior technical 
knowledge and competency of municipal processes.    According to the 
participants, oversight is highly technical especially for the municipal councillors 
and the executive mayor.  Participants indicated that municipal councillors are 
unable to use the monitoring tools such as the Service Delivery and Budget 
Implementation plans, as well as performance management reports and the 
regular municipal financial reports. 
     
Therefore, most of the participants indicated that the Provincial Treasury 
exercises an intelligence driven municipal budget oversight.   The qualitative 
expressions and impressions from the Provincial Treasury and the municipal 
managers indicated that the Provincial Treasury engages with reports and 
collected data from their regular meetings with municipalities.  According to these 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
189 
 
participants, data is analysed meticulously from these different sources.  The 
Provincial Treasury gathers relevant, accurate and reliable data on the budget 
preparation, approval, implementation and auditing.   Logically, the data-focused 
process described above can be described as intelligence driven municipal 
budget oversight.  This process is understandably complex and highly technical.      
 
Thus, the involvement of the Provincial Treasury is perceived by most 
participants as adding value to the municipal budget oversight.  Its expertise is 
recognised by most of the participants, including the municipal managers.  In 
fact, municipal councillors themselves credit the role played by the Provincial 
Treasury for receiving clean audit outcomes.  Some councillors, especially from 
the DA, claimed that coordination, integration and cooperation was necessary.  
This assertion concurs with O’Toole’s (1990: 397) observation that: 
“[T]he dominant theoretical and practical impulses in the field of 
public administration have long been toward organisational 
integration, the benefits of non-duplicative structures, the value of 
efficiency and advantages of smooth, nearly frictionless action”.             
 
Participants also indicated that the oversight approach between the municipal 
councillors and the Provincial Treasury was critical in sharing extensive municipal 
budget oversight burden.  Participants, especially municipal councillors indicated 
that it would be impossible for them to exercise municipal budget oversight alone.  
Thus, the partnership with the Provincial Treasury is critical in lessening the costs 
and time required to exercising municipal budget oversight.       
       
8.5.3 PROMOTES THE RELIABILITY OF THE MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT 
SYSTEM 
The findings in this study showed that multiple promote reliability of oversight.  
The Provincial Treasury was adamant that its independence and capacity was 
significant in preventing total failure of finance in municipalities in instances 
where the municipal councillors fail to exercise oversight.   Some councillors also 
acknowledged that the involvement of the Provincial Treasury in exercising 
oversight on various stages of the municipal budget process is useful in closing 
the oversight gaps and failures of the internal principals. 
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The ability to close oversight gaps was referred to as “redundancy” in chapter 
two of this study.  Often, redundancy is seen as wasted effort that must be 
avoided at all costs.  However, the findings of this study suggest that redundancy 
is a valuable feature for reducing the uncertainty for oversight. The use of 
redundancy in this study is consistent with Prado’s (2011) conception which 
explain it as a systematic bypass by another unit of the organisation to perform 
the same function independently and parallel to pre-existing ones.  
 
The Provincial Treasury often overrides the budget oversight decisions of 
municipal councillors.  Participants acknowledged that though it is a sensitive 
issue, it does have a positive effect on the system municipal budget oversight. 
As indicated already that oversight by multiple principals can possibly result in 
one principal closing the oversight gaps when one of some principals abdicating 
their oversight obligations. Also related to the reliability of the oversight was the 
ability of the Provincial Treasury to override municipal councillors as a positive 
effect of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  The participants 
explained that the ability to override enables the Provincial Treasury to continue 
executing its oversight roles and responsibilities when the municipal councils and 
the executive mayors fail to exercise effective and meaningful oversight.  
  
However, there were municipal councillors who were uncomfortable with the 
involvement of the Provincial Treasury.  These councillors felt that the ability of 
the Provincial Treasury should not be used to annex the power of the municipal 
council and councillors to exercise municipal budget oversight.  To these 
councillors, the Provincial Treasury has the tendency to exploit its role to its 
benefit and relegate the municipal council out of its rightful place.    Participants’ 
views concur with literature that advocates for multiple principals as being both 
more effective and comparatively more advantageous than a single oversight 
principal.  The advantage of the model and behaviour of municipal budget 
oversight principals’ lies in its amenability to disperse the oversight authority in a 
manner that is able to harness the strengths of different jurisdictions of 
government.     
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The importance of this finding is that it provides an understanding regarding why 
the constitutive behaviour of the multiple principals reflects their different 
influences and motives.  This finding is also critical in describing why different 
principals adopt different approaches in their oversight endeavours.  
Furthermore, the finding has significant value in developing an understanding as 
to why behaviour of municipal budget oversight principals during the different 
stages of the budget process is often conflict-ridden, and lacks uniformity and 
consistency.    
 
8.6 NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT BY 
MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS 
It was mentioned in Chapter Two of this study that, despite its commendable 
advantages, the multiple-principal model and constative environment have 
inherent considerable negative effects on oversight.  This study question 
explored the negative experiences and perception of municipal managers, 
Provincial Treasury and municipal councillors of the negative effects of municipal 
budget oversight by multiple principals.  Five themes in these findings were 
constructed from the thematic analysis of the narrative descriptions of municipal 
managers and oversight principals.  The findings are discussed below. 
 
8.6.1 CONFLICTING RELATIONSHIPS IN MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT  
Participants described their individual experiences of the negative effects of 
municipal budget oversight by multiple principals, all the participants mentioned 
conflict between the municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury.  All 
participants often made reference to construct and practice of the municipal 
budget oversight by multiple principals as conflictual.  In addition, participants 
mentioned that the usual political party rivalry permeated their municipal budget 
oversight activities.  They also indicated that the practice of oversight by multiple 
principals entails conflict among the municipal councillors themselves, their 
respective municipal managers and between the municipal council and the 
Provincial Treasury as well as municipal managers.  According to the 
participants, the conflict is experienced due to the contestations for control and 
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protection of the municipal manager.  Equally, participants indicated that conflicts 
arise because of political parties during the municipal budget process.  
       
It is therefore a finding of this study that the practice of oversight by multiple 
principals during the municipal budget process is manifestly conflictual.  In terms 
of this finding, the municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury are engaged 
in power struggle for control of the municipal managers.  This power struggle 
inevitably leads to tensions and conflict among the principals – and neither does 
it leave the municipal manager unaffected.  
          
This finding highlights how conflict should be understood and appreciated as a 
key aspect of the practice of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  
In other words, conflict defines the nature of the relationship between the 
principals:  it will be impossible for municipal budget oversight by multiple 
principals to avoid conflict.  Evidence from this study indicates that some 
municipal councillors from the Democratic Alliance perceive the municipal budget 
oversight as a political tactic used by the African National Congress (ANC) as the 
opposition party to make itself relevant in the Western Cape.  Equally, it indicated 
a perception held by number of participating municipal councillors from the 
Democratic Alliance that municipal budget oversight provides the ANC and other 
smaller opposition parties with an opportunity to score political points on the 
Democratic Alliance’s administration.  
   
The significance of this finding is that various perceptions prevailing in the 
municipality are likely to impact negatively on cohesiveness of municipal 
councillors.  Consequently, some oversight principals will experience opposition 
and possible blocking of meaningful municipal budget oversight from other 
principals.  
 
8.6.2 CONFUSION RESULTING FROM COMPLEXITY  
In describing their understanding, experiences and perceptions of the negative 
effects of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals, all the participants 
referred to the issue of confusion.  Confusion during the municipal budget 
process was explained as an outcome of different players involved in the same 
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game but using different rules and having diverse objectives.  In this regard, both 
the oversight principals and the municipal managers articulated some degree of 
confusion as their experience of municipal budget oversight by multiple 
principals.   
         
Benz (2007) describes the issue of confusion as a manifestation of complexity.  
Benz (2007) argues that an oversight arrangement that has multiple principals 
can be complex and challenging, particularly for the single agent.  Similarly, Di 
John (2008) explains confusion as an outcome of different sets of rules of the 
game, which are often contradictory but coexist in the same territory, putting 
principals and agents in a complex situation.  Consequently, the competing 
individualised oversight actions, preferences and behaviour among the different 
principals can exacerbate an already existing complexity of the municipal budget 
oversight process to the point of paralyzing the system itself. 
   
Most of the participants acknowledged that budget oversight by multiple 
principals, is invariably complex and problematic.  Participants felt that, in an 
environment where there are multiple of oversight principals, each principal 
expects the municipal manager to behave in a particular way.  Thus, the 
municipal manager is forced to continuously mutate its behaviour depending on 
the principal it is dealing with.  Unavoidably, this results in a complex and 
problematic oversight arrangement for the municipal manager.   
 
The finding is that the nature of oversight by multiple principals is complex.  This 
is because of the simultaneous, parallel, conflicting and uncoordinated budget 
oversight activities of the municipal council, the executive mayor and Provincial 
Treasury.  In addition, the possibility of involving different political parties and 
structures in contested issues such as the municipal budget is understandably 
complex.  This complexity as experienced mostly by municipal managers results 
from being subjected to different powers, attitudes and values of multiple political 
oversight principals.  
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The issue of complexity in the multiple-principal model and the constitutive 
behaviour of multiple principals is well articulated in literature.  According to Di 
John (2008) complexity is inevitable in an oversight practice governed by 
different sets of rules, contradictory strategies and objectives.  While the 
participants pointed out that they are struggling to deal with this complexity, they 
also appreciated that it is a consequence of legislative design and prescriptions.  
 
Therefore, complexity in the context of these findings does not suggest that the 
practice of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals is defective.  On the 
contrary, complexity in this instance explains the existence of perpetual tension 
between structures involved in a shared oversight space.  As indicated in Chapter 
Two, the multiplicity of oversight principals can occasion a complex, elaborate 
and sophisticated oversight arrangement.  Therefore, this elaborate architecture 
has the potential to create confusion on municipal budget oversight.  Thus, the 
issue of complexity highlights the intricate nature of the practice of oversight 
when multiple political oversight principals are involved.  It is an understandable 
manifestation of the dispersion of oversight authority to many budget 
independent principals. 
  
In addition, the finding on confusion and related complexity of the model and 
behaviour of multiple oversight principals as it relates to municipal managers is 
consistent with the concept of multiple accountability disorder (MAD) as 
discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis.  The concept of MAD describes a 
pathology that results from an agent accounting to different and conflicting 
principals (Koppell, 2005).  It indicated that MAD could have negative effect on 
the agent.     
         
8.6.3 LACK OF COORDINATION  
Lack of coordination of the budget oversight measures and activities of the 
municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury was also described as either 
manifesting or creating a situation where there is no information sharing among 
these oversight principals.  As Hill and Jones (1992) indicate, in an oversight 
arrangement by multiple principals, a situation is created where one or some 
principals are likely to passively rely on other principals to gather information from 
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the agent (Hill and Jones, 1992).  Accordingly the ability of the Provincial 
Treasury to collect but not share information with municipal councillors was one 
of the issues mentioned mostly by municipal councillors.  The concern was that 
the Provincial Treasury was communicating more with, and providing  information 
and feedback to, municipal managers rather than the municipal councillors.  
  
The issue of information sharing was highlighted in Chapter Two as lifeblood of 
oversight involving multiple principals.  It was indicated that without an 
institutional system of ensuring that adequate, reliable, relevant and accurate 
information is shared among the oversight principals, the model and the practice 
is likely to present challenges to both the principals and the administrative agent.  
Accordingly, the inability of the Provincial Treasury and the municipal councillors 
to share information has negative effects on municipal budget oversight.  
Particularly, this inability results in principals requesting the same information 
from the municipal manager, resulting in excessive oversight.  
   
As Wilson (1989) found, when the uncoordinated and unsynchronised demands 
and sharing of information is highly detrimental to effective oversight.  Similarly, 
the FFC (2014) has highlighted that lack of sharing of information among the 
principals results in the excessiveness of municipal budget oversight by multiple 
principals.  Inevitably, the cumulative negative effect of this model and practice 
of municipal budget oversight impose an administrative burden on municipal 
managers.  
     
Acknowledging the negative effects of the lack of coordination arising out of the 
model and practice of budget oversight by multiple principals, participants made 
reference to the blame shifting among the municipal councillors themselves, as 
well as the Provincial Treasury.  The participants indicated that the uncoordinated 
efforts of oversight principals has led to the ruling party in the municipal council 
being blamed for not being interested in exercising budget oversight and 
frustrating the efforts of other councillors who genuinely attempting to exercise 
budget oversight on the municipal manager. This view is similar to what Sobol 
(2015) refers to as “pathological delegation”.  Pathological delegation is defined 
as a situation that makes the agent unable to perform due to the multiplicity of 
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uncoordinated and overlapping delegation.  Thomson (2007) attributes this 
problem of pathological delegation to possible preference heterogeneity among 
principals.  According to Thomson (2007: 6), when principals “lack unity and 
delegate contradictory and confusing signals to the agent”, this creates 
uncertainty about delegation.  
    
Accordingly, the municipal managers were the most disadvantaged by lack of 
coordination and its manifestations of lack of information sharing and blame 
shifting among the oversight principals.  Evidently, municipal manager as the 
administrative agents are affected by warring political oversight principals.  It is 
therefore, inevitable that the productivity of municipal managers is not left 
unaffected.       
 
8.6.4 RELEGATION OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS IN THE BUDGET OVERSIGHT 
SPACE  
Municipal councillors experienced and perceived municipal budget oversight by 
multiple principals as encouraging their relegation to the periphery of the 
municipal budget oversight space.  The municipal councillors feel emasculated 
by the Provincial Treasury.  According to the majority the municipal councillors, 
the Provincial Treasury has annexed to itself the authority to exercise municipal 
budget oversight.  Municipal councillors believed that the Provincial Treasury has 
monopolised the oversight space and systematically, relegated the municipal 
councillors to insignificant subordinate status in the budget oversight landscape.   
 
These experiences and perceptions are inconsistent with the constitutional 
design and the relationship between the municipality and the provincial 
government.  In particular, the relationship between the municipality and the 
provincial government should be non-hierarchical (Steytler, 2005).  In addition, 
the experiences and perceptions contradict the Prado et al (2015) description of 
the multiple-principal model and arrangement as institutional layering that 
introduces additional oversight principals’ measures without substituting or 
replace the existing ones irrespective of the ineffectiveness.   
This finding also contradicts consistent conclusions in literature, which identifies 
and accentuates the municipal council as the primary principal and the ultimate 
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custodian and authority holder of public finance.  In addition to being the 
legitimate representatives of the community, the municipal council is the 
decision-maker, the delegating authority, the overseer of the executive and 
administration and the local tax authority (Section 11 (1) of the Municipal 
Systems Act).   This bequeaths the municipal council with the foremost and 
highest decision-making authority of the municipality.  Admittedly, these powers 
and authority elevate and confirm the supremacy of the municipal council over 
other structures of the municipality, including the municipal manager.   
 
8.5 CONCLUSION  
This chapter discussed the experiences and perceptions of the Provincial 
Treasury, municipal managers and municipal councillors of the multiple-principal 
model, the principals’ constitutive behaviour and effects on municipal budget 
oversight.  The discussions highlighted the difference among the municipal 
budget oversight principals.  More significantly, it brought to the surface the 
political contestations among the municipal budget oversight principals.  The 
discussion demonstrates that the multiple-principal model and the principals’ 
constitutive behaviour and effects have given rise to perception of undue 
dominance of the Provincial Treasury in the municipal budget oversight 
processes.  Therefore, the municipal councillors feel and believe that though they 
are the public representatives who ought to be the primary authority and 
conspicuous budget oversight actors, their role has been expropriated by the 
Provincial Treasury.   On balance however some form of “supervised autonomy” 
might need to be considered. 
  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
198 
 
CHAPTER 9:  CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
As indicated in Chapter One, the burden of improving municipal financial 
accountability in South Africa requires an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals operating at 
various scales. A focus on multiple principals and scales has been relatively 
neglected in the literature although this is crucial for understanding the substance 
of democracy and accountability to citizens who are the ultimate principals. To 
achieve this understanding, I investigated the on-the-ground experiences and 
perceptions of the Provincial Treasury, municipal managers and municipal 
councillors in order to get beyond the formal manifestations of municipal budget 
oversight.  One of the key objectives of the study was to gain a better grasp of 
the organisational and political intricacies of the oversight model for municipal 
budgets within a wider context.  A qualitative investigation and analysis of the 
subjective experiences, senses of relative power, and perceptions of the 
principals and agents within South Africa’s intergovernmental framework was 
undertaken.   This final chapter considers the wider scholarly and policy 
implications of key findings of this research.   
     
9.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
To understand municipal budget oversight requires an investigation of the 
institutional architecture and its dialectical nature of relationships and interactions 
between and among the municipal budget actors and their context.  Accordingly, 
the following objectives were used to guide the study:    
 To review the literature on the concept of oversight by multiple principals 
and to develop a rigorous conceptual and theoretical framework for 
understanding issues around budget oversight.   
 To conduct an analytical legislative review with the aim of exploring the 
assumptions behind the relevant legislative provisions that establish and 
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facilitate the multiple principals for municipal budget oversight in South 
Africa.  
 To describe the governance context and peculiarities that influence 
municipal budget oversight in the Western Cape Province.     
 Conduct interviews to shed light on how municipal managers and 
oversight principals in selected municipalities in the Western Cape 
experience and perceive the multiple principals ’model, its manifestations, 
dynamics and effects when exercising municipal budget oversight on the 
municipal budget process.  
 To identify areas of further research on municipal budget oversight by 
multiple principals.    
 
To realise the above objectives, the study was anchored on the principal-agent 
theory. The position advanced by the study is that municipal budget oversight is 
institutionalised and implemented through a principal-agent relationship between 
the municipal manager as the administrative agent and the political structures, 
as principals.  The principal-agent theory was deemed appropriate considering 
the combative nature of the budget oversight relationship between the political 
structures and the municipal managers during the municipal budget process.  
Fundamentally, and quite significant for this study, the theoretical framework was 
recalibrated to respond to the context of the municipal fiscal governance that 
establishes multiple budget oversight.  Accordingly, the multiple principal-agent 
frameworks was used to reflect the multiplicity of political oversight structures 
exercising oversight on the municipal manager during the municipal budget 
process. (Gailmard, 2010).   
 
The study makes a contribution to the more in-depth, broader and contextual 
understanding of municipal budget oversight. Previous research on municipal 
budget oversight did not elevate the element of multiple oversight principals and 
their individual behaviour towards the municipal managers and themselves.  As 
I will show in this chapter, findings of the study suggest the existence of a 
multiplicity of principals, independence of principals when engaging with the 
municipal manager, concurrency of oversight measures and heterogeneity of 
oversight efforts, during the different stages of the budget process.   
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9.3 THE MULTIPLE-PRINCIPAL MODEL  
Three key findings include; firstly, that there are very different understandings of 
municipal budget oversight and respective roles of different players; and 
secondly, specific roles of political oversight principals; and thirdly, the authority 
of municipal budget oversight principals i.e. councillors.    
 
9.3.1 DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT 
A considerable amount of studies have shown that oversight and accountability 
are predisposed to be understood from different orientations, such as legal, 
professional, democratic and political accountability (Bovens (2007).  Similarly, 
this study also showed distinct variations in terms of how key budget actors 
interviewed for the study understanding of municipal budget oversight.  The 
findings show that participants on the study understand and perceived the 
rationale for municipal budget oversight differently.   
 
The study has highlighted that municipal managers and Provincial Treasury 
official understand and perceive municipal budget oversight as a process of 
formal legal compliance.  On the other hand, municipal councillors perceive 
municipal budget oversight as a tool and process for monitoring the substance, 
extent and quality of service delivery to citizens.   Accordingly, the study found 
that participants’ views and understanding of municipal budget oversight were 
divided between political imperatives (such as re-election and service delivery) 
and legal logic.  These perennial tensions reflect the biases between expertise 
and political legitimacy; between technical-rationality and the political rationality. 
The finding regarding different understandings of the municipal budget oversight 
confirms an assertion made in chapter one of this study regarding the polarised 
debates around municipal budget oversight.  In particular, the participants 
differed in terms of the rationale for oversight.   Essentially, the findings indicate 
the importance of understanding the lack of congruence between the political 
orientation of municipal councillors which perceive municipal budget oversight as 
a means and instrument to achieve good governance and that of the Provincial 
treasury which focuses on municipal budget oversight as compliance and an end 
in itself.      
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9.3.2 MULTIPLE OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS  
The study has contributed to the existing literature on the concept and theory of 
municipal budget oversight.  Previous studies of municipal budget oversight 
focused on the internal committees of the municipal council as oversight 
principals.  This constitutes a misrepresentation of the actual municipal budget 
oversight as other important oversight players are located in different spheres of 
government.        
 
Unsurprisingly, the study confirmed that municipal budget oversight in South 
Africa is exercised by a multiplicity of political structures located in local, 
provincial and national spheres of government.   Therefore, the municipal budget 
oversight actors displayed an awareness of which structures are involved in 
municipal budget oversight.  This finding implies the attempts to underplay the 
role of multiple principals in municipal budget oversight risks empirical and 
analytical distortions.  Therefore, this highlights that it is important to note that to 
understand the notion and model of the municipal budget by multiple principals, 
it is useful to acknowledge and appreciate the omnipresence of the multiple 
principals.                  
 
As established in chapter three of this thesis, the conventional single principal-
single agent framework presents a theoretical dilemma for explaining the 
relationship between the municipal manager as the agent and the multiple 
oversight principals.  The municipal budget oversight model instigated by the 
Constitution and the MFMA required an appropriate theory, which could explicate 
nuanced understanding of the dynamics and peculiarities of the web of complex 
relationships between the municipal manager and the oversight principals and 
the between the principal themselves.   
 
Accordingly, the need to reconfigure and modify the principal-agent theory to 
multiple principal-agent theory was justified by the realisation that the single 
principal-single agent theory is in some case not contextually appropriate to 
address the obtaining complexities and dynamics.  Against this background, the 
study gravitated towards the multiple-principal model in order to capture the 
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governance architecture of contemporary South Africa and its related complex 
municipal budget oversight dynamics.      
Quite significantly, the study showed that the criticism of the model of municipal 
budget oversight by multiple principals was futile, as the model is a significant 
feature of the architecture of the governance of South Africa.  In particular, the 
model is a manifestation of the intergovernmental fiscal relations which 
prescribes the budget oversight supervision by various political structures 
located in different jurisdictions of government.  Thus, the model with its 
multiplicity is legitimate irrespective of the criticism directed at it.   
 
Notably, the study emphasised the number and diversity of the budget oversight 
principals showing the complexity of the governance architecture, which entails 
the involvement of a number of jurisdictions or scales in municipal budget 
governance and oversight.  The multiplicity of political principals exercising 
oversight on the municipal budget undermines the dominant trend in the scholarly 
literature that identifies the municipal council as the only oversight principal.  
 
The paradoxical nature of this finding as it applies to the municipal budget 
oversight in the Western Cape municipalities is that the municipal council is the 
official political oversight principal that has an explicit contract with the municipal 
manager (Section 57 (1) (a) of the Municipal System Act).  But the puzzling issue 
is that the provincial government, especially, the Provincial Treasury, which does 
not have an explicit employment contract with municipal managers, is authorised 
by various legislative provisions to also exercise budget oversight on the 
municipality, particularly the municipal manager.   
 
This finding broadened the scope of the investigation to include oversight 
relationships that exist without clear contract and hierarchy.  It highlights the 
ability of legislation in this context, the MFMA to create a principal-agent 
relationship with employment control.  As the study shows, in the case of the 
provincial government, an oversight relationship is established without it being 
the principal directly involved in the appointment of – or having the authority to 
sanction – the municipal manager as the agent.   
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9.3.3 BUDGET OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY OF OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS 
Fundamentally, the study found that there is shared oversight authority over the 
municipal manager which is created through the executive mayor, the municipal 
councillors and the Provincial Treasury.   Most of the participants acknowledged 
that multiple principals are involved in the municipal budget oversight and the 
council is only one player.  What is becoming clearer is that the multiple-principal 
model creates an opportunity for different oversight principals to exercise the 
nature of power and authority they are each capable of.  From the literature and 
interviews, it could be inferred that the municipal councillors are more 
comfortable with exercising legitimate power and authority over the municipal 
manager in relation to their ward level constituents.  On the other hand, the 
Provincial Treasury seemed to be vastly much better than municipal councillors 
regarding expertise in financial and accounting matters.       
 
Quite notably, most municipal councillors perceived the Provincial Treasury as 
having too much authority, and that this was undermining and threatening the 
role and political legitimacy of the municipal councillors.  The councillors 
indicated that the Provincial Treasury behaves as if municipalities are under 
provincial intervention as contemplated by Section 139 of the Constitution.  
According to participants, the Provincial Treasury has de facto usurped the 
municipal budget process of municipalities instead of providing support.  
 
In my view, the issue of final authority in the Western Cape needs to be 
recalibrated so that support and usurpation are clarified. In other words, 
councillors should not feel their role is meaningless and that there councillors 
need to be more fully capacitated.   
 
Therefore, the study noted that there is a vast difference in terms of the budget 
oversight authority being dispersed to the different principals. This thesis dispels 
the assumption that principals in the multiple-principal model have the same 
power and influence and cooperate.  In fact, the study refutes Venter’s (1999) 
argument that local government and other spheres of government interlock as 
equals.  However, the notion of interlocking as equals is informed by the 
constitutional principle of interrelatedness and the fact that local government 
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derives its powers and functions directly from the Constitution, which suggests 
that no hierarchy between these spheres, the supervision roles of provincial and 
national spheres of government effectively changes this understanding.  
Therefore, this research suggests the notion of supervised autonomy is more 
appropriate to describe the de facto oversight authority of different oversight 
principals.  And thus, the constitutional framework which emphases equality 
between the different spheres of government might have to be revisited.     
 
What this study demonstrated is that official budget oversight legal authority does 
not automatically translate into de facto influence. Therefore, it is important to 
acknowledge and concede that the Provincial Treasury is exceptionally dominant 
in the municipal budget oversight space.  These councillors believed that the 
manner in which the Provincial Treasury exercised its municipal budget authority 
was promoting hierarchy and subordination of municipal council and councillors.  
 
An important insight concerning the dominance of the Provincial Treasury in 
municipal budget oversight processes suggests that the oversight authority has 
migrated from the local political structure to the bureaucracy in the Provincial 
Treasury.  This study indicates that the migration of oversight authority might 
galvanise appropriate budget oversight skills not available in the municipal 
council. And, while such skills and powers are essential to mitigate possible risk 
and drift from the legality and rationality of municipal budget process, it runs 
counter to the official idea that power rests with elected councillors and local 
communities.  
 
Transferring oversight authority to the Provincial Treasury is perceived as 
hollowing out the municipal council of its relevance and significance in directing 
the administration of the municipal budget.  This finding has not been adequately 
examined by local governance scholarship. In particular, there is a feeling that 
the pervasive – and invasive – involvement of the Provincial Treasury in the 
municipal budget processes has become more than what it is envisaged: as the 
requisite support and monitoring but has evolved into total control by the 
Provincial Treasury.  Accordingly, the available literature has not adequately 
explored and described the provincial role that is similar to an intervention, 
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consistent with the legislative provisions contemplated in section 139 of the 
Constitution.  
 
9.3.4 RELATIONSHIPS AMONG OVERSIGHT PRINCIPALS  
Participants experience and perceive the relationships between the municipal 
councillors and the Provincial Treasury in terms of how they each exercise their 
authority as “unstructured”.  This finding reaffirms that there is no requirement for 
consent or consensus among the principals.  As shown in the study, the nature 
of the relationship among the municipal councillors themselves and between 
municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury is usually very hostile and 
combative due to different political affiliations.  Consequently, a significant finding 
of the study is that the relationship between the municipal budget oversight 
principals cannot be deemed to be apolitical.  In fact, it was clear from the study 
that the DA councillors have an affinity for and tolerance of the involvement of 
the Provincial Treasury - an “outsider” for ANC councillors.  Similarly, the DA 
councillors seemed to be more tolerant and deferential to the Provincial Treasury. 
 
This PhD found that the principal-agent theory problem of goal conflict and 
political drift is not only confined to the relationship between the budget principals 
and the municipal manager as the agent but also appears to be prevalent among 
the principals themselves.  In this regard, the principal-agent theory helps in 
explaining the deviation, drifting and redundancy among the municipal budget 
oversight principals.  
 
In addition, these findings demonstrated that the primary strength of the multiple 
principal-agent theory lies in its ability to explain the various political structures 
and their mechanisms when exercising oversight on the municipal manager, 
which, radically transform the traditional agency relationship akin to a single 
principal and a single agent.  In this way, it is possible to understand the political 
machinations involved in municipal budget oversight. Similarly, it enabled the 
creation of the link between the municipal budget oversight model and the multi-
spheres governance architecture of South Africa.   
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9.4 MANIFESTATIONS, DYNAMICS OF MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT 
BY MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS  
 
The exploration of the distinctive dynamics of the model and practice is central 
to developing an in-depth understanding of municipal budget oversight by 
multiple principals.  Accordingly, I discovered independent political agendas; 
different oversight approaches, measures and activities; fragmentation; anarchy; 
redundancy and information asymmetry to be key characteristics in the dynamics 
of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals in the Western Cape.    
 
9.4.1 DIFFERENT POLITICAL AGENDAS FOR MUNICIPAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT 
The study made an important observation regarding the different political 
agendas on municipal budget oversight.  Participants indicated that the 
Provincial Treasury and different political structures in the municipality adopt and 
pursue different political agendas to exercise oversight during the different 
stages of the municipal budget process.  The different political agendas between 
the Provincial Treasury and the municipal political structures highlights the 
interplay of scale and the territorial contestations during the municipal budget 
process. In addition, different political agendas bring to the fore political 
contradictions, ideology, and territoriality for the ultimate control of the municipal 
budget.   
  
This understanding confirms a concern of public administration regarding the 
multiplicity of oversight principals.  There is an acknowledgement among 
scholars that even though oversight problems and failures are often 
conceptualised as collective actions, they are actually an aggregate result of 
political agenda and behaviours of individual oversight principals.  Consequently, 
it is inappropriate to assume that the municipal council/councillors share the 
same political agenda in the oversight of the municipal budget.   
 
Furthermore, the finding on the differences in the political agendas of oversight 
principals implies the lack of a common set of institutional values guiding the 
activities among them on the exercise of municipal budget oversight.  
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Accordingly, this study has highlighted the lack of common values among the 
oversight principals as inherent manifestation. While it is understood and 
expected that there will often be a lack of common values between the municipal 
managers as administrative agent and the oversight principals, it is taken for 
granted that the principal will address this problem with more oversight.  
However, research and literature are yet to pay attention to lack of common 
values among the oversight principals.  
 
9.4.2 DIFFERENT OVERSIGHT APPROACHES AND ACTIVITIES 
The second finding highlighted that the oversight principals adopt different 
approaches to exercise oversight on the municipal budget process.  The study 
found that while some principals focus on being proactive in ensuring that 
municipal managers comply, other principals are more reactive and focus more 
on ex-post oversight.  This finding is consistent with an environment when the 
principals have different motivations and capacity.  In this regard, the municipal 
councillors tend to be reactive because of their limited capacity to detect 
problems from monthly data provided in regular financial reports.   
       
Similarly, the municipal managers interviewed for this study believed the 
municipal councillors and the Provincial Treasury employ different measures and 
activities to exercise oversight during the municipal budget process.  This 
indicates that each principal within a multiplicity model exercises extensive 
independence when designing own oversight measures that are consistent with 
their political mandate and capacity.   
 
 9.4.3 FRAGMENTATION OF BUDGET OVERSIGHT   
The study exposed that fragmentation as a prominent feature of municipal budget 
oversight by multiple principals.  As I noted in Chapter 7 of this thesis, confusion 
was considered by many participants as one of the abiding realities and features 
of the governance system of a multiplicity of principals.  The principals agreed 
that in the oversight space it is not clear who has the authority to do what.  
However, this study considers fragmentation as a constructive division and 
demobilisation of negative forces that obstruct the effective exercise of oversight.  
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Participants experienced fragmentation due to overlapping, sharing oversight 
authority and duplication among the oversight principal.  
Evidently, the model of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals, 
fragmentation of efforts and measures of oversight among the political principals 
result in inevitable contradictions, competition and productive conflict. Similarly, 
fragmentation provides a constructive division and demobilisation of against 
negative forces that obstruct the effective exercise of oversight.  This discovery 
refutes common-sense advocacy for a collective model that emphasises 
cohesiveness among oversight principals, especially among the Provincial 
Treasury and the municipal councillors (Malan, 2005).   
 
The relevance of fragmentation in the municipal budget oversight has not 
received research attention.  Current research creates an impression of 
collaboration and mutual coexistence among the municipal budget oversight 
players as more appropriate (Van Niekerk, 2015).  However, my study indicated 
that fragmentation is healthy in that it disrupts the tendency to monopolise 
oversight authority.  Similarly, fragmentation limits the narrow notion of a federal 
or unitary dichotomy but responds to a governance architecture that is embedded 
within a multi-jurisdictional character.  Fundamentally, this finding aligns with an 
assertion made in Chapter Two of the study that the proliferation of oversight 
principals is the reality of modern government especially those like South Africa 
with a multi-sphere governance architecture.   
 
 9.4.4 ANARCHY  
Expectedly, municipal managers described the multiple-principal model and its 
application as chaotic.  This description is consistent with Schillemans (2010) 
characterisation of multiple-principal model as a pathology and a disorder.  The 
description highlights that different oversight principals expect distinct and 
diverse behaviour from municipal managers.  The study showed that while the 
Provincial Treasury is obsessed with procedural compliance, municipal 
councillors, on the other hand, insist on better outcomes related to service 
delivery.  In this regard, the municipal managers are caught between stools: they 
need to find a way to effectively juggle the political/service delivery outcomes and 
procedural compliance.     
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The study demonstrated that irrespective of the legitimacy of the model of 
oversight by multiple principals, the municipal managers perceived the effects to 
have a negative consequence.  While the municipal managers describe the effect 
of the model of oversight by multiple principals as creating “complexity”, the 
principals perceived this complexity as bordering on anarchy.   
     
The empirical finding of this study is combining local autonomy, and light 
supervision will produce anarchy.  In this regards, this study refutes the 
conventional wisdom that municipal budget oversight should be a predictable 
and orderly process involving common interests, values and political rationalities.  
On the contrary, this finding shows how the necessity of a chaotic web of explicit 
and implicit interactions among the municipal budget oversight actors is actually 
good for effective municipal budget oversight.   This accords with a more robust 
notion of democracy as an agonistic process where disagreement and 
pluralisation is valorised (Mouffe 2000).  
 
9.4.4 REDUNDANCY  
The study pointed to constant dissonance in the discourse between coordination 
and “redundancy”.   Notably, most authors – including those used in the literature 
review for this thesis such as Steytler (2005) (Malan (2005); and Tapscott (2000) 
emphasise the need for coordination between the different oversight scalar 
jurisdictions.  These authors refer to redundancy negatively as an antithesis of 
the required integration and coordination.  Generally, experts in public 
administration and governance are critical of a number of governance structures 
operating in the same space.  Competition and overlap inherent in redundancy 
are criticised as contributing to inefficiencies of government.   
 
However, my finding is quite the opposite: in fact “redundancy” is a meaningful 
factor in improving municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.   Meaning 
that, when the Provincial Treasury and the municipal councillors conduct their 
oversight independently, they are able to pick up each other's blind spots.  
Equally, redundancy allows different oversight principals to deploy different 
oversight measures where and when the other principals fail to do so.  In this 
regard, redundancy should be understood as a positive system attribute rather 
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than a destructive and costly exercise.  As pointed out by the provincial official 
“Our involvement provides an additional pair of eyes on what is happening with 
the finances of the municipality” and this suggests that having “outsiders” 
involved provides additional and useful checks and balances.   
 
Most importantly, redundancy allows the Provincial Treasury to intervene rapidly 
when failure or lapses in municipal budget oversight occur.  This suggests that 
the design of multiple oversight principals creates a deliberate model that 
enables one of the oversight principals to observe and when necessary, take 
over from the principals that are unable to exercise its oversight responsibility. In 
fact, most councillors interviewed in this study openly acknowledged their own 
limitations and begrudgingly accepted the role of the province.  
 
9.4.5 Information Asymmetry 
The study showed that the problem of information asymmetry among the 
municipal councillors is not about the lack of availability of information, but more 
about the inability of some principals to interpret technical financial data 
contained in financial reports.   Notably, the Provincial Treasury has the benefit 
of utilising the officials with the requisite expertise to engage and interpret 
municipal budget and financial reports, while the majority of municipal councillors 
do not have the capacity and support.  Consequently, the inability of the 
municipal councillors to interrogate budget related reports perpetuates their 
ineffectiveness, which in turn promotes their relegation to minor status by the 
municipal managers and the Provincial Treasury officials.     
     
In terms of the above, it is difficult to determine from the finding of the study 
whether the multiplicity of oversight principals results in the functional paralysis 
of municipalities.  While practitioner-based organisations such as SALGA have 
indicated that virulence of multiple oversight principals and their associated 
measures, the study acknowledges the negative effects but does not confirm and 
support this view entirely.   
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9.5 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY  
The sample employed for this study was small, but this is a function of the study 
aims, which were to explore in depth processes rather than make mathematical 
extrapolations.  However, it is important to consider that the aim of the study was 
to understand municipal budget oversight by multiple principals by exploring the 
individual experiences and perceptions of municipal managers, Provincial 
Treasury and municipal councillors.  Accordingly, the study neither makes claims 
of representativeness of the sample, nor of the generalisability of the findings.  I 
was also aware that the Western Cape Province has its own political peculiarities 
mechanisms and dynamics pertaining to municipal budget oversight – and thus, 
the issues obtaining in this province may not be applicable in other provinces.  
However, the multiplicity of oversight processes and political pluralisation 
processes in the Western Cape have deepened democracy.  
       
Secondly, the municipal governance system and its related processes and 
mechanisms are rigidly prescribed by law.  Hence, research of municipal budget 
oversight is overwhelmingly eclipsed within a legal framework.  Although the 
study unavoidably gravitated toward the legal predispositions, it has also critically 
engaged the legal framework.  
 
9.5 RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH   
The study has provided some understanding of the dynamic, complex 
phenomenon such as the municipal oversight by multiple principals.  However, 
the findings of this study provide a basis from which to pursue future research on 
municipal budget oversight.  Accordingly, this study proposes three areas for 
future research on municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  These 
areas focus on the design, behaviour and effects of municipal budget oversight 
principals. 
 
Exploratory studies by their very nature examine critical assumptions and issues 
and unearth topics for further research.  Thus, in the process of writing this thesis, 
numerous questions have emerged.  These questions may merit further 
research.  Of these numerous questions, the study identified areas that, based 
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on the new knowledge acquired in this study, deserve particular attention and 
may be appropriate to further research.   
  
While the findings of this study have provided valuable and rich views and 
perceptions of municipal managers, Provincial Treasury and municipal 
councillors from the Western Cape Province municipalities, on municipal budget 
oversight by multiple principals, additional studies from other provinces will 
provide more insights.  
 
This study used only the principal-agent theory as an explanatory framework to 
explain the notion of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  In 
reflecting on the results of the study, theories such as stakeholder theory, 
institutional theory and stewardship theory could be considered for future 
research on municipal budget oversight by multiple principals. 
 
Lastly, this study focused on the municipal managers as bureaucratic agents in 
the municipal budget oversight relationship.  It is suggested that future research 
should explore the perceptions of political oversight principals regarding 
municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.  This exploration could also 
provide a perspective that will contribute to developing a better understanding of 
the phenomenon of municipal budget oversight by multiple principals.   
           
It is important to note that the findings on the model, behaviour and effects of 
municipal budget oversight principals do not indicate its efficacy and 
effectiveness (or otherwise).  Notably, this finding provides only an 
understanding of the model, behaviour and effects of multiple principals involved 
in municipal budget oversight, from the perceptive of municipal managers. The 
Western Cape is a significant laboratory for improving multiple oversight in South 
Africa. Finally, this study recommends that a careful rethinking of co-operative 
intergovernmentalism in SA is long overdue.   
 
The study, through both the literature and empirical data, explored and described 
the functional principle behind the oversight of municipal budget by multiple 
principals.  The study provided both the description and the analytical nuances 
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of the institutional model, behaviour and effects of multiple oversight principals 
involved in municipal budget oversight. Through interrogating the experience and 
perceptions of municipal managers, municipal councillors and Provincial 
Treasury of the principals’ model, and their constitutive behaviour and effects on 
the municipal budget oversight.   
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APPENDIX 3:   
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE PROVINCIAL TREASURY AND 
MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS 
 
Question 1: Municipal Budget Oversight Multiple-Principal Model 
1. Describe your understanding of municipal budget oversight.   
2. Who according to your experience exercises municipal budget oversight? 
3. What is your perception about how budget oversight is structured? 
4. What is your view regarding the number of structures exercising oversight on 
the municipal budget? 
5. Describe these oversight relationships with municipal manager? 
6. What is your opinion of these oversight relationships? 
 
Question 2:  Manifestations, dynamics of multiple oversight on the Municipal 
Budget Oversight  
7. How do you exercise oversight on the municipal budget process? 
8. Describe your experience of how other oversight principals exercise oversight 
on the municipal budget process. 
9. What in your view makes the exercise municipal budget oversight the way it 
is? 
10. What do other principals do? 
11. What is your feeling about what other principals do when exercising oversight 
on the different stages of the municipal budget process? 
12. What makes you different from other municipal budget oversight principals? 
13. What are looking for (your focus) when you exercise oversight on the 
municipal budget? 
14. Describe your experience of exercising municipal budget oversight activities. 
15. What do you think about the budget oversight activities of other principals? 
 
Question 3:  The positive and negative effects of Budget Oversight by Multiple 
Principals  
Positive Effects 
16 What is value of these principals on municipal budge oversight?  
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17 What would you list as positive effects of the multiplicity of oversight 
principals? 
18 What make you think these promote effective municipal budget oversight?   
Negative Effects  
19 What would you list as negative effects of the multiplicity of oversight 
principals? 
20 Describe your experiences of the negative effect of the municipal budget 
oversight by multiple principals. 
21 How do you think these affect oversight on the municipal budget oversight  
  
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MUNICIPAL MANAGERS  
 
Question 1:  Municipal budget oversight by the multiple-principal model? 
1.  What is your understanding of municipal budget oversight? 
2. What is your experience of municipal budget oversight? 
3. Who are the structures exercising oversight on the municipal budget 
process? 
4. How would you describe these oversight principals? 
5. What is your perception regarding being overseen by these number of 
oversight principals? 
6. What is common and different about the budget oversight principals? 
Question 2:  Manifestations, dynamics of multiple oversight on the Municipal 
Budget Oversight 
7. Describe your experience of what happens during the oversight of the 
drafting, approval, implementation and auditing of the municipal budget 
process.  
8. What is the nature of relationships and engagement between the oversight 
principals?  
9. How do feel about the manner in which these principals behave during the 
different stages of municipal budget process? 
 
Question 3:  Positive effects of Oversight by multiple principals  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
257 
 
10. What would you list as positive effects of the multiplicity of oversight 
principals? 
11. What is the value of these principals on municipal budge oversight?  
12. What make you think these promote effective municipal budget 
oversight? 
Negative Effects  
13. What would you list as negative effects of the multiplicity of oversight 
principals? 
14. Describe your experiences of the negative effect of the municipal budget 
oversight by multiple principals. 
15. How do you think these affect oversight on the municipal budget?   
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